Saul Smilansky (smilansky)

Cited in the following articles

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Räikkä, Juha and Smilansky, Saul. 2012. “The Ethics of Alien Attitudes.” The Monist 95(3): 511–532.
Smilansky, Saul. 1994. “Ethical Advantages of Hard Determinism .” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54(1): 355–363, doi:10.2307/2108494.
Smilansky, Saul. 1997. “Preferring Not to Have Been Born.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75: 241–247.
Smilansky, Saul. 2001. “Free Will: From Nature to Illusion.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101: 71–95.
Smilansky, Saul. 2002. “Free Will, Fundamental Dualism, and the Centrality of Illusion.” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, edited by Robert H. Kane, pp. 489–505. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press. Second edition: Kane (2011), doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001.
Smilansky, Saul. 2003a. “Compatibilism: The Argument from Shallowness.” Philosophical Studies 115(3): 257–282.
Smilansky, Saul. 2003b. “Free Will and the Mystery of Modesty.” American Philosophical Quarterly 40(2): 105–117.
Smilansky, Saul. 2005. “Free Will and Respect for Persons.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29: Free Will and Moral Responsibility, edited by Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 248–261. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.
Smilansky, Saul. 2006. “Control, Desert and the Difference between Distributive and Retributive Justice.” Philosophical Studies 131(3): 511–524.
Smilansky, Saul. 2007a. 10 Moral Paradoxes. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9780470696606.
Smilansky, Saul. 2007b. “Determinism and Prepunishment: The Radical Nature of Compatibilism.” Analysis 67(4): 347–349.
Smilansky, Saul. 2008a. “Prepunishment for Compatibilists: A Reply to Kearns (2008).” Analysis 68(3): 254–257.
Smilansky, Saul. 2008b. “More Prepunishment for Compatibilists: A Reply to Beebee (2008).” Analysis 68(3): 260–263.
Smilansky, Saul. 2010. “Free Will : Some Bad News.” in Action, Ethics, and Responsibility, edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and Harry S. Silverstein, pp. 187–202. Topics in Contemporary Philosophy n. 6. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262014731.001.0001.
Smilansky, Saul. 2011. “Free Will, Fundamental Dualism, and the Centrality of Illusion.” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, edited by Robert H. Kane, 2nd ed., pp. 425–441. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press. First edition: Kane (2002), doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.001.0001.
Smilansky, Saul. 2012. “Life is Good [on Benatar (2006)].” South African Journal of Philosophy / Suid-Afrikaanse Tydskrif Vir Wysbegeerte 31(1): 69–78.
Smilansky, Saul. 2013a. “Why Moral Paradoxes Matter? ‘Teflon Immorality’ and the Perversity of Life.” Philosophical Studies 165(1): 229–243.
Smilansky, Saul. 2013b. “Morally, Should We Prefer Never to Have Existed?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91(4): 655–666.
Smilansky, Saul. 2017. “The Nonidentity Problem: United and Unconquered.” in Current Controversies in Bioethics, edited by S. Matthew Liao and Collin O’Neil, pp. 99–114. Current Controversies in Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
Smilansky, Saul. 2018. “Free Will, Understanding, and Justification: Terrorism, Israel, and the Palestinians.” in Ted Honderich on Consciousness, Determinism, and Humanity, edited by Gregg D. Caruso, pp. 291–310. Philosophers in Depth. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Further References

Beebee, Helen. 2008. “Smilansky’s Alleged Refutation of Compatibilism [on Smilansky (2007a)].” Analysis 68(3): 258–260.
Benatar, David. 2006. Better Never to Have Been. The Harm of Coming into Existence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199296422.001.0001.
Kearns, Stephen. 2008. “Compatibilism Can Resist Prepunishment: A Reply to Smilansky (2007a).” Analysis 68(3): 250–253.