Kein Profilbild | No profile picture | Utilisateur n'as pas d'image
https://philosophie.ch/profil/kiverstein

Julian Kiverstein (kiverstein)

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

No contributions yet

Bibliography

    Basile, Pierfrancesco, Kiverstein, Julian and Phemister, Pauline, eds. 2010a. The Metaphysics of Consciousness. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 67. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Basile, Pierfrancesco, Kiverstein, Julian and Phemister, Pauline. 2010b. Preface.” in The Metaphysics of Consciousness, edited by Pierfrancesco Basile, Julian Kiverstein, and Pauline Phemister, pp. 1–4. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 67. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Clark, Andy, Kiverstein, Julian and Vierkant, Tillmann, eds. 2013a. Decomposing the Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199746996.001.0001.
    Clark, Andy, Kiverstein, Julian and Vierkant, Tillmann. 2013b. Decomposing the Will: Meeting the Zombie Challenge.” in Decomposing the Will, edited by Andy Clark, Julian Kiverstein, and Tillmann Vierkant, pp. 1–32. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199746996.001.0001.
    Kirchhoff, Michael D. and Kiverstein, Julian. 2019. Extended Consciousness and Predictive Processing: A Third Wave View. Routledge Focus on Philosophy. London: Routledge.
    Kiverstein, Julian. 2006. An Enactive Theory of Phenomenal Intentionality.” in Content, Consciousness, and Perception. Essays in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, edited by Ezio Di Nucci and Conor McHugh, pp. 190–211. Newcastle upon Tye: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
    Kiverstein, Julian. 2010. Making Sense of Phenomenal Unity: An Intentionalist Account of Making Sense of Phenomenal Unity: An Intentionalist Account of Temporal Experience.” in The Metaphysics of Consciousness, edited by Pierfrancesco Basile, Julian Kiverstein, and Pauline Phemister, pp. 155–182. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 67. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Kiverstein, Julian. 2011. Social Understanding without Mentalizing.” Philosophical Topics 39(1): 41–65.
    Kiverstein, Julian, ed. 2017a. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
    Kiverstein, Julian. 2017b. Introduction: Sociality and the Human Mind.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind, edited by Julian Kiverstein, pp. 1–16. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
    Kiverstein, Julian. 2020. Embodied Cognition and the Neural Reuse Hypothesis.” in Current Controversies in Philosophy of Cognitive Science, edited by Adam J. Lerner, Simon Cullen, and Sarah-Jane Leslie, pp. 87–107. Current Controversies in Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
    Kiverstein, Julian and Arstila, Valtteri. 2013. Time in Mind.” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Time, edited by Heather Dyke and Adrian Bardon, pp. 444–469. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118522097.
    Kiverstein, Julian, Farina, Mirko and Clark, Andy. 2015. Substituting the Senses.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception, edited by Mohan Matthen, pp. 659–677. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.001.0001.
    Kiverstein, Julian and Rietveld, Erik. 2015. The Primacy of Skilled Intentionality: on Hutto & Satne’s the Natural Origins of Content [on Hutto and Satne (2015)].” Philosophia 43(3): 701–721.
    Kiverstein, Julian and Wheeler, Michael, eds. 2012. Heidegger and Cognitive Science. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Further References

    Hutto, Daniel D. and Satne, Glenda. 2015. The Natural Origins of Content.” Philosophia 43(3): 521–536.