Dorothy Edgington (edgington)
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Bibliography
Edgington, Dorothy. 1981. “Meaning, Bivalence and Realism.”
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81: 153–173.
Edgington, Dorothy. 1985a. “The Paradox of Knowability.” Mind
94: 557–568.
Edgington, Dorothy. 1985b. “Verificationism and the Manifestations of
Meaning.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
Supplementary Volume 59: 32–52.
Edgington, Dorothy. 1986. “Do
Conditionals Have Truth Conditions?”
Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de
Filosofı́a 18(52): 3–30. Reprinted in Jackson (1991,
176–201).
Edgington, Dorothy. 1990. “Explanation, Causation and Laws.”
Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de
Filosofı́a 22(66): 55–73.
Edgington, Dorothy. 1991. “Matter-of-Fact Conditionals.”
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume
65: 185–209.
Edgington, Dorothy. 1992a. “Validity, Uncertainty, and Vagueness.”
Analysis 52(4): 193–203.
Edgington, Dorothy. 1992b.
“Changing Beliefs Rationally: Some Puzzles.”
in Cognition, Semantics and
Philosophy, edited by Jesús Ezquerro and Jesús M. Larrazabal, pp. 47–74. Philosophical
Studies Series n. 52. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Edgington, Dorothy. 1993. “Wright and Sainsbury on Higher-Order
Vagueness.” Analysis 53(4): 193–200.
Edgington, Dorothy. 1995a.
“On Conditionals.” Mind 104(413):
235–329.
Edgington, Dorothy. 1995b. “Conditionals and the Ramsey Test.”
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume
69: 67–86.
Edgington, Dorothy. 1995c. “The Logic of Uncertainty.”
Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de
Filosofı́a 27(81): 27–54.
Edgington, Dorothy. 1996. “Lowe on Conditional Probability.”
Mind 105(420): 617–630.
Edgington, Dorothy. 1997. “Truth, Objectivity, Counterfactuals, and
Gibbard.” Mind 106: 107–116.
Edgington, Dorothy. 1998. “Williamson on Iterated Attitudes [on Williamson
(1998)].” Proceedings of the British
Academy 95: 135–158.
Edgington, Dorothy. 2000a. “Indeterminacy de re.” Philosophical
Topics 28(1): 27–44.
Edgington, Dorothy. 2000b. “General Conditional Statements: A Response to Kölbel
(2000).” Mind 109.
Edgington, Dorothy. 2001a.
“Conditionals.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2001/entries/conditionals/.
Edgington, Dorothy. 2001b. “The Philosophical Problem of Vagueness.”
Legal Theory ???
Edgington, Dorothy. 2001c.
“Conditionals.” in The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic,
edited by Lou F. Goble, pp. 385–414.
Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers,
doi:10.1002/9781405164801.
Edgington, Dorothy. 2002.“Williamson (2002) on Vagueness,
Identity, and Leibniz’s Law.” in Individuals, Essence and Identity. Themes in Analytic
Metaphysics, edited by Andrea Bottani, Pierdaniele Giaretta, and Massimiliano Carrara, pp. 305–318. Topoi
Library n. 4. Dordrecht: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-94-017-1866-0.
Edgington, Dorothy. 2003. “What if? Questions About Conditionals.”
Mind and Language 18(4): 380–401.
Edgington, Dorothy. 2004a. “Two Kinds of Possibility.” Proceedings
of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 78: 1–22.
Edgington, Dorothy. 2004b. “Counterfactuals and the Benefit of
Hindsight.” in Cause and Chance:
Causation in an Indeterministic World, edited by Phil Dowe and Paul Noordhof, pp. 12–27. London: Routledge.
Edgington, Dorothy. 2005a. “Ramsey’s Legacies on Conditionals and
Truth.” in Ramsey’s
Legacy, edited by Hallvard Lillehammer and David Hugh Mellor, pp. 37–52. Mind Association
Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Edgington, Dorothy. 2005b. “The Mystery of the Missing Boundary.”
