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Drew Khlentzos (khlentzos)

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Bibliography

    Forrest, Peter and Khlentzos, Drew. 2000. “Introduction: Truth Maker and Its Variants.” Logique et Analyse 43(169–170): 3–15.
    Khlentzos, Drew. 1988. “Can Deduction Be Justified?” Logique et Analyse 31(123–124): 199–212.
    Khlentzos, Drew. 1989. “Anti-Realism under Mind?” Dialectica 43(4): 315–328.
    Khlentzos, Drew. 1993. “Can a Mental Representation Have a Truth-Condition?” in Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium: Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences, edited by Roberto Casati and Graham White, pp. 251–256. Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Kirchberg am Wechsel: The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
    Khlentzos, Drew. 2000. “ ‘What In the World Could Correspond to Truth?’ .” Logique et Analyse 43(169–170): 109–144.
    Khlentzos, Drew. 2001. “Semantic Challenges to Realism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2001/entries/realism-sem-challenge/.
    Khlentzos, Drew. 2004. “Semantic Challenges to Realism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2004/entries/realism-sem-challenge/.
    Khlentzos, Drew. 2005. Naturalistic Realism and the AntiRealist Challenge. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
    Khlentzos, Drew. 2008. “Moral Realism, Meta-Ethical Pyrrhonism and Naturalism.” in Moral Psychology Today. Essays on Values, Rational Choice, and the Will, edited by David K. Chan, pp. 17–36. Philosophical Studies Series n. 110. Dordrecht: Springer.
    Khlentzos, Drew. 2011. “Challenges to Metaphysical Realism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/realism-sem-challenge/.
    Khlentzos, Drew. 2016a. “Naturalism and the Question of Realism.” in The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism, edited by Kelly James Clark, pp. 150–167. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118657775.
    Khlentzos, Drew. 2016b. “Challenges to Metaphysical Realism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/realism-sem-challenge/.
    Khlentzos, Drew. 2020. “Conceptual Schemes.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism, edited by Martin Kusch, pp. 457–467. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781351052306.
    Khlentzos, Drew. 2021. “Challenges to Metaphysical Realism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/realism-sem-challenge/.