Sarah-Jane Leslie (leslie-sj)
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Bibliography
Johnston, Mark and Leslie, Sarah-Jane. 2012. “Concepts, Analysis, Generics and the Canberra
Plan.” in Philosophical
Perspectives 26: Philosophy of Mind, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 113–171. Hoboken, New Jersey:
John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Lerner, Adam J., Cullen, Simon and Leslie, Sarah-Jane, eds. 2020. Current Controversies in Philosophy of Cognitive
Science. Current Controversies in
Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
Lerner, Adam and Leslie, Sarah-Jane. 2013. “Generics, Generalism, and Reflective Equilibrium:
Implications for Moral Theorizing from the Study of
Language.” in Philosophical
Perspectives 27: Philosophy of Language, edited by John
Hawthorne, pp. 366–403. Hoboken, New
Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Leslie, Sarah-Jane. 2007a. “Generics and the Structure of the Mind.” in
Philosophical Perspectives 21: Philosophy of
Mind, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 375–403. Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers.
Leslie, Sarah-Jane. 2007b.
“Moderately Sensitive Semantics.” in Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism. New Essays
on Semantics and Pragmatics, pp. 133–168. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Leslie, Sarah-Jane. 2008. “Generics: Cognition and Acquisition.”
The Philosophical Review 117(1): 1–47, doi:10.1215/00318108-2007-023.
Leslie, Sarah-Jane. 2009. “ ‘If,’ ‘Unless,’ and
Quantification.” in Compositionality, Context and Semantic Values. Essays in
Honour of Ernie Lepore, edited by Christopher Viger and Robert J. Stainton, pp. 3–30. Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy n. 85.
Dordrecht: Springer.
Leslie, Sarah-Jane. 2011. “Essence, Plenitude, and Paradox.” in
Philosophical Perspectives 25: Metaphysics, edited
by John Hawthorne, pp. 277–296. Hoboken,
New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Leslie, Sarah-Jane. 2012.
“Generics.” in The
Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language, edited by
Gillian K. Russell and Delia Graff Fara, pp. 355–366. Routledge Philosophy
Companions. London: Routledge.
Leslie, Sarah-Jane. 2013. “Essence and Natural Kinds: When Science Meets Preschooler
Intuition.” in Oxford Studies in
Epistemology, volume IV, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 108–165. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672707.001.0001.
Leslie, Sarah-Jane. 2014. “Carving Up the Social World with Generics.”
in Oxford Studies in Experimental
Philosophy, volume I, pp. 208–231. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198718765.001.0001.
Leslie, Sarah-Jane. 2015a.
“Generics Oversimplified.”
Noûs 49(1): 28–54.
Leslie, Sarah-Jane. 2015b. “ ‘Hillary Clinton is the Only Man in the Obama
Administration’: Dual Character Concepts, Generics, and
Gender.” Analytic Philosophy 56(2): 111–141.
Leslie, Sarah-Jane. 2017. “The Original Sin of Cognition: Fear, Prejudice, and
Generalization.” The Journal of Philosophy
114(8): 393–421.
Leslie, Sarah-Jane and Lerner, Adam J. 2016. “Generic
Generalizations.” in The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The
Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information,
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/generics/.
Leslie, Sarah-Jane and Lerner, Adam J. 2022. “Generic
Generalizations.” in The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The
Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information,
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/generics/.
Wodak, Daniel and Leslie, Sarah-Jane. 2018. “The Mark of the Plural: Generic Generalizations and
Race.” in The Routledge Companion
to Philosophy of Race, edited by Paul C. Taylor, Linda Martı́n Alcoff, and Luvell Anderson, 3rd ed., pp. 277–289. Routledge
Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Wodak, Daniel, Leslie, Sarah-Jane and Rhodes, Marjorie. 2015. “What a Loaded Generalization: Generics and Social
Cognition.” Philosophy Compass 10(9): 625–635.