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71(3): 704–711.
Edgington, Dorothy. 2006a.
“Conditionals.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/entries/conditionals/.
Edgington, Dorothy. 2006b. “The Pragmatics of the Logical Constants.”
in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of
Language, edited by Ernest LePore and Barry C. Smith, pp. 768–793. Oxford
Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552238.001.0001.
Edgington, Dorothy. 2007. “On
Conditionals.” in Handbook of
Philosophical Logic, Volume XIV, edited by Dov
M. Gabbay and Franz Guenthner, 2nd ed., pp. 127–221. Dordrecht:
Springer, doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-6324-4.
Edgington, Dorothy. 2008.
“Counterfactuals.” Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 108: 1–21.
Edgington, Dorothy. 2009. “Conditionals, Truth, and Assertion.” in
Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals. Themes from
the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, edited by Ian Ravenscroft, pp. 283–310. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267989.001.0001.
Edgington, Dorothy. 2010. “Sorensen on Vagueness and Contradiction.”
in Cuts and Clouds. Vagueness, Its Nature, and
Its Logic, edited by Richard Dietz and Sebastiano Moruzzi, pp. 91–105. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.001.0001.
Edgington, Dorothy. 2011a. “Conditionals, Causation, and Decision.”
Analytic Philosophy 52(2): 75–87.
Edgington, Dorothy. 2011b. “Causation First: Why Causation is Prior to
Counterfactuals.” in Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding
Causation. Issues in Philosophy and Psychology, edited by
Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack, and Sarah R. Beck, pp. 230–241. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590698.001.0001.
Edgington, Dorothy. 2014.
“Indicative Conditionals.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/conditionals/.
Edgington, Dorothy. 2016. “Schiffer on Indeterminacy, Vagueness and
Conditionals.” in Meanings and
Other Things. Themes from the Work of Stephen Schiffer,
edited by Gary Ostertag, pp. 156–171.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684939.001.0001.
Edgington, Dorothy. 2020a. “Credence, Conditionals, Knowledge and Truth [on Moss
(2018)].” Analysis 80(2): 332–342.
Edgington, Dorothy. 2020b.
“Indicative Conditionals.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/conditionals/.
Edgington, Dorothy. 2021a.
“Counterfactual Conditionals.” in The Routledge Handbook of Modality, edited by
Otávio Bueno and Scott A. Shalkowski, pp. 30–39. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London:
Routledge.
Edgington, Dorothy. 2021b. “Philosophy and Me.” in Conditionals, Paradox, and Probability. Themes from the
Philosophy of Dorothy Edgington, edited by Lee Walters and John Hawthorne, pp. 8–18. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198712732.001.0001.
MacBride, Fraser, Marion, Mathieu, Frápolli, Marı́a José, Edgington, Dorothy, Elliott, Edward, Lutz, Sebastian and Paris, Jeffrey Bruce. 2019. “Frank
Ramsey.” in The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The
Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information,
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/ramsey/.
MacBride, Fraser, Marion, Mathieu, Frápolli, Marı́a José, Edgington, Dorothy, Elliott, Edward, Lutz, Sebastian and Paris, Jeffrey Bruce. 2023. “Frank
Ramsey.” in The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The
Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information,
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/ramsey/.
Further References
Jackson, Frank, ed. 1991.
Conditionals. Oxford Readings
in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kölbel, Max. 2000. “Edgington on Compounds of Conditionals.”
Mind 109.
Moss, Sarah. 2018.
Probabilistic Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198792154.001.0001.
Williamson, Timothy. 1998.
“Iterated Attitudes.” Proceedings of the
British Academy 95: 85–133.
Williamson, Timothy. 2002. “Vagueness, Identity and Leibniz’s Law.” in
Individuals, Essence and Identity. Themes in
Analytic Metaphysics, edited by Andrea Bottani, Pierdaniele Giaretta, and Massimiliano Carrara, pp. 273–304. Topoi
Library n. 4. Dordrecht: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-94-017-1866-0.