Mark Johnston (johnston-ma)

Cited in the following articles

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Goddard, Leonard and Johnston, Mark. 1983. “The Nature of Reflexive Paradoxes: Part I.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 24: 491–508.
Johnston, Mark. 1985. “Why Having a Mind Matters.” in Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, edited by Ernest LePore and Brian P. McLaughlin, pp. 408–426. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Johnston, Mark. 1987a. “Human Beings.” The Journal of Philosophy 84: 59–83.
Johnston, Mark. 1987b. “Is there a Problem about Persistence?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 61: 107–135.
Johnston, Mark. 1988a. “The End of the Theory of Meaning.” Mind and Language 3(1): 28–42.
Johnston, Mark. 1988b. “Self-Deception and the Nature of the Mind.” in Perspectives on Self-Deception, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, pp. 63–91. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.
Johnston, Mark. 1989a. “Dispositional Theories of Value.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 63: 139–174.
Johnston, Mark. 1989b. “Fission and the Facts.” in Philosophical Perspectives 3: Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 369–397. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Johnston, Mark. 1989c. “Relativism and the Self.” in Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation, edited by Michael Krausz, pp. 441–472. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
Johnston, Mark. 1991. “Explanation, Response-Dependence and Judgement-Dependence.” in Response-Dependent Concepts, edited by Peter Menzies, pp. 122–183. Working Papers in Philosophy n. 1. Canberra: RSSS Australasian National University.
Johnston, Mark. 1992a. “Constitution Is Not Identity.” Mind 101(401): 89–105.
Johnston, Mark. 1992b. “Reasons and Reductionism.” The Philosophical Review 101: 589–618.
Johnston, Mark. 1992c. “How to Speak of the Colors.” Philosophical Studies 68(3): 221–263, doi:10.1007/bf00694847.
Johnston, Mark. 1993a. “Verificationism as Philosophical Narcissism.” in Philosophical Perspectives 7: Language and Logic, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 307–330. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Johnston, Mark. 1993b. “Objectivity Refigured: Pragmatism Without Verificationism.” in Reality, Representation & Projection, edited by John Haldane and Crispin Wright, pp. 85–131. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Johnston, Mark. 1995. “Self-Deception and the Nature of Mind [on Johnston (1988b)].” in Connectionism – Debates on Psychological Explanation, edited by Cynthia Macdonald and Graham F. Macdonald, pp. 461–461. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Johnston, Mark. 1996a. “A Mind-Body Problem at the Surface of Objects [reply to Gibbard (1996), Sosa (1996) and Villanueva (1996)].” in Philosophical Issues 7: Perception, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 219–229. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Johnston, Mark. 1996b. “Is the External World Invisible?” in Philosophical Issues 7: Perception, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 185–198. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Johnston, Mark. 1997a. “Manifest Kinds.” The Journal of Philosophy 94(11): 564–583.
Johnston, Mark. 1997b. “Human Concerns without Superlative Selves.” in Reading Parfit, edited by Jonathan Dancy, pp. 149–179. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Johnston, Mark. 1997c. “Postscript: Visual Experience.” in Readings on Colors. Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color, edited by Alex Byrne and David R. Hilbert. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Johnston, Mark. 1998. “Are Manifest Qualities Response-Dependent?” The Monist 81(1): 3–42.
Johnston, Mark. 2001a. “The Authority of Affect.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63(1): 181–214.
Johnston, Mark. 2001b. “Is Affect Always Mere Effect? [reply to Wedgwood (2001)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63(1): 225–228.
Johnston, Mark. 2002. “Parts and Principles: False Axioms in Mereology.” Philosophical Topics 30(1): 129–166.
Johnston, Mark. 2004a. “Subjectivism and ‘Unmasking’ .” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69(1): 187–201.
Johnston, Mark. 2004b. “The Obscure Object of Hallucination.” Philosophical Studies 120(1–3): 113–183. Reprinted in Byrne and Logue (2009, 207–270).
Johnston, Mark. 2005. “Constitution.” in The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Frank Jackson and Michael A. Smith, pp. 636–679. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199234769.001.0001.
