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Jesper Kallestrup (kallestrup)

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Bibliography

    Carter, J. Adam, Clark, Andy, Kallestrup, Jesper, Palermos, Spyridon Orestis and Pritchard, Duncan, eds. 2018a. Socially Extended Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198801764.001.0001.
    Carter, J. Adam, Clark, Andy, Kallestrup, Jesper, Palermos, Spyridon Orestis and Pritchard, Duncan, eds. 2018b. Extended Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198769811.001.0001.
    Carter, J. Adam, Clark, Andy, Kallestrup, Jesper, Palermos, Spyridon Orestis and Pritchard, Duncan. 2018c. “Introduction.” in Socially Extended Epistemology, edited by J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, Spyridon Orestis Palermos, and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 1–10. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198801764.001.0001.
    Carter, J. Adam, Kallestrup, Jesper, Palermos, Spyridon Orestis and Pritchard, Duncan. 2014. “Varieties of Externalism.” in Philosophical Issues 24: Extended Knowledge, edited by Jesper Kallestrup and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 63–109. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Christensen, Jonas and Kallestrup, Jesper. 2012. “Counterfactuals and Downward Causation: A Reply to Zhong (2012).” Analysis 72(3): 513–517.
    Hohwy, Jakob and Kallestrup, Jesper, eds. 2008a. Being Reduced. New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211531.001.0001.
    Hohwy, Jakob and Kallestrup, Jesper. 2008b. “Introduction.” in Being Reduced. New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation, edited by Jakob Hohwy and Jesper Kallestrup, pp. 1–19. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211531.001.0001.
    Kallestrup, Jesper. 2003. “Paradoxes About Belief.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81(1): 107–117.
    Kallestrup, Jesper. 2005. “Contextualism Between Scepticism and Common-Sense.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 69: 247–266. “Epistemological Contextualism,” ed. by Martijn Blaauw.
    Kallestrup, Jesper. 2006a. “Physicalism, Conceivability and Strong Necessities.” Synthese 151(2): 273–295.
    Kallestrup, Jesper. 2006b. “Epistemological Physicalism and the Knowledge Argument.” American Philosophical Quarterly 43(1): 1–23.
    Kallestrup, Jesper. 2006c. “The Causal Exclusion Argument.” Philosophical Studies 131(2): 459–485.
    Kallestrup, Jesper. 2007. “If Omniscient Beings are Dialetheists, Then so are Anti-Realists.” Analysis 67(3): 252–254.
    Kallestrup, Jesper. 2008. “Three Strands in Kripke’s Argument against the Identity Theory.” Philosophy Compass 3(6): 1255–1280.
    Kallestrup, Jesper. 2009a. “Critical Notice of Récanati (2007).” Analysis 69(2): 347–352.
    Kallestrup, Jesper. 2009b. “Reliabilist Justification: Basic, Easy, and Brute.” Acta Analytica 24(3): 155–171.
    Kallestrup, Jesper. 2009c. “Knowledge-wh and the Problem of Convergent Knowledge.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78(2): 468–476.
    Kallestrup, Jesper. 2011a. Semantic Externalism. London: Routledge.
    Kallestrup, Jesper. 2011b. “Recent Work on McKinsey’s Paradox.” Analysis 71(1): 157–171.
    Kallestrup, Jesper. 2012a. “Actually-Rigidified Descriptivism Revisited.” Dialectica 66(1): 5–21.
    Kallestrup, Jesper. 2012b. “Bootstrap and Rollback: Generalizing Epistemic Circularity.” Synthese 189(2): 395–413.
    Kallestrup, Jesper. 2013. “No Bare Knowledge.” Logique et Analyse 56(223): 333–345.
    Kallestrup, Jesper. 2015. “Two Notions of Circularity.” Inquiry 58(5): 486–512.
    Kallestrup, Jesper. 2016. “Brains in Vats, Causal Constraints on Reference and Semantic Externalism.” in The Brain in a Vat, edited by Sanford C. Goldberg, pp. 37–53. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781107706965.
    Kallestrup, Jesper and Pritchard, Duncan. 2012. “Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Anti-Individualism.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93: 84–103.
    Kallestrup, Jesper and Pritchard, Duncan. 2013a. “Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Dependence.” in Knowledge, Virtue, and Action. Essays on Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work, edited by Tim Henning and David P. Schweikard, pp. 209–226. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy n. 51. London: Routledge.
    Kallestrup, Jesper and Pritchard, Duncan. 2013b. “The Power, and Limitations, of Virtue Epistemology.” in Powers and Capacities in Philosophy. The New Aristotelianism, edited by John Greco and Ruth Groff, pp. 248–269. London: Routledge.
    Kallestrup, Jesper and Pritchard, Duncan. 2014a. “Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth.” European Journal of Philosophy 22(3): 335–357.
    Kallestrup, Jesper and Pritchard, Duncan, eds. 2014b. Philosophical Issues 24: Extended Knowledge. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Kallestrup, Jesper and Pritchard, Duncan. 2016a. “From Epistemic Anti-Individualism to Intellectual Humility.” Res Philosophica 93(3): 533–552.
    Kallestrup, Jesper and Pritchard, Duncan. 2016b. “Dispositional Robust Virtue Epistemology versus Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.” in Performance Epistemology. Foundations and Applications, edited by Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas, pp. 31–50. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746942.001.0001.
    Kallestrup, Jesper and Pritchard, Duncan. 2017. “Epistemic Supervenience, Anti-Individualism, and Knowledge-First Epistemology.” in Knowledge First. Approaches in Epistemology and Mind, edited by J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon, and Benjamin W. Jarvis, pp. 200–222. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198716310.001.0001.
    Pedersen, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding and Kallestrup, Jesper. 2013. “The Epistemology of Absence-Based Inference.” Synthese 190(13): 2573–2593.
    Pritchard, Duncan and Kallestrup, Jesper. 2004. “An Argument for the Inconsistency of Content Externalism and Epistemic Internalism.” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 31(3–4): 345–354.
    Sprevak, Mark and Kallestrup, Jesper, eds. 2014a. New Waves in Philosophy of Mind. New Waves in Philosophy. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
    Sprevak, Mark and Kallestrup, Jesper. 2014b. “Entangled Externalisms.” in New Waves in Philosophy of Mind, edited by Mark Sprevak and Jesper Kallestrup, pp. 77–97. New Waves in Philosophy. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Further References