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John Turri (turri)

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Bibliography

    Benton, Matthew A. and Turri, John. 2014. Iffy Predictions and Proper Expectations.” Synthese 191(8): 1857–1866.
    Blouw, Peter, Buckwalter, Wesley and Turri, John. 2017. Gettier Cases: A Taxonomy.” in Explaining Knowledge. New Essays on the Gettier Problem, edited by Rodrigo Martins Borges, Claudio de Almeida, and Peter Klein, pp. 242–252. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198724551.001.0001.
    Buckwalter, Wesley and Turri, John. 2014. Telling, Showing and Knowing: A Unified Theory of Pedagogical Norms.” Analysis 74(1): 16–20.
    Buckwalter, Wesley and Turri, John. 2016. Perceived Weaknesses of Philosophical Inquiry: A Comparison to Psychology.” Philosophia 44(1): 33–52.
    Buckwalter, Wesley and Turri, John. 2020. Inability and Obligation in Intellectual Evaluation.” Episteme 17(4): 475–497.
    Doucet, Mathieu and Turri, John. 2014. Non-Psychological Weakness of Will: Self-Control, Stereotypes, and Consequences.” Synthese 191(16): 3935–3954.
    Greco, John, Alfano, Mark and Turri, John. 2017. Virtue Epistemology.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/epistemology-virtue/.
    Greco, John, Alfano, Mark and Turri, John. 2021. Virtue Epistemology.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/epistemology-virtue/.
    Greco, John and Turri, John. 2009. Virtue Epistemology.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/epistemology-virtue/.
    Littlejohn, Clayton and Turri, John, eds. 2014. Epistemic Norms. New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660025.001.0001.
    McKinnon, Rachel and Turri, John. 2013. Irksome Assertions.” Philosophical Studies 166(1): 123–128.
    Pritchard, Duncan and Turri, John. 2011. The Value of Knowledge.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/knowledge-value/.
    Pritchard, Duncan and Turri, John. 2014. The Value of Knowledge.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/knowledge-value/.
    Pritchard, Duncan, Turri, John and Carter, J. Adam. 2018. The Value of Knowledge.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/knowledge-value/.
    Pritchard, Duncan, Turri, John and Carter, J. Adam. 2022. The Value of Knowledge.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/knowledge-value/.
    Roeber, Blake, Sosa, Ernest, Steup, Matthias and Turri, John, eds. 2024. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. 3rd ed. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup (2005).
    Rose, David, Buckwalter, Wesley and Turri, John. 2014. When Words Speak Louder than Actions: Delusion, Belief, and the Power of Assertion.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92(4): 683–700.
    Steup, Matthias, Turri, John and Sosa, Ernest, eds. 2014. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. 2nd ed. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup (2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.
    Turri, John. 2009a. An Infinitist Account of Doxastic Justification.” Dialectica 63(2): 209–218.
    Turri, John. 2009b. The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons.” Noûs 43(3): 490–512.
    Turri, John. 2010a. Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act Contextualism.” The Philosophical Review 119(1): 77–95.
    Turri, John. 2010b. Refutation by Elimination.” Analysis 70(1): 35–39.
    Turri, John. 2010c. Prompting Challenges.” Analysis 70(3): 456–462, doi:10.1093/analys/anq027.
    Turri, John. 2010d. Foundationalism for Modest Infinitists.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40(2): 274–284.
    Turri, John. 2010e. Does Perceiving Entail Knowing? Theoria 76(3): 197–206.
    Turri, John. 2011a. A New and Improved Argument for a Necessary Being.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89(2): 357–359.
    Turri, John. 2011b. The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89(1): 37–45.
    Turri, John. 2011c. Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved.” Philosophers’ Imprint 11(8).
    Turri, John. 2011d. Believing for a Reason.” Erkenntnis 74(3): 383–397.
    Turri, John. 2011e. Promises to Keep: Speech Acts and the Value of Reflective Knowledge.” Logos & Episteme 2(4): 583–590.
    Turri, John. 2012a. A Puzzle about Withholding.” The Philosophical Quarterly 62(247): 355–364.
    Turri, John. 2012b. Is Knowledge Justified True Belief? Synthese 184(3): 247–259.
    Turri, John. 2012c. Doomed to Fail: The Sad Epistemological Fate of Ontological Arguments.” in Ontological Proofs Today, edited by Mirosław Szatkowski, pp. 413–422. Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis n. 50. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
    Turri, John, ed. 2013a. Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa. Philosophical Studies Series n. 118. Dordrecht: Springer.
    Turri, John. 2013b. A Conspicuous Art: Putting Gettier to the Test.” Philosophers’ Imprint 13(10).
    Turri, John. 2013c. Liberal Thinking.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91(3): 515–533.
    Turri, John. 2013d. Knowledge Guaranteed.” Noûs 47(3): 602–612.
