John Turri (turri)
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Bibliography
Benton, Matthew A. and Turri, John. 2014. “Iffy Predictions and Proper Expectations.”
Synthese 191(8): 1857–1866.
Blouw, Peter, Buckwalter, Wesley and Turri, John. 2017. “Gettier Cases:
A Taxonomy.” in Explaining
Knowledge. New Essays on the Gettier Problem, edited by
Rodrigo Martins Borges, Claudio de Almeida, and Peter Klein, pp. 242–252. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198724551.001.0001.
Buckwalter, Wesley and Turri, John. 2014. “Telling, Showing and Knowing: A Unified Theory of
Pedagogical Norms.” Analysis 74(1): 16–20.
Buckwalter, Wesley and Turri, John. 2016. “Perceived Weaknesses of Philosophical Inquiry: A
Comparison to Psychology.” Philosophia 44(1):
33–52.
Buckwalter, Wesley and Turri, John. 2020. “Inability and Obligation in Intellectual
Evaluation.” Episteme 17(4): 475–497.
Doucet, Mathieu and Turri, John. 2014. “Non-Psychological Weakness of Will: Self-Control,
Stereotypes, and Consequences.” Synthese 191(16):
3935–3954.
Greco, John, Alfano, Mark and Turri, John. 2017. “Virtue
Epistemology.” in The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The
Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information,
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/epistemology-virtue/.
Greco, John, Alfano, Mark and Turri, John. 2021. “Virtue
Epistemology.” in The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The
Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information,
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/epistemology-virtue/.
Greco, John and Turri, John. 2009. “Virtue
Epistemology.” in The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The
Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information,
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/epistemology-virtue/.
Littlejohn, Clayton and Turri, John, eds. 2014. Epistemic Norms. New Essays on Action, Belief, and
Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660025.001.0001.
McKinnon, Rachel and Turri, John. 2013. “Irksome
Assertions.” Philosophical Studies 166(1):
123–128.
Pritchard, Duncan and Turri, John. 2011. “The Value of Knowledge.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/knowledge-value/.
Pritchard, Duncan and Turri, John. 2014. “The Value of Knowledge.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/knowledge-value/.
Pritchard, Duncan, Turri, John and Carter, J. Adam. 2018. “The Value of Knowledge.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/knowledge-value/.
Pritchard, Duncan, Turri, John and Carter, J. Adam. 2022. “The Value of Knowledge.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/knowledge-value/.
Roeber, Blake, Sosa, Ernest, Steup, Matthias and Turri, John, eds. 2024. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. 3rd ed.
Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3.
Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup
(2005).
Rose, David, Buckwalter, Wesley and Turri, John. 2014. “When Words Speak Louder than Actions: Delusion, Belief,
and the Power of Assertion.” Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 92(4): 683–700.
Steup, Matthias, Turri, John and Sosa, Ernest, eds. 2014. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. 2nd ed.
Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3.
Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup
(2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.
Turri, John. 2009a. “An Infinitist Account of Doxastic
Justification.” Dialectica 63(2): 209–218.
Turri, John. 2009b. “The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons.”
Noûs 43(3): 490–512.
Turri, John. 2010a. “Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act
Contextualism.” The Philosophical Review 119(1):
77–95.
Turri, John. 2010b. “Refutation by Elimination.”
Analysis 70(1): 35–39.
Turri, John. 2010d. “Foundationalism for Modest Infinitists.”
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40(2): 274–284.
Turri, John. 2010e. “Does
Perceiving Entail Knowing?” Theoria 76(3):
197–206.
Turri, John. 2011a. “A New and Improved Argument for a Necessary
Being.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89(2):
357–359.
Turri, John. 2011b. “The Express Knowledge Account of
Assertion.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy
89(1): 37–45.
Turri, John. 2011c. “Manifest
Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved.” Philosophers’
Imprint 11(8).
Turri, John. 2011d. “Believing for a Reason.”
Erkenntnis 74(3): 383–397.
Turri, John. 2011e. “Promises to Keep: Speech Acts and the Value of Reflective
Knowledge.” Logos & Episteme 2(4): 583–590.
Turri, John. 2012a. “A Puzzle about Withholding.” The
Philosophical Quarterly 62(247): 355–364.
Turri, John. 2012b. “Is
Knowledge Justified True Belief?” Synthese
184(3): 247–259.
Turri, John. 2012c. “Doomed to Fail: The Sad Epistemological Fate of
Ontological Arguments.” in Ontological Proofs
Today, edited by Mirosław Szatkowski, pp. 413–422. Philosophische
Analyse / Philosophical Analysis n. 50. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt:
Ontos Verlag.
Turri, John, ed. 2013a. Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest
Sosa. Philosophical Studies Series n. 118.
Dordrecht: Springer.
Turri, John. 2013b. “A Conspicuous Art: Putting Gettier to the
Test.” Philosophers’ Imprint 13(10).
Turri, John. 2013c. “Liberal
Thinking.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy
91(3): 515–533.
Turri, John. 2013d.
“Knowledge Guaranteed.”
Noûs 47(3): 602–612.
Turri, John. 2013f. “Infinitism, Finitude and Normativity.”
