Jonathan L. Kvanvig (kvanvig)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Benton, Matthew A. and Kvanvig, Jonathan L., eds. 2021. Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198849865.001.0001.
Hand, Michael and Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 1999. “Tennant on Knowability.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77: 422–428.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 1984. “Credulism.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16(2): 101–109.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 1986. The Possibility of an All-Knowing God. New Delhi: St. Martin’s Press.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 1989. “Adams on Actualism and Presentism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50: 289–298.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 1993. The Problem of Hell. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 1994. “Review of Walls (1992).” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 36(1): 59–61.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 1995a. “The Knowability Paradox and the Prospects for Anti-Realism.” Noûs 29(4): 481–500.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 1995b. “Coherentists’ Distractions.” Philosophical Topics 23(1): 257–275.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L., ed. 1996a. Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology. Essays in Honor of Plantinga’s Theory of Knowledge. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 1996b. “Plantinga’s Proper Function Account of Warrant.” in Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology. Essays in Honor of Plantinga’s Theory of Knowledge, edited by Jonathan L. Kvanvig, pp. 281–305. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 1998. “Why should Inquiring Minds Want to Know? Meno Problems and Epistemological Axiology.” The Monist 81(3): 426–451.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2000. “Zagzebski on Justification [on Zagzebski (1996)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60(1): 191–196.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2002. “Divine Hiddenness: What Is the Problem?” in Divine Hiddenness, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul K. Moser, pp. 149–163. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2003a. The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2003b. “Heaven and Hell.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2003/entries/heaven-hell/.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2003c. “Propositionalism and the Perspectival Character of Justification.” American Philosophical Quarterly 40(1): 3–17.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2003d. “Simple Reliabilism and Agent Reliabilism [on Greco (2000)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66(2): 451–456.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2003e. “Justification and Proper Basing.” in The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer, edited by Erik J. Olsson, pp. 43–62. Philosophical Studies Series n. 95. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2003f. “Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2003/entries/justep-coherence/.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2004a. “Nozickian Epistemology and the Value of Knowledge.” in Philosophical Issues 14: Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 201–218. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2004b. “Nozickian Epistemology and the Question of Closure.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4(3): 351–364.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2005a. “Truth is Not the Primary Epistemic Goal.” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Matthias Steup, 1st ed., pp. 551–574. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Steup, Turri and Sosa (2014, 352–362).
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2005b. “Knowledge and Truth, the Value of.” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald M. Borchert, 2nd ed. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2006a. The Knowability Paradox. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199282595.001.0001.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2006b. “Closure Principles.” Philosophy Compass 1(3): 256–267.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2006c. “Scientific Naturalism and the Value of Knowledge.” in Knowledge and Reality. Essays in Honor of Alvin Plantinga, edited by Thomas M. Crisp, Matthew Davidson, and David A. Vander Laan, pp. 193–214. Philosophical Studies Series n. 103. Dordrecht: Springer.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2007a. “Two Approaches to Epistemic Defeat.” in Alvin Plantinga, edited by Deane-Peter Baker, pp. 107–124. Contemporary Philosophy in Focus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2007b. “Propositionalism and the Metaphysics of Experience.” in Philosophical Issues 17: The Metaphysics of Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 165–178. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2007c. “Creation and Conservation.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2007/entries/creation-conservation/.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2007d. “Contextualism, Contrastivism, Relevant Alternatives, and Closure.” Philosophical Studies 134(2): 131–140.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L., ed. 2008a. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. vol. I. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2008b. “Pointless Truth.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32: Truth and its Deformities, edited by Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 199–212. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2008c. “Closure and Alternative Possibilities.” in The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism, edited by John Greco, pp. 456–483. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195183214.001.0001.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2008d. “Heaven and Hell.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/heaven-hell/.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L., ed. 2009a. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. vol. II. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2009b. “Restriction Strategies for Knowability: Some Lessons in False Hope.” in, pp. 205–222.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2009c. “The Value of Understanding.” in Epistemic Value, edited by Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 95–111. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.001.0001.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2009d. “Précis of Kvanvig (2003a).” in Epistemic Value, edited by Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 309–312. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.001.0001.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2009e. “Responses to Critics [Greco (2009), Elgin (2009) and Riggs (2009)].” in Epistemic Value, edited by Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 339–352. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.001.0001.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2009f. “Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries.” in Williamson on Knowledge, edited by Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 140–160. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287512.003.0010.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2009g. “Religious Pluralism and the Buridan’s Ass Paradox.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1(1): 1–26.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2009h. “Conservation, Concurrence, and Counterfactuals of Freedom.” in Metaphysics and God. Essays in Honor of Eleonore Stump, edited by Kevin Timpe, pp. 112–126. Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Religion. London: Routledge.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2010a. “The Swamping Problem Redux: Pith and Gist.” in Social Epistemology, edited by Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 89–111. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577477.001.0001.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2010b. “Sosa’s Virtue Epistemology.” Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 42(125): 47–62.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2010c. “Resurrection, Heaven, and Hell.” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Religion, edited by R. Charles Taliaferro, Paul Draper, and Philip L. Quinn, 2nd ed., pp. 630–638. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L., ed. 2011a. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. vol. III. