Marc Lange (lange-m)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Lange, Marc. 1992. “Armstrong and Dretske on the Explanatory Power of Regularities.” Analysis 52: 154–159.
Lange, Marc. 1994a. “Dispositions and Scientific Explanation.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75: 108–132.
Lange, Marc. 1994b. “Earman on the Projectibility of Grue.” in PSA 1994: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Part I: Contributed Papers, edited by David L. Hull, Micky Forbes, and Richard M. Burian, pp. 87–95. East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association.
Lange, Marc. 1994c. “Scientific Realism and Components: The Case of Classical Astronomy.” The Monist 77(1): 111–127.
Lange, Marc. 1999a. “Calibration and the Epistemological Role of Bayesian Conditionalization.” The Journal of Philosophy 96(6): 294–324.
Lange, Marc. 1999b. “Laws, Counterfactuals, Stability, and Degrees of Likelihood.” Philosophy of Science 66(2): 243–267.
Lange, Marc. 2000. Natural Laws in Scientific Practice. New York: Oxford University Press.
Lange, Marc. 2001. “The Most Famous Equation.” The Journal of Philosophy 98(5): 219–238.
Lange, Marc. 2002. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Physics. Locality, Fields, Energy and Mass. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Lange, Marc. 2003. “Baseball, Pessimistic Inductions and the Turnover Fallacy.” Analysis 62(4): 281–285.
Lange, Marc. 2004a. “The Autonomy of Functional Biology: A Reply to Rosenberg.” Biology and Philosophy 19(1): 93–109.
Lange, Marc. 2004b. “A Note on Scientific Essentialism, Laws of Nature, and Counterfactual Conditionals.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82(2): 227–241.
Lange, Marc. 2004c. “Review Essay on Friedman (1999).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68(2): 702–712.
Lange, Marc. 2005a. “A Counterfactual Analysis of the Concepts of Logical Truth and Necessity.” Philosophical Studies 125(3): 277–303.
Lange, Marc. 2005b. “Reply to Ellis (2005) and Handfield (2005) on Essentialism, Laws, and Counterfactuals.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83(4): 581–588.
Lange, Marc. 2005c. “Laws and Their Stability.” Synthese 144(3): 415–432.
Lange, Marc. 2005d. “How can Instantaneous Velocity Fulfill Its Causal Role?” The Philosophical Review 114(4): 433–468.
Lange, Marc. 2005e. “Classical Mechanics, Philosophy of.” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald M. Borchert, 2nd ed. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Lange, Marc. 2005f. “Energy [Addendum].” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald M. Borchert, 2nd ed. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Lange, Marc. 2005g. “Laws, Scientific.” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald M. Borchert, 2nd ed. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Lange, Marc. 2005h. “A Lower Complexity Bound for Propositional Dynamic Logic with Intersection.” in Advances in Modal Logic, volume V, edited by Renate A. Schmidt, Ian Pratt-Hartmann, Mark A. Reynolds, and Heinrich Theodor Wansing, pp. 133–147. London: King’s College Publications.
Lange, Marc. 2006a. “Do Chances Receive Equal Treatment Under the Laws? Or: Must Chances Be Probabilities?” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57(2): 383–403.
Lange, Marc. 2006b. “Farewell to Laws of Nature? [Review of Mumford (2004)].” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 37(2): 361–369.
Lange, Marc. 2007. “The End of Diseases.” Philosophical Topics 35(1–2): 265–292.
Lange, Marc. 2008a. “Why Contingent Facts Cannot Necessities Make.” Analysis 68(2): 120–128.
Lange, Marc. 2008b. “Laws of nature.” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science, edited by Stathis Psillos and Martin Curd, pp. 203–212. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Lange, Marc. 2008c. “Laws and Theories.” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Biology, edited by Sahotra Sarkar and Anya Plutynski, pp. 489–505. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9780470696590.
Lange, Marc. 2009a. Laws and Lawmakers. Science, Metaphysics, and the Laws of Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195328134.001.0001.
Lange, Marc. 2009b. “A Tale of Two Vectors.” Dialectica 63(4): 397–431.
Lange, Marc. 2009c. “Why Proofs by Mathematical Induction are Generally Not Explanatory.” Analysis 69(2): 203–211.
Lange, Marc. 2009d. “Why do the Laws Explain Why?” in Dispositions and Causes, edited by Toby Handfield, pp. 286–321. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lange, Marc. 2009e. “Dimensional Explanations.” Noûs 43(4): 742–775.
Lange, Marc. 2009f. “Scientific Inquiry.” in Central Issues of Philosophy, edited by John Shand, pp. 177–192. Stocksfield: Acumen Publishing.
Lange, Marc. 2009g. “Causation in Classical Mechanics.” in The Oxford Handbook of Causation, edited by Helen Beebee, Christopher R. Hitchcock, and Peter Menzies, pp. 649–660. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279739.001.0001.
Lange, Marc. 2009h. “Must the Fundamental Laws of Physics Be Complete?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78(2): 312–345.
Lange, Marc. 2010a. “Review of Bird (2007).” The Philosophical Review 119(1): 97–99.
Lange, Marc. 2010b. “What are Mathematical Coincidences (and Why Does it Matter)?” Mind 119(474): 307–340.
Lange, Marc. 2011a. “Meta-Laws of Nature and the Best System Account.” Analysis 71(2): 216–222.
Lange, Marc. 2011b. “Author’s Response [to Woodward (2011), Loewer (2011) and Carroll (2011)].” Analysis 71(2): 216–222.
Lange, Marc. 2011c. “It Takes More Than All Kinds to Make a World.” in Carving Nature at Its Joints. Natural Kinds in Metaphysics and Science, edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and Matthew H. Slater, pp. 53–84. Topics in Contemporary Philosophy n. 7. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262015936.001.0001.