Philosophical Studies 163(3): 791–795.
Turri, John. 2013g. “Bi-Level
Virtue Epistemology.” in Virtuous
Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa, edited by John
Turri, pp. 147–164. Philosophical
Studies Series n. 118. Dordrecht: Springer.
Turri, John. 2014a. “Knowledge and Suberogatory Assertion.”
Philosophical Studies 167(3): 557–567.
Turri, John. 2014b. “You
Gotta Believe.” in Epistemic
Norms. New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion, edited
by Clayton Littlejohn and John Turri, pp. 193–200. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660025.001.0001.
Turri, John. 2014c. “The Problem of ESEE Knowledge.”
Ergo 1(4): 101–127.
Turri, John. 2014d. “Linguistic Intuitions in Context: A Defence of
Nonskeptical Pure Invariantism.” in
Intuitions, edited by Anthony Robert Booth and Darrell P. Rowbottom, pp. 165–186. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609192.001.0001.
Turri, John. 2015a. “Knowledge and the Norm of Assertion: A Simple
Test.” Synthese 192(2): 385–392.
Turri, John. 2015b. “Selfless
Assertions: Some Empirical Evidence.” Synthese
192(4): 1221–1233.
Turri, John. 2015c. “Evidence of Factive Norms of Belief and
Decision.” Synthese 192(12): 4009–4030.
Turri, John. 2015d. “An Open and Shut Case: Epistemic Closure in the Manifest
Image.” Philosophers’ Imprint 15(2).
Turri, John. 2015e. “Understanding and the Norm of Explanation.”
Philosophia 43(4): 1171–1175.
Turri, John. 2015f.
“Unreliable Knowledge.” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 90(3): 529–545, doi:10.1111/phpr.12064.
Turri, John. 2015g. “From Virtue Epistemology to Abilism: Theoretical and
Empirical Developments.” in Character. New Directions from Philosophy, Psychology,
and Theology, edited by Christian B. Miller, R. Michael Furr, Angela M. Knobel, and William Fleeson, pp. 315–331. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190204600.003.0015.
Turri, John. 2016a. “A New Paradigm for Epistemology: From Reliabilism to
Abilism.” Ergo 3(8): 189–231, doi:10.3998/ergo.12405314.0003.008.
Turri, John. 2016b. “The Point of Assertion is to Transmit
Knowledge.” Analysis 76(2): 130–136.
Turri, John. 2016c. “Knowledge as Achievement, More or Less.” in
Performance Epistemology. Foundations and
Applications, edited by Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas, pp. 124–135. New York: Oxford
University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746942.003.0008.
Turri, John. 2017a.
“Epistemic Contextualism: An Idle Hypothesis.”
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95(1): 141–156.
Turri, John. 2017b. “Experimental Work on the Norms of
Assertion.” Philosophy Compass 12(7), doi:10.1111/phc3.e12425.
Turri, John. 2017c. “Sustaining Rules: A Model and Application.”
in Knowledge First. Approaches in Epistemology
and Mind, edited by J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon, and Benjamin W. Jarvis, pp. 259–277. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198716310.001.0001.
Turri, John. 2017d. “Knowledge Attributions in Iterated Fake Barn
Cases.” Analysis 77(1): 104–115.
Turri, John. 2017e. “Epistemic Situationism and Cognitive
Ability.” in Epistemic Situationism,
edited by Abrol Fairweather and Mark
Alfano, pp. 158–167. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199688234.003.0009.
Turri, John. 2018a. “The Non-Factive Turn in Epistemology: Some
Hypotheses.” in The Factive Turn
in Epistemology, edited by Veli Mitova, pp. 219–228. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316818992.
Turri, John. 2018b. “Experimental Epistemology and ‘Gettier’
Cases.” in The Gettier Problem,
edited by Stephen Cade Hetherington, pp.
199–217. Classic Philosophical Arguments. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316827413.014.
Turri, John. 2019. “Virtue Epistemology and Abilism on
Knowledge.” in The Routledge
Handbook of Virtue Epistemology, edited by Heather Battaly, pp. 309–316. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London:
Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315712550-26.
Turri, John and Blouw, Peter. 2015. “Excuse Validation: A Study in
Rule-Breaking.” Philosophical Studies 172(3):
615–634.
Turri, John and Buckwalter, Wesley. 2017. “Descartes’s Schism, Locke’s Reunion: Completing the
Pragmatic Turn in Epistemology.” American
Philosophical Quarterly 54(1): 25–45.
Turri, John, Buckwalter, Wesley and Rose, David. 2016. “Actionability
Judgments Cause Knowledge Judgments.” Thought
5(3): 212–222.
Turri, John and Klein, Peter D., eds. 2014. Ad Infinitum. New Essays on Epistemological
Infinitism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609598.001.0001.
Weaver, Sara and Turri, John. 2018. “Personal Identity and Persisting as Many.”
in Oxford Studies in Experimental
Philosophy, volume II, edited by Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe, and Shaun Nichols, pp. 213–242. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198815259.001.0001.
Further References
Sosa, Ernest and Steup, Matthias, eds. 2005. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. 1st ed.
Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3.
Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Steup, Turri and Sosa
(2014).