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603213.001.0001.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2011b. “The Rational Significance of Reflective Assent.” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 34–54. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2011c. Destiny and Deliberation. Essays in Philosophical Theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199696574.001.0001.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2011d. “Millar on the Value of Knowledge.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 85: 83–99.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2011e. “Virtue Epistemology.” in The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 199–207. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2011f. “Epistemic Justification.” in The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 25–36. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2011g. “Norms of Assertion.” in Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, edited by Jessica A. Brown and Herman Cappelen, pp. 233–250. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573004.001.0001.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2011h. “Against Pragmatic Encroachment.” Logos & Episteme 2(1): 77–85.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L., ed. 2012a. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. vol. IV. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656417.001.0001.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2012b. “Truth-Tracking and the Value of Knowledge.” in The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology, edited by Kelly Becker and Tim Black, pp. 101–121. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511783630.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2013a. “Affective Theism and People of Faith.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 37: The New Atheism and Its Critics, edited by Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 109–128. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2013b. “Perspectivalism and Reflective Ascent.” in The Epistemology of Disagreement, edited by David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey, pp. 223–242. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698370.001.0001.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2013c. “Curiosity and the Response-Dependent Special Value of Understanding.” in Knowledge, Virtue, and Action. Essays on Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work, edited by Tim Henning and David P. Schweikard, pp. 151–174. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy n. 51. London: Routledge.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2013d. “Theories of Providence and Creation.” Res Philosophica 90(1): 49–67.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L., ed. 2014a. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. vol. V. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198704768.001.0001.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2014b. Rationality and Reflection. How to Think About What to Think. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716419.001.0001.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2014c. “Epistemic Normativity.” in Epistemic Norms. New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion, edited by Clayton Littlejohn and John Turri, pp. 115–134. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660025.001.0001.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2014d. “Coherentism.” in The Bloomsbury Companion to Epistemology, edited by Andrew Cullison, pp. 67–82. Bloomsbury Companions. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L., ed. 2015. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. vol. VI. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722335.001.0001.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L., ed. 2016a. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. vol. VII. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198757702.001.0001.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2016b. “The Idea of Faith as Trust: Lessons in Noncognitivist Approaches to Faith.” in Reason and Faith. Themes from Richard Swinburne, edited by Michael Bergmann and Jeffrey E. Brower, pp. 4–25. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732648.001.0001.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2016c. “Intellectual Humility: Lessons from the Preface Paradox.” Res Philosophica 93(3): 509–532.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L., ed. 2017a. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. vol. VIII. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198806967.001.0001.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2017b. “The Cognitive Dimension of Heavenly Bliss.” in Paradise Understood. New Philosophical Essays about Heaven, edited by T. Ryan Byerly and Eric J. Silverman, pp. 62–77. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2017c. “Lessons from Gettier.” in Explaining Knowledge. New Essays on the Gettier Problem, edited by Rodrigo Martins Borges, Claudio de Almeida, and Peter Klein, pp. 152–168. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198724551.001.0001.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2018a. Faith and Humility. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198809487.001.0001.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2018b. “Knowledge, Understanding, and Reasons for Belief.” in The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, edited by Daniel Star, pp. 685–704. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.001.0001.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2019. “Theoretical Unity in Epistemology.” in Themes from Klein. Knowledge, Scepticism, and Justification, edited by Branden Fitelson, Rodrigo Martins Borges, and Cherie Braden, pp. 39–56. Synthese Library n. 404. Dordrecht: Springer.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2020. Faith and Humility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2021. Depicting Deity. A Metatheological Approach. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192896452.001.0001.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. and McCann, Hugh J. 1988. “Divine Conservation and the Persistence of the World.” in Divine and Human Actions. Essays in the Metaphysics of Theism, edited by Thomas V. Morris, pp. 13–49. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. and Riggs, Wayne D. 1992. “Can a Coherence Theory Appeal to Appearance States?” Philosophical Studies 67: 197–217.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L., Sosa, Ernest and Dancy, Jonathan, eds. 2003. Value of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. and Vander Laan, David A. 2014. “Creation and Conservation.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/creation-conservation/.
McCann, Hugh J. and Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 1991. “The Occasionalist Proselytizer: A Modified Catechism.” in Philosophical Perspectives 5: Philosophy of Religion, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 587–615. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.

Further References

Elgin, Catherine Z. 2009. “Is Understanding Factive? [on Kvanvig (2003a)].” in Epistemic Value, edited by Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 322–330. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.001.0001.
Greco, John. 2000. Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Greco, John. 2009. “The Value Problem [on Kvanvig (2003a)].” in Epistemic Value, edited by Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 313–321. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.001.0001.
Riggs, Wayne D. 2009. “Understanding, Knowledge, and the Meno Requirement [on Kvanvig (2003a)].” in Epistemic Value, edited by Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 331–338. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.001.0001.
Sosa, Ernest and Steup, Matthias, eds. 2005. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. 1st ed. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Steup, Turri and Sosa (2014).
Steup, Matthias, Turri, John and Sosa, Ernest, eds. 2014. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. 2nd ed. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup (2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.
Walls, Jerry L. 1992. Hell: The Logic of Damnation. Library of Religious Philosophy n. 9. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, doi:10.2307/j.ctvpg84qp.
Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus. 1996. Virtues of the Mind. An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781139174763.