    Turri, John. 2013e. That’s Outrageous.” Theoria 79(2): 167–171, doi:10.1111/theo.12005.
    Turri, John. 2013f. Infinitism, Finitude and Normativity.” Philosophical Studies 163(3): 791–795.
    Turri, John. 2013g. Bi-Level Virtue Epistemology.” in Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa, edited by John Turri, pp. 147–164. Philosophical Studies Series n. 118. Dordrecht: Springer.
    Turri, John. 2014a. Knowledge and Suberogatory Assertion.” Philosophical Studies 167(3): 557–567.
    Turri, John. 2014b. You Gotta Believe.” in Epistemic Norms. New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion, edited by Clayton Littlejohn and John Turri, pp. 193–200. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660025.001.0001.
    Turri, John. 2014c. The Problem of ESEE Knowledge.” Ergo 1(4): 101–127.
    Turri, John. 2014d. Linguistic Intuitions in Context: A Defence of Nonskeptical Pure Invariantism.” in Intuitions, edited by Anthony Robert Booth and Darrell P. Rowbottom, pp. 165–186. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609192.001.0001.
    Turri, John. 2015a. Knowledge and the Norm of Assertion: A Simple Test.” Synthese 192(2): 385–392.
    Turri, John. 2015b. Selfless Assertions: Some Empirical Evidence.” Synthese 192(4): 1221–1233.
    Turri, John. 2015c. Evidence of Factive Norms of Belief and Decision.” Synthese 192(12): 4009–4030.
    Turri, John. 2015d. An Open and Shut Case: Epistemic Closure in the Manifest Image.” Philosophers’ Imprint 15(2).
    Turri, John. 2015e. Understanding and the Norm of Explanation.” Philosophia 43(4): 1171–1175.
    Turri, John. 2015f. Unreliable Knowledge.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90(3): 529–545, doi:10.1111/phpr.12064.
    Turri, John. 2015g. From Virtue Epistemology to Abilism: Theoretical and Empirical Developments.” in Character. New Directions from Philosophy, Psychology, and Theology, edited by Christian B. Miller, R. Michael Furr, Angela M. Knobel, and William Fleeson, pp. 315–331. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190204600.003.0015.
    Turri, John. 2016a. A New Paradigm for Epistemology: From Reliabilism to Abilism.” Ergo 3(8): 189–231, doi:10.3998/ergo.12405314.0003.008.
    Turri, John. 2016b. The Point of Assertion is to Transmit Knowledge.” Analysis 76(2): 130–136.
    Turri, John. 2016c. Knowledge as Achievement, More or Less.” in Performance Epistemology. Foundations and Applications, edited by Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas, pp. 124–135. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746942.003.0008.
    Turri, John. 2017a. Epistemic Contextualism: An Idle Hypothesis.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95(1): 141–156.
    Turri, John. 2017b. Experimental Work on the Norms of Assertion.” Philosophy Compass 12(7), doi:10.1111/phc3.e12425.
    Turri, John. 2017c. Sustaining Rules: A Model and Application.” in Knowledge First. Approaches in Epistemology and Mind, edited by J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon, and Benjamin W. Jarvis, pp. 259–277. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198716310.001.0001.
    Turri, John. 2017d. Knowledge Attributions in Iterated Fake Barn Cases.” Analysis 77(1): 104–115.
    Turri, John. 2017e. Epistemic Situationism and Cognitive Ability.” in Epistemic Situationism, edited by Abrol Fairweather and Mark Alfano, pp. 158–167. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199688234.003.0009.
    Turri, John. 2018a. The Non-Factive Turn in Epistemology: Some Hypotheses.” in The Factive Turn in Epistemology, edited by Veli Mitova, pp. 219–228. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316818992.
    Turri, John. 2018b. Experimental Epistemology and ‘Gettier’ Cases.” in The Gettier Problem, edited by Stephen Cade Hetherington, pp. 199–217. Classic Philosophical Arguments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316827413.014.
    Turri, John. 2019. Virtue Epistemology and Abilism on Knowledge.” in The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology, edited by Heather Battaly, pp. 309–316. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315712550-26.
    Turri, John and Blouw, Peter. 2015. Excuse Validation: A Study in Rule-Breaking.” Philosophical Studies 172(3): 615–634.
    Turri, John and Buckwalter, Wesley. 2017. Descartes’s Schism, Locke’s Reunion: Completing the Pragmatic Turn in Epistemology.” American Philosophical Quarterly 54(1): 25–45.
    Turri, John, Buckwalter, Wesley and Rose, David. 2016. Actionability Judgments Cause Knowledge Judgments.” Thought 5(3): 212–222.
    Turri, John and Klein, Peter D., eds. 2014. Ad Infinitum. New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609598.001.0001.
    Weaver, Sara and Turri, John. 2018. Personal Identity and Persisting as Many.” in Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, volume II, edited by Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe, and Shaun Nichols, pp. 213–242. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198815259.001.0001.

Further References

    Sosa, Ernest and Steup, Matthias, eds. 2005. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. 1st ed. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Steup, Turri and Sosa (2014).