Thomas Kelly (kelly-t)

Mentionné.e sur les pages du portail suivantes

Cité.e dans les articles suivants

Contributions à Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Kelly, Thomas. 2002. “The Rationality of Belief and Some Other Propositional Attitudes.” Philosophical Studies 110(2): 163–196.
Kelly, Thomas. 2003. “Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66(3): 612–640.
Kelly, Thomas. 2004. “Sunk Costs, Rationality, and Acting for the Sake of the Past.” Noûs 38(1): 60–85.
Kelly, Thomas. 2005a. “Moorean Facts and Belief Revision, or Can the Skeptic Win?” in Philosophical Perspectives 19: Epistemology, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 179–209. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Kelly, Thomas. 2005b. “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume I, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 167–196. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199285891.003.0007.
Kelly, Thomas. 2006a. “The Cost of Skepticism: Who Pays? [on BonJour and Sosa (2003)].” Philosophical Studies 131(3): 695–712.
Kelly, Thomas. 2006b. “Evidence.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2006/entries/evidence/.
Kelly, Thomas. 2007. “Evidence and Normativity: Reply to Leite (2007).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75(2): 465–474.
Kelly, Thomas. 2008a. “Evidence: Fundamental Concepts and the Phenomenal Conception.” Philosophy Compass 3(5): 933–955.
Kelly, Thomas. 2008b. “Common Sense as Evidence: Against Revisionary Ontology and Skepticism.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32: Truth and its Deformities, edited by Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 53–78. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Kelly, Thomas. 2008c. “Disagreement, Dogmatism, and Belief Polarization.” The Journal of Philosophy 105(10): 611–633.
Kelly, Thomas. 2010. “Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence.” in Disagreement, edited by Richard H. Feldman and Ted A. Warfield, pp. 111–174. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.003.0007.
Kelly, Thomas. 2011a. “Following the Argument where it Leads.” Philosophical Studies 154(1): 105–124.
Kelly, Thomas. 2011b. “Taking Things for Granted: Comments on Harman and Sherman (2011).” Philosophical Studies 156(1): 141–147.
Kelly, Thomas. 2013. “Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment.” in The Epistemology of Disagreement, edited by David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey, pp. 31–53. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698370.001.0001.
Kelly, Thomas. 2014a. “Evidence.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/evidence/.
Kelly, Thomas. 2014b. “Evidence Can Be Permissive.” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa, 2nd ed., pp. 298–311. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup (2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.ch12.
Kelly, Thomas. 2014c. “Quine and Epistemology.” in A Companion to W.v.O. Quine, edited by Gilbert H. Harman and Ernest LePore, pp. 17–37. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118607992.
Kelly, Thomas. 2014d. “Believers as Thermometers.” in The Ethics of Belief, edited by Jonathan D. Matheson and Rico Vitz, pp. 301–314. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686520.001.0001.
Kelly, Thomas. 2016a. “Historical versus Current Time Slice Theories in Epistemology.” in Goldman and His Critics, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin and Hilary Kornblith, pp. 43–68. Philosophers and Their Critics. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
Kelly, Thomas. 2016b. “Disagreement in Philosophy: Its Epistemic Significance.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, edited by Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler, and John Hawthorne, pp. 374–394. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.001.0001.
Kelly, Thomas. 2022. Bias: A Philosophical Study. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192842954.001.0001.
Kelly, Thomas and McGrath, Sarah. 2010. “Is Reflective Equilibrium Enough?” in Philosophical Perspectives 24: Epistemology, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 325–359. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00195.x.
Kelly, Thomas and McGrath, Sarah. 2017. “Are there Any Successful Philosophical Arguments?” in Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes from the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen, edited by John Adorno Keller, pp. 324–341. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198715702.001.0001.
McGrath, Sarah and Kelly, Thomas. 2015. “Soames and Moore on Method in Ethics and Epistemology.” Philosophical Studies 172(6): 1661–1670.

Further References

BonJour, Laurence and Sosa, Ernest. 2003. Epistemic Justification. Great Debates in Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Harman, Gilbert H. and Sherman, Brett. 2011. “Knowledge and Assumptions.” Philosophical Studies 156(1): 131–140.
Leite, Adam. 2007. “Epistemic Instrumentalism and Reasons for Belief: A Reply to Tom Kelly’s ‘Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique’ .” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75(2): 456–464.