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Dustin Locke (locke-du)

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Certainty and Assertion

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Bibliography

    Korman, Daniel Z. and Locke, Dustin. 2020a. Against Minimalist Responses to Moral Debunking Arguments.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume XV, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 309–331. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198859512.001.0001.
    Korman, Daniel Z. and Locke, Dustin. 2020b. Evolutionary Debunking and Moral Relativism.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism, edited by Martin Kusch, pp. 190–199. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781351052306.
    Korman, Daniel Z. and Locke, Dustin. 2023. Modal Security and Evolutionary Debunking.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 47: Genealogy of Belief: You Just Believe That Because …, edited by Peter A. French, Howard K. Wettstein, and Yuval Avnur, pp. 135–156. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.5840/msp202311243.
    Locke, Dustin. 2012. Quidditism without Quiddities.” Philosophical Studies 160(3): 345–363.
    Locke, Dustin. 2014a. Knowledge Norms and Assessing Them Well.” Thought 3(1): 80–89.
    Locke, Dustin. 2014b. The Decision-Theoretic Lockean Thesis.” Inquiry 57(1): 28–54.
    Locke, Dustin. 2014c. Darwinian Normative Skepticism.” in Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief. Disagreement and Evolution, edited by Michael Bergmann and Patrick Kain, pp. 220–236. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669776.001.0001.
    Locke, Dustin. 2015a. Knowledge, Explanation, and Motivating Reasons.” American Philosophical Quarterly 52(3): 215–232.
    Locke, Dustin. 2015b. Practical Certainty.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90(1): 72–95, doi:10.1111/phpr.12036.
    Locke, Dustin. 2017. Implicature and Non-Local Pragmatic Encroachment.” Synthese 194(2): 631–654.
    Locke, Dustin. 2018. The Epistemic Significance of Moral Disagreement.” in The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, edited by Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett, pp. 499–518. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315213217.