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Joshua May (may-jo)

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Bibliography

    Allen, Timothy and May, Joshua. 2014. Does Opacity Undermine Privileged Access? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22(4): 617–629.
    King, Matt and May, Joshua, eds. 2022. Agency in Mental Disorder: Philosophical Dimensions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198868811.001.0001.
    May, Joshua. 2011. Relational Desires and Empirical Evidence against Psychological Egoism.” European Journal of Philosophy 19(1): 39–58.
    May, Joshua. 2013. Skeptical Hypotheses and Moral Skepticism.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43(3): 341–359.
    May, Joshua. 2014a. Does Disgust Influence Moral Judgment? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92(1): 125–141.
    May, Joshua. 2014b. On the Very Concept of Free Will.” Synthese 191(12): 2849–2866.
    May, Joshua. 2014c. Moral Judgment and Deontology: Empirical Developments.” Philosophy Compass 9(11): 745–755.
    May, Joshua. 2017. Empathy and Intersubjectivity.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Empathy, edited by Heidi L. Maibom, pp. 169–179. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
    May, Joshua. 2018. Regard for Reasons in the Moral Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198811572.001.0001.
    May, Joshua. 2023. Neuroethics: Agency in the Age of Brain Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780197648087.001.0001.
    May, Joshua and Holton, Richard. 2012. What in the World is Weakness of Will? Philosophical Studies 157(3): 341–360.
    May, Joshua and Kumar, Victor. 2019. Moral Reasoning and Emotion.” in The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology, edited by Aaron Z. Zimmerman, Karen Jones, and Mark Timmons, pp. 139–156. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
    May, Joshua, Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, Hull, Jay G. and Zimmerman, Aaron Z. 2010. Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge Attributions: an Empirical Study.” The Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1: 265–273.