Lange, Marc. 2011d. “Hume and the Problem of Induction.” in Handbook of the History of Logic. Volume 10: Inductive Logic, edited by Dov M. Gabbay, Stephan Hartmann, and John Woods, pp. 43–92. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co.
Lange, Marc. 2012. “ ‘There sweep great general principles which all the laws seem to follow’ .” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume VII, edited by Karen Bennett and Dean W. Zimmerman, pp. 154–187. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659081.001.0001.
Lange, Marc. 2013a. “Grounding, Scientific Explanation, and Humean Laws.” Philosophical Studies 164(1): 255–261, doi:10.1007/s11098-012-0001-x.
Lange, Marc. 2013b. “What Makes a Scientific Representation Distinctively Mathematical?” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64: 485–511.
Lange, Marc. 2013c. “How to Explain the Lorentz Transformations.” in Metaphysics and Science, edited by Stephen Mumford and Matthew Tugby, pp. 73–99. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674527.001.0001.
Lange, Marc. 2013d. “Are Some Things Naturally Necessary?” in The Puzzle of Existence. Why Is There Something Rather than Nothing?, edited by Tyron Craig Goldschmidt, pp. 235–251. Routledge Studies in Metaphysics n. 6. London: Routledge.
Lange, Marc. 2014. “Aspects of Mathematical Explanation: Symmetry, Unity, and Salience.” The Philosophical Review 123(4): 485–531.
Lange, Marc. 2015a. “Explanation, Existence and Natural Properties in Mathematics – A Case Study: Desargues’ Theorem.” Dialectica 69(4): 435–472.
Lange, Marc. 2015b. “Laws of Nature.” in Physical Theory. Method and Interpretation, edited by Lawrence Sklar, pp. 63–93. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195145649.001.0001.
Lange, Marc. 2015c. “Depth and Explanation in Mathematics.” Philosophia Mathematica 23(2): 196–214.
Lange, Marc. 2016. “Explanatory Proofs and Beautiful Proofs.” Journal of Humanistic Mathematics 6(1): 8–51.
Lange, Marc. 2017a. Because Without Cause: Non-Causal Explanations in Science and Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190269487.001.0001.
Lange, Marc. 2017b. “Idealism and Incommensurability.” in Idealism. New Essays in Metaphysics, edited by Tyron Craig Goldschmidt and Kenneth L. Pearce, pp. 259–274. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198746973.001.0001.
Lange, Marc. 2017c. “The Evidential Relevance of Explanatoriness: A Reply to Roche and Sober.” Analysis 77(2): 303–312.
Lange, Marc. 2018a. “Transitivity, Self-Explanation, and the Explanatory Circularity Argument Against Humean Accounts of Natural Law.” Synthese 195(3): 1337–1353.
Lange, Marc. 2018b. “How the Explanations of Natural Laws Make Some Reducible Physical Properties Natural and Explanatorily Potent.” in Laws of Nature, edited by Walter R. Ott and Lydia Patton, pp. 181–204. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198746775.001.0001.
Lange, Marc. 2018c. “Because Without Cause: Scientific Explanations by Constraint.” in Explanation Beyond Causation. Philosophical Perspectives on Non-Causal Explanations, edited by Alexander Reutlinger and Juha Saatsi, pp. 15–38. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198777946.001.0001.
Lange, Marc. 2018d. “What would Normative Necessity Be?” The Journal of Philosophy 115(4): 169–186.
Lange, Marc. 2018e. “A Reply to Craver and Povich (2017) on the Directionality of Distinctively Mathematical Explanations.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 67: 85–88.
Lange, Marc. 2019. “Ground and Explanation in Mathematics.” Philosophers' imprint 19(33).
Lange, Marc. 2021a. “Laws of Nature, Natural Necessity, and Counterfactual Conditionals.” in The Routledge Handbook of Modality, edited by Otávio Bueno and Scott A. Shalkowski, pp. 230–238. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Lange, Marc. 2021b. “Laws.” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Physics, edited by Eleanor Knox and Alastair Wilson, pp. 635–643. Routledge Companions. London: Routledge.
Lange, Marc. 2022. “Bolzano, the Parallelogram of Forces, and Scientific Explanation.” in Bolzano’s Philosophy of Grounding. Translations and Studies, edited by Stefan Roski and Benjamin Sebastian Schnieder, pp. 394–417. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192847973.001.0001.
Lange, Marc and Rosenberg, Alexander. 2011. “Can there be A Priori Causal Models of Natural Selection?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89(4): 591–599.

Further References

Bird, Alexander. 2007. Nature’s Metaphysics. Laws and Properties. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199227013.001.0001.
Carroll, John W. 2011. “Counterfactuals all the way down? [comments on Lange (2009a)].” Metascience 20(1): 39–45.
Craver, Carl F. and Povich, Mark. 2017. “The Directionality of Distinctively Mathematical Explanations.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 63: 31–38.
Ellis, Brian. 2005. “Marc Lange on Essentialism.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83(1): 75–79.
Friedman, Michael. 1999. Dynamics of Reason. Stanford, California: CSLI Publications.
Handfield, Toby. 2005. “Lange on Essentialism, Counterfactuals, and Explanation.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83(1): 81–85.
Loewer, Barry C. 2011. “Counterfactuals all the way down? [comments on Lange (2009a)].” Metascience 20(1): 34–39.
Mumford, Stephen. 2004. Laws in Nature. Routledge Studies in Twentieth-Century Philosophy n. 18. London: Routledge.
Woodward, James F. 2011. “Counterfactuals all the way down? [comments on Lange (2009a)].” Metascience 20(1): 27–33.