Bernard Molyneux (molyneux)
Email:
molyneux(at)UCDAVIS.EDU
Cited in the following articles
Avner Baz's Ordinary Language Challenge to the Philosophical Method of Cases, If Philosophers Aren't Using Intuitions as Evidence, What Are They Doing?Contributions to Philosophie.ch
No contributions yet
Bibliography
Earlenbaugh, Joshua and Molyneux, Bernard. 2009a. “Intuitions are Inclinations to Believe.” Philosophical Studies 145(1): 89–109.
Earlenbaugh, Joshua and Molyneux, Bernard. 2009b. “If Intuitions Must Be Evidential then Philosophy is in Big Trouble.” Studia Philosophica Estonica 2(2): 35–53, doi:10.12697/spe.2009.2.2.03.
Molyneux, Bernard. 2007. “Primeness, Internalism and Explanatory Generality.” Philosophical Studies 135(2): 255–277.
Molyneux, Bernard. 2011. “On the Infinitely Hard Problem of Consciousness.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89(2): 211–228.
Molyneux, Bernard. 2014. “New Arguments that Philosophers Don’t Treat Intuitions as Evidence.” Metaphilosophy 45(3): 441–461, doi:10.1111/meta.12094.
Molyneux, Bernard. 2015a. “The Logic of Mind-Body Identification.” Ergo 2(11): 239–265.
Molyneux, Bernard. 2015b. “Zombies and Probability: A Stochastic Approach to the Dualist’s Problems.” American Philosophical Quarterly 52(3): 201–213.