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Dorothy Edgington (edgington)

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Bibliography

    Edgington, Dorothy. 1981. Meaning, Bivalence and Realism.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81: 153–173.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 1985a. The Paradox of Knowability.” Mind 94: 557–568.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 1985b. Verificationism and the Manifestations of Meaning.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 59: 32–52.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 1986. Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 18(52): 3–30. Reprinted in Jackson (1991, 176–201).
    Edgington, Dorothy. 1990. Explanation, Causation and Laws.” Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 22(66): 55–73.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 1991. Matter-of-Fact Conditionals.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 65: 185–209.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 1992a. Validity, Uncertainty, and Vagueness.” Analysis 52(4): 193–203.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 1992b. Changing Beliefs Rationally: Some Puzzles.” in Cognition, Semantics and Philosophy, edited by Jesús Ezquerro and Jesús M. Larrazabal, pp. 47–74. Philosophical Studies Series n. 52. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 1993. Wright and Sainsbury on Higher-Order Vagueness.” Analysis 53(4): 193–200.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 1995a. On Conditionals.” Mind 104(413): 235–329.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 1995b. Conditionals and the Ramsey Test.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 69: 67–86.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 1995c. The Logic of Uncertainty.” Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 27(81): 27–54.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 1996. Lowe on Conditional Probability.” Mind 105(420): 617–630.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 1997. Truth, Objectivity, Counterfactuals, and Gibbard.” Mind 106: 107–116.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 1998. Williamson on Iterated Attitudes [on Williamson (1998)].” Proceedings of the British Academy 95: 135–158.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 2000a. Indeterminacy de re.” Philosophical Topics 28(1): 27–44.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 2000b. General Conditional Statements: A Response to Kölbel (2000).” Mind 109.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 2001a. Conditionals.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2001/entries/conditionals/.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 2001b. The Philosophical Problem of Vagueness.” Legal Theory ???
    Edgington, Dorothy. 2001c. Conditionals.” in The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic, edited by Lou F. Goble, pp. 385–414. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9781405164801.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 2002.Williamson (2002) on Vagueness, Identity, and Leibniz’s Law.” in Individuals, Essence and Identity. Themes in Analytic Metaphysics, edited by Andrea Bottani, Pierdaniele Giaretta, and Massimiliano Carrara, pp. 305–318. Topoi Library n. 4. Dordrecht: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-94-017-1866-0.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 2003. What if? Questions About Conditionals.” Mind and Language 18(4): 380–401.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 2004a. Two Kinds of Possibility.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 78: 1–22.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 2004b. Counterfactuals and the Benefit of Hindsight.” in Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World, edited by Phil Dowe and Paul Noordhof, pp. 12–27. London: Routledge.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 2005a. Ramsey’s Legacies on Conditionals and Truth.” in Ramsey’s Legacy, edited by Hallvard Lillehammer and David Hugh Mellor, pp. 37–52. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 2005b. The Mystery of the Missing Boundary.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71(3): 704–711.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 2006a. Conditionals.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/entries/conditionals/.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 2006b. The Pragmatics of the Logical Constants.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, edited by Ernest LePore and Barry C. Smith, pp. 768–793. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552238.001.0001.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 2007. On Conditionals.” in Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume XIV, edited by Dov M. Gabbay and Franz Guenthner, 2nd ed., pp. 127–221. Dordrecht: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-6324-4.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 2008. Counterfactuals.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108: 1–21.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 2009. Conditionals, Truth, and Assertion.” in Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals. Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, edited by Ian Ravenscroft, pp. 283–310. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267989.001.0001.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 2010. Sorensen on Vagueness and Contradiction.” in Cuts and Clouds. Vagueness, Its Nature, and Its Logic, edited by Richard Dietz and Sebastiano Moruzzi, pp. 91–105. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.001.0001.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 2011a. Conditionals, Causation, and Decision.” Analytic Philosophy 52(2): 75–87.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 2011b. Causation First: Why Causation is Prior to Counterfactuals.” in Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation. Issues in Philosophy and Psychology, edited by Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack, and Sarah R. Beck, pp. 230–241. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590698.001.0001.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 2014. Indicative Conditionals.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/conditionals/.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 2016. Schiffer on Indeterminacy, Vagueness and Conditionals.” in Meanings and Other Things. Themes from the Work of Stephen Schiffer, edited by Gary Ostertag, pp. 156–171. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684939.001.0001.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 2020a. Credence, Conditionals, Knowledge and Truth [on Moss (2018)].” Analysis 80(2): 332–342.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 2020b. Indicative Conditionals.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/conditionals/.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 2021a. Counterfactual Conditionals.” in The Routledge Handbook of Modality, edited by Otávio Bueno and Scott A. Shalkowski, pp. 30–39. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
    Edgington, Dorothy. 2021b. Philosophy and Me.” in Conditionals, Paradox, and Probability. Themes from the Philosophy of Dorothy Edgington, edited by Lee Walters and John Hawthorne, pp. 8–18. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198712732.001.0001.
    MacBride, Fraser, Marion, Mathieu, Frápolli, Marı́a José, Edgington, Dorothy, Elliott, Edward, Lutz, Sebastian and Paris, Jeffrey Bruce. 2019. Frank Ramsey.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/ramsey/.
    MacBride, Fraser, Marion, Mathieu, Frápolli, Marı́a José, Edgington, Dorothy, Elliott, Edward, Lutz, Sebastian and Paris, Jeffrey Bruce. 2023. Frank Ramsey.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/ramsey/.

Further References

    Jackson, Frank, ed. 1991. Conditionals. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Kölbel, Max. 2000. Edgington on Compounds of Conditionals.” Mind 109.
    Moss, Sarah. 2018. Probabilistic Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198792154.001.0001.
    Williamson, Timothy. 1998. Iterated Attitudes.” Proceedings of the British Academy 95: 85–133.
    Williamson, Timothy. 2002. Vagueness, Identity and Leibniz’s Law.” in Individuals, Essence and Identity. Themes in Analytic Metaphysics, edited by Andrea Bottani, Pierdaniele Giaretta, and Massimiliano Carrara, pp. 273–304. Topoi Library n. 4. Dordrecht: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-94-017-1866-0.