Jeanette Kennett (kennett)

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Donovan, Caitrin, Fine, Cordelia and Kennett, Jeanette. 2018. “Reliable and Unreliable Judgements about Reasons.” in The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, edited by Daniel Star, pp. 939–963. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.001.0001.
Gerrans, Philip and Kennett, Jeanette. 2006. “Introduction.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 9(1): 3–12.
Gerrans, Philip and Kennett, Jeanette. 2010. “Neurosentimentalism and Moral Agency.” Mind 119(475): 585–614.
Gerrans, Philip and Kennett, Jeanette. 2017. “Mental Time Travel, Dynamic Evaluation, and Moral Agency.” Mind 126(501): 259–268.
Kennett, Jeanette. 2003. Agency and Responsibility: A Common-Sense Moral Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266302.001.0001.
Kennett, Jeanette. 2006. “Do Psychopaths Really Threaten Moral Rationalism?” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 9(1): 69–82.
Kennett, Jeanette. 2007. “Mental Disorder, Moral Agency, and the Self.” in The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics, edited by Bonnie Steinbock, pp. 90–113. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199562411.001.0001.
Kennett, Jeanette. 2008. “Reasons, Reverence, and Value.” in Moral Psychology, Volume 3. The Neuroscience of Morality. Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, pp. 259–264. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Kennett, Jeanette. 2011. “Introduction: Science and Normative Authority.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 14(3): 229–235.
Kennett, Jeanette. 2015. “What’s Required for Motivation by Principle?” in Motivational Internalism, edited by Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Sixten Strandberg, Ragnar Francén, John Eriksson, and Fredrik Bjorklund, pp. 108–133. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Published under the name “Ragnar Francén Olinder”, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199367955.001.0001.
Kennett, Jeanette. 2017. “Empathy and Psychopathology.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Empathy, edited by Heidi L. Maibom, pp. 364–376. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Kennett, Jeanette. 2019. “Competence, Attributability, and Blame. Resolving the Responsibility of the Psychopath.” in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Themes from the Philosophy of Gary Watson, volume V, edited by D. Justin Coates and Neal A. Tognazzini, pp. 142–164. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198830238.001.0001.
Kennett, Jeanette. 2020. “Review of May (2018).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98(1): 199–201.
Kennett, Jeanette and Fine, Cordelia. 2008a. “Internalism and the Evidence from Psychopaths and ‘Acquired Sociopaths’ .” in Moral Psychology, Volume 3. The Neuroscience of Morality. Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, pp. 173–190. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Kennett, Jeanette and Fine, Cordelia. 2008b. “Could There Be an Empirical Test for Internalism? [response to Roskies (2008) and Smith (2008)].” in Moral Psychology, Volume 3. The Neuroscience of Morality. Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, pp. 217–226. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Kennett, Jeanette and Matthews, Steve. 2008. “Normative Agency.” in Practical Identity and Narrative Agency, edited by Catriona Mackenzie and Kim Atkins, pp. 212–231. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy n. 14. London: Routledge.
Kennett, Jeanette and McConnell, Doug. 2013. “Explaining Addiction: How Far Does the Reward Account of Motivation Take Us?” Inquiry 56(5): 470–489.
Kennett, Jeanette, McConnell, Doug and Snoek, Anke. 2019. “Reactive Attitudes, Relationships, and Addiction.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Science of Addiction, edited by Hanna Pickard and Serge H. Ahmed, pp. 440–452. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Kennett, Jeanette and Smith, Michael A. 1994. “Philosophy and Commonsense: The Case of Weakness of Will.” in Philosophy in Mind: the Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind, edited by Michaelis S. Michael and John Hawthorne, pp. 141–158. Philosophical Studies Series n. 60. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Reprinted in Smith (2004, 56–72).
Kennett, Jeanette and Smith, Michael A. 1996. “Frog and Toad Lose Control.” Analysis 56: 63–73. Reprinted in Smith (2004, 73–83).
Kennett, Jeanette and Wolfendale, Jessica. 2019. “Self-Control and Moral Security.” in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, volume VI, edited by David W. Shoemaker, pp. 33–63. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198845539.001.0001.
Matthews, Steve and Kennett, Jeanette. 2012. “Truth, Lies, and the Narrative Self.” American Philosophical Quarterly 49(4): 310–316.
Wolfendale, Jessica and Kennett, Jeanette, eds. 2011. Fashion: Thinking with Style. Philosophy for Everyone. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444345568.

Further References

May, Joshua. 2018. Regard for Reasons in the Moral Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198811572.001.0001.
Roskies, Adina L. 2008. “Internalism and the Evidence from Pathology.” in Moral Psychology, Volume 3. The Neuroscience of Morality. Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, pp. 191–206. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Smith, Michael A. 2004. Ethics and the A Priori. Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-Ethics. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511606977.
Smith, Michael A. 2008. “The Truth about Internalism.” in Moral Psychology, Volume 3. The Neuroscience of Morality. Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, pp. 207–216. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.