Stephen Kearns (kearns-s)
Zitiert in den folgenden Artikeln
Circular Paths and Infinite Descent: a Guide, Responsibility First: How to Resist Agnosticism about Moral ResponsibilityBeiträge zu Philosophie.ch
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Bibliography
Kearns, Stephen. 2007. “In Praise of Folly: A Reply to Blome-Tillmann (2007).” Analysis 67(3): 219–222.
Kearns, Stephen. 2008. “Compatibilism Can Resist Prepunishment: A Reply to Smilansky (2007).” Analysis 68(3): 250–253.
Kearns, Stephen. 2011a. “Responsibility for Necessities.” Philosophical Studies 155(2): 307–324.
Kearns, Stephen. 2011b. “Can a Thing Be Part of Itself?” American Philosophical Quarterly 48(1): 87–96.
Kearns, Stephen. 2012. “Aborting the Zygote Argument.” Philosophical Studies 160(3): 379–389.
Kearns, Stephen. 2017. “Review of Shoemaker (2015).” Analysis 77(4): 869–872.
Kearns, Stephen. 2018. “Reasons, Choices, and Responsibility.” in The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, edited by Daniel Star, pp. 461–484. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.001.0001.
Kearns, Stephen. 2019. “Critical Notice of Keller (2017).” Analysis 79(1): 154–164.
Kearns, Stephen and Magidor, Ofra. 2008. “Epistemicism about Vagueness and Meta-Linguistic Safety.” in Philosophical Perspectives 22: Philosophy of Language, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 277–304. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Kearns, Stephen and Magidor, Ofra. 2012. “Semantic Sovereignty.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85(2): 322–350.
Kearns, Stephen and Star, Daniel. 2009. “Reasons as Evidence.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume IV, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 215–242. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kearns, Stephen and Star, Daniel. 2011. “On Good Advice: A Reply to McNaughton and Rawling (2011).” Analysis 71(3): 506–508.
Kearns, Stephen and Star, Daniel. 2013. “Reasons, Facts-About-Evidence, and Indirect Evidence.” Analytic Philosophy 54(2): 237–243.
Kearns, Stephen and Star, Daniel. 2015. “Weighing Explanations.” in Weighing and Reasoning. Themes from the Philosophy of John Broome, edited by Iwao Hirose and Andrew Reisner, pp. 232–252. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684908.001.0001.
Further References
Blome-Tillmann, Michael. 2007. “The Folly of Trying to Define Knowledge.” Analysis 67(3): 214–219.
Keller, John Adorno, ed. 2017. Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes from the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198715702.001.0001.
McNaughton, David and Rawling, Piers. 2011. “The Making/Evidential Reason Distinction.” Analysis 71(1): 100–102.
Shoemaker, David W. 2015. Responsibility from the Margins. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198715672.001.0001.