Michael McKenna (mckenna-m)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Clarke, Randolph, McKenna, Michael and Smith, Angela M., eds. 2015a. The Nature of Moral Responsibility. New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199998074.001.0001.
Clarke, Randolph, McKenna, Michael and Smith, Angela M. 2015b. “Introduction.” in The Nature of Moral Responsibility. New Essays, edited by Randolph Clarke, Michael McKenna, and Angela M. Smith, pp. 1–16. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199998074.001.0001.
Haji, Isthiyaque and McKenna, Michael. 2004. “Dialectical Difficulties in the Debate about Freedom and Alternative Possibilities.” The Journal of Philosophy 101(6): 299–314, doi:10.5840/jphil2004101616.
Haji, Isthiyaque and McKenna, Michael. 2006. “Defending Frankfurt’s Argument in Deterministic Contexts: A Reply to Palmer (2005).” The Journal of Philosophy 103(7): 363–372, doi:10.5840/jphil2006103715.
Haji, Isthiyaque and McKenna, Michael. 2011. “Disabling Levy’s Frankfurt-Style Enabling Cases.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92(3): 400–414.
Levy, Neil and McKenna, Michael. 2007. “Symposium on Free Will and Luck.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 10(2): 151–152.
McKenna, Michael. 2000. “Assessing Reasons – Responsive Compatibilism.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8(1): 89–114.
McKenna, Michael. 2001a. “Review of Fischer and Ravizza (1998).” The Journal of Philosophy 98(2): 93–100.
McKenna, Michael. 2001b. “Source Incompatibilism, Ultimacy, and the Transfer of Non-Responsibility.” American Philosophical Quarterly 38(1): 37–51.
McKenna, Michael. 2002. “Review of Mele (1995).” The Philosophical Review 111(4): 612–615.
McKenna, Michael. 2004a. “Responsibility and Globally Manipulated Agents.” Philosophical Topics 32(1–2): 169–192.
McKenna, Michael. 2004b. “Compatibilism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2004/entries/compatibilism/.
McKenna, Michael. 2005a. “Where Frankfurt and Strawson Meet.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29: Free Will and Moral Responsibility, edited by Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 163–180. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.
McKenna, Michael. 2005b. “Reasons Reactivity and Incompatibilist Intuitions.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 8(2): 131–143.
McKenna, Michael. 2005c. “The Relationship between Autonomous and Morally Responsible Agency.” in Personal Autonomy. New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy, edited by James Stacey Taylor, pp. 205–234. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McKenna, Michael. 2006. “Collective Responsibility and an Agent Meaning Theory.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30: Shared Intentions and Collective Responsibility, edited by Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 16–34. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.
McKenna, Michael. 2008a. “Saying Good-Bye to the Direct Argument the Right Way.” The Philosophical Review 117(3): 349–383.
McKenna, Michael. 2008b. “Putting the Lie on the Control Condition for Moral Responsibility.” Philosophical Studies 139(1): 29–37.
McKenna, Michael. 2008c. “A Hard-line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-Case Manipulation Argument.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77(1): 142–159.
McKenna, Michael. 2009a. “Recent Work on Free Will and Moral Responsibility.” Philosophy Compass 4(1): 96–133.
McKenna, Michael. 2009b. “Compatibilism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/compatibilism/.
McKenna, Michael. 2009c. “Compatibilism & Desert: Critical Comments on ‘Four Views on Free Will’ .” Philosophical Studies 144(1): 3–13.
McKenna, Michael. 2011. “Contemporary Compatibilism: Mesh Theories and Reasons-Responsive Theories.” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, edited by Robert H. Kane, 2nd ed., pp. 175–198. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press. First edition: Kane (2002), doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.001.0001.
McKenna, Michael. 2012a. Conversation and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199740031.001.0001.
McKenna, Michael. 2012b. “Defending Nonhistorical Compatibilism: A Reply to Haji and Cuypers.” in Philosophical Issues 22: Action Theory, edited by Ernest Sosa, Enrique Villanueva, and Berit Brogaard, pp. 264–280. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
McKenna, Michael. 2013a. “Source Compatibilism and That Pesky Ability to Do Otherwise: Comments on Dana Nelkin’s Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility.” Philosophical Studies 163(1): 105–116.
McKenna, Michael. 2013b. “Reasons-Responsiveness, Agents, and Mechanisms.” in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, volume I, edited by David W. Shoemaker, pp. 151–183. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199694853.001.0001.
McKenna, Michael. 2014a. “The Metaphysical Importance of the Compatibility Question: Comments on Mark Balaguer’s Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem.” Philosophical Studies 169(1): 39–50.
McKenna, Michael. 2014b. “Defending Conversation and Responsibility: Reply to Dana Nelkin and Holly Smith.” Philosophical Studies 171(1): 73–84.
McKenna, Michael. 2015. “In Defense of a Challenge to Moral Responsability Skepticism: A Reply to Levy.” in Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility, edited by Andrei A. Buckareff, Carlos J. Moya, and Sergi Rosell, pp. 204–206. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
McKenna, Michael. 2019. “Watsonian Compatibilism.” in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Themes from the Philosophy of Gary Watson, volume V, edited by D. Justin Coates and Neal A. Tognazzini, pp. 5–37. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198830238.001.0001.
McKenna, Michael. 2023. “A Timid Response to the Consequence Argument.” in Philosophical Issues 33: The Philosophy of Action, edited by Michael McKenna and Carolina Sartorio, pp. 155–169. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12250.
McKenna, Michael and Coates, D. Justin. 2015. “Compatibilism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/compatibilism/.
McKenna, Michael and Coates, D. Justin. 2019. “Compatibilism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/compatibilism/.
McKenna, Michael and Coates, D. Justin. 2024. “Compatibilism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2024/entries/compatibilism/.
McKenna, Michael and Sartorio, Carolina, eds. 2023. Philosophical Issues 33: The Philosophy of Action. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
McKenna, Michael and Schoelandt, Chad van. 2015. “Crossing a Mesh Theory with a Reasons-Responsive Theory: Unholy Spawn of an Impending Apocalypse or Love Child a New Dawn?” in Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility, edited by Andrei A. Buckareff, Carlos J. Moya, and Sergi Rosell, pp. 44–64. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Warmke, Brandon, Nelkin, Dana Kay and McKenna, Michael, eds. 2021. Forgiveness and Its Moral Dimensions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780190602147.001.0001.

Further References

Fischer, John Martin and Ravizza, Mark. 1998. Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511814594.
Mele, Alfred R. 1995. Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195150430.001.0001.
Palmer, David D. 2005. “New Distinctions, Same Troubles: A Reply to Haji and McKenna (2004).” The Journal of Philosophy 102(9): 474–482, doi:10.5840/jphil2005102934.