Johnston, Mark. 2006a. “Hylomorphism.” The Journal of Philosophy 103(12): 652–698.
Johnston, Mark. 2006b. “Better than Mere Knowledge? The Function of Sensory Awareness.” in Perceptual Experience, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 260–290. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289769.001.0001.
Johnston, Mark. 2007a. “ ‘Human Beings’ Revisited: My Body is Not an Animal.” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume III, edited by Dean W. Zimmerman, pp. 33–76. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199218394.003.0002.
Johnston, Mark. 2007b. “Objective Mind and the Objectivity of Our Minds.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75(2): 233–268.
Johnston, Mark. 2009. Saving God: Religion After Idolatry. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Johnston, Mark. 2010. Surviving Death. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, doi:10.1515/9781400834600.
Johnston, Mark. 2011a. “On a Neglected Epistemic Virtue.” in Philosophical Issues 21: The Epistemology of Perception, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 165–218. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Johnston, Mark. 2011b. “There are no Visual Fields (and no Minds Either).” Analytic Philosophy 52(4): 231–242.
Johnston, Mark. 2014a. “Personal Identity: Are We Ontological Trash?” in The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy, edited by Barry Dainton and Howard Robinson, pp. 378–414. Bloomsbury Companions. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Johnston, Mark. 2014b. “The Problem with the Content View.” in Does Perception Have Content?, edited by Berit Brogaard, pp. 105–137. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199756018.001.0001.
Johnston, Mark. 2016a. “Personites, Maximality and Ontological Trash.” in Philosophical Perspectives 30: Metaphysics, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 198–228. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Johnston, Mark. 2016b. “Remnant Persons: Animalism’s Undoing.” in Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity, edited by Stephan Blatti and Paul F. Snowdon, pp. 89–127. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608751.001.0001.
Johnston, Mark. 2018a. “Sensory Disclosure: Neither a Propositional, Nor a Factive, Attitude.” in Non-Propositional Intentionality, edited by Alex Grzankowski and Michelle Montague, pp. 152–191. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198732570.001.0001.
Johnston, Mark. 2018b. “Ramon Llull, ca. 1232–1316 .” in A Companion to Ramon Llull and Lullism, edited by Amy M. Austin and Mark D. Johnston, pp. 3–17. Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition n. 82. Leiden: E.J. Brill.
Johnston, Mark. 2019a. “Why did the One Not Remain Within Itself?” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, volume IX, edited by Lara Buchak, Dean W. Zimmerman, and Philip Swenson, pp. 106–164. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198845492.001.0001.
Johnston, Mark. 2019b. “Is Hope for Another Life Rational?” in Current Controversies in Philosophy of Religion, edited by Paul Draper, pp. 47–68. Current Controversies in Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
Johnston, Mark and Leslie, Sarah-Jane. 2012. “Concepts, Analysis, Generics and the Canberra Plan.” in Philosophical Perspectives 26: Philosophy of Mind, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 113–171. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.

Further References

Byrne, Alex and Logue, Heather, eds. 2009. Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262026550.001.0001.
Gibbard, Allan F. 1996. “Visible Properties of Human Interest Only [on Johnston (1996b)].” in Philosophical Issues 7: Perception, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 199–208. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Sosa, David. 1996. “Getting Acquainted with Perception [on Johnston (1996b)].” in Philosophical Issues 7: Perception, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 209–214. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Villanueva, Enrique. 1996. “Would More Acquaintance with the External World Relieve Epistemic Anxiety? [on Johnston (1996b)].” in Philosophical Issues 7: Perception, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 215–218. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2001. “Sensing Values? [on Johnston (2001a)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63(1): 215–223.