Sarah Moss (moss-s)

Cited in the following articles

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Moss, Sarah. 2011. “Scoring Rules and Epistemic Compromise.” Mind 120(480): 1053–1069.
Moss, Sarah. 2012a. “On the Pragmatics of Counterfactuals.” Noûs 46(3): 561–586.
Moss, Sarah. 2012b. “Four-Dimensionalist Theories of Persistence.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90(4): 671–686.
Moss, Sarah. 2012c. “The Role of Linguistics.” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language, edited by Gillian K. Russell and Delia Graff Fara, pp. 513–524. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Moss, Sarah. 2013. “Epistemology Formalized.” The Philosophical Review 122(1): 1–43.
Moss, Sarah. 2015. “Time-Slice Epistemology and Action under Indeterminacy.” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume V, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 172–194. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722762.003.0006.
Moss, Sarah. 2018a. Probabilistic Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198792154.001.0001.
Moss, Sarah. 2018b. “Moral Encroachment.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118(2): 177–205.
Moss, Sarah. 2020a. “Summary of Moss (2018a).” Analysis 80(2): 313–315.
Moss, Sarah. 2020b. “Replies to Edgington (2020), Pavese (2020), and Campbell-Moore and Konek (2020).” Analysis 80(2): 356–370.
Moss, Sarah. 2021. “Pragmatic Encroachment and Legal Proof.” in Philosophical Issues 31: Law and Epistemology, edited by Alexander A. Guerrero, pp. 258–279. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12207.

Further References

Campbell-Moore, Catrin and Konek, Jason. 2020. “Believing Probabilistic Contents: On the Expressive Power and Coherence of Sets of Sets of Probabilities [on Moss (2018a)].” Analysis 80(2): 316–331.
Edgington, Dorothy. 2020. “Credence, Conditionals, Knowledge and Truth [on Moss (2018a)].” Analysis 80(2): 332–342.
Pavese, Carlotta. 2020. “Probabilistic Knowledge in Action [on Moss (2018a)].” Analysis 80(2): 342–356.