Carlos J. Moya (moya-cj)

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Buckareff, Andrei A., Moya, Carlos J. and Rosell, Sergi, eds. 2015a. Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Buckareff, Andrei A., Moya, Carlos J. and Rosell, Sergi. 2015b. “Introduction.” in Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility, edited by Andrei A. Buckareff, Carlos J. Moya, and Sergi Rosell, pp. 1–12. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Grimaltós, Tobies and Moya, Carlos J. 1996. “Belief, Content, and Cause.” in Cognitive Dynamics, edited by Jérôme Dokic, pp. 159–173. European Review of Philosophy n. 2. Stanford, California: CSLI Publications.
Grimaltós, Tobies and Moya, Carlos J. 2009. “Content, Meaning and Truth [on Gupta (2006)].” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17(2): 299–305.
Moya, Carlos J. 1990. The Philosophy of Action. An Introduction. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Moya, Carlos J. 1992. “Intention, intentionalité et causalité.” Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie 42(3): 293–304.
Moya, Carlos J. 1995. “A Paradox in Compatibilist Accounts of Free Will and Moral Responsibility.” Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 27(80): 119–127.
Moya, Carlos J. 1996. “The Regress-Problem: A Reply to Vermazen (1995).” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77: 155–161.
Moya, Carlos J. 1997. “Was Descartes an Individualist? A Critical Discussion of Ferraiolo (1996).” Teorema 16(2): 77–85.
Moya, Carlos J. 1998a. “Boghossian’s ‘Reductio’ of Compatibilism [on Boghossian (1997)].” in Philosophical Issues 9: Concepts, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 243–251. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Moya, Carlos J. 1998b. “Reason and Causation in Davidson’s Theory of Action Explanation.” Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 30(89): 29–43.
Moya, Carlos J. 2003a. “Externalism, Inclusion, and Knowledge of Content.” in Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge, edited by Marı́a José Frápolli and Esther Romero, pp. 165–186. CSLI Lecture Notes n. 132. Stanford, California: CSLI Publications.
Moya, Carlos J. 2003b. “Blockage Cases: No Case against PAP.” Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 35(104): 109–120.
Moya, Carlos J. 2006a. Moral Responsibility – The Ways of Scepticism. Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory n. 6. London: Routledge.
Moya, Carlos J. 2006b. “Moran on Self-Knowledge, Agency and Responsibility.” Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 38(114): 3–20.
Moya, Carlos J. 2011a. “Alternatives and Responsibility: an Asymmetrical Approach.” in Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Kevin Mulligan, edited by Anne Reboul. Genève: Département de philosophie, Université de Genève. Reprinted in Reboul (2014b, 2: 25–38), http://kevin.philosophie.ch.
Moya, Carlos J. 2011b. “On the Very Idea of a Robust Alternative.” Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 43(128): 3–26.
Moya, Carlos J. 2014a. “Doing One’s Best, Alternative Possibilites, and Blameworthness.” Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 46(136): 3–26.
Moya, Carlos J. 2014b. “Alternatives and Responsibility: An Asymmetrical Approach.” in Mind, Values, and Metaphysics. Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan, volume 2, edited by Anne Reboul, pp. 25–38. Cham: Springer. Book publication of Reboul (2011).
Moya, Carlos J. 2015. “Reasons and Freedom.” in Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility, edited by Andrei A. Buckareff, Carlos J. Moya, and Sergi Rosell, pp. 79–93. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Moya, Carlos J. 2016. “Frankfurtian Reflections: A Critical Discussion of Robert Lockie’s ‘Three Recent Frankfurt Cases’ .” Philosophia 44(2): 585–605.
Moya, Carlos J. and Grimaltós, Tobies. 2000. “Memory and Justification: Hookway and Fumerton on Scepticism [on Hookway (2000)].” in Philosophical Issues 10: Skepticism, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 386–394. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Further References

Boghossian, Paul Artin. 1997. “What the Externalist Can Know A Priori.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97: 161–175. Reprinted in Villanueva (1998, 197–211), in Wright, Smith and Macdonald (1998) and in Boghossian (2008, 177–188).
Boghossian, Paul Artin. 2008. Content & Justification. Philosophical Papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199292103.001.0001.
Ferraiolo, W. 1996. “Individualism and Descartes.” Teorema 16(1): 71–86.
Gupta, Anil. 2006. Empiricism and Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195189582.001.0001.
Hookway, Christopher. 2000. Truth, Rationality, and Pragmatism. Themes from Peirce. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Reboul, Anne, ed. 2011. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Kevin Mulligan. Genève: Département de philosophie, Université de Genève. Book publication: Reboul (2014a), http://kevin.philosophie.ch.
Reboul, Anne, ed. 2014a. Mind, Values, and Metaphysics. Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan. vol. 1. Cham: Springer. Book publication of Reboul (2011).
Reboul, Anne, ed. 2014b. Mind, Values, and Metaphysics. Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan. vol. 2. Cham: Springer. Book publication of Reboul (2011).
Vermazen, Bruce. 1995. “Carlos Moya’s Regress-Problem.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 76: 73–81.
Villanueva, Enrique, ed. 1998. Philosophical Issues 9: Concepts. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Wright, Crispin, Smith, Barry C. and Macdonald, Cynthia, eds. 1998. Knowing Our Own Minds. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199241406.001.0001.