Crispin Wright (wright-c)
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cjgw(at)st-andrews.ac.uk
Cited in the following articles
Converse Predicates and the Interpretation of Second Order Quantification, In Defense of Relations, The Mental States First Theory of Promising, Reflective Equilibrium on the FringeContributions to Philosophie.ch
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Bibliography
Clark, Peter and Wright, Crispin, eds. 1988. Mind, Psychoanalysis and Science. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Haldane, John and Wright, Crispin, eds. 1993a. Reality, Representation & Projection. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Haldane, John and Wright, Crispin. 1993b. “Introduction.” in Reality, Representation & Projection, edited by John Haldane and Crispin Wright, pp. 3–13. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hale, Bob and Wright, Crispin. 1994. “A Reductio Ad Surdum? Field on the Contingency of Mathematical Objects.” Mind 103(410): 169–184.
Hale, Bob and Wright, Crispin, eds. 1997a. A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Hale, Wright and Miller (2017).
Hale, Bob and Wright, Crispin. 1997b. “Putnam’s Model-Theoretic Argument against Metaphysical Realism.” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, edited by Bob Hale and Crispin Wright, pp. 427–457. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Hale, Wright and Miller (2017, 703–730).
Hale, Bob and Wright, Crispin. 2000. “Implicit Definition and the A Priori.” in New Essays on the A Priori, edited by Paul Artin Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke, pp. 286–319. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Hale and Wright (2001a, 117–150), doi:10.1093/0199241279.001.0001.
Hale, Bob and Wright, Crispin. 2001a. The Reasons Proper Study. Essays Towards a Neo-Fregean Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0198236395.001.0001.
Hale, Bob and Wright, Crispin. 2001b. “To Bury Caesar….” in The Reasons Proper Study. Essays Towards a Neo-Fregean Philosophy of Mathematics, pp. 335–398. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0198236395.001.0001.
Hale, Bob and Wright, Crispin. 2001c. “Introduction.” in The Reasons Proper Study. Essays Towards a Neo-Fregean Philosophy of Mathematics, pp. 1–27. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0198236395.001.0001.
Hale, Bob and Wright, Crispin. 2001d. “Postscript: Eighteen Problems.” in The Reasons Proper Study. Essays Towards a Neo-Fregean Philosophy of Mathematics, pp. 422–436. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0198236395.001.0001.
Hale, Bob and Wright, Crispin. 2002. “Benacerraf’s Dilemma Revisited.” European Journal of Philosophy 10(1): 101–129.
Hale, Bob and Wright, Crispin. 2003. “Responses to Commentators on Hale and Wright (2001a).” Philosophical Books 44(3): 245–263.
Hale, Bob and Wright, Crispin. 2005. “Logicism in the Twenty-First Century.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, edited by Stewart Shapiro, pp. 166–202. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195148770.001.0001.
Hale, Bob and Wright, Crispin. 2008. “Abstraction and Additional Nature.” Philosophia Mathematica 16(2): 182–208.
Hale, Bob and Wright, Crispin. 2009. “The Metaontology of Abstraction.” in Metametaphysics. New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, edited by David J. Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman, pp. 178–212. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199546046.001.0001.
Hale, Bob and Wright, Crispin. 2010. “Assertibilist Truth and Objective Content: Still Inexplicit?” in Reading Brandom. On Making It Explicit, edited by Bernhard Weiss and Jeremy Wanderer, pp. 276–293. London: Routledge.
Hale, Bob and Wright, Crispin. 2015. “Bolzano’s Definition of Analytic Propositions.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 91: 325–364. “Themes from Ontology, Mind, and Logic. Present and Past – Essays in Honour of Peter Simons,” ed. by Sandra Lapointe.
Hale, Bob, Wright, Crispin and Miller, Alexander, eds. 2017. A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. 2nd ed. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Hale and Wright (1997a), doi:10.1002/9781118972090.
MacBride, Fraser and Wright, Crispin, eds. forthcoming. Being Committed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Macdonald, Graham F. and Wright, Crispin, eds. 1986. Fact, Science, and Morality: Essays On A.J. Ayer’s “Language, Truth, and Logic” . Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Moruzzi, Sebastiano and Wright, Crispin. 2009. “Trumping Assessments and the Aristotelian Future.” Synthese 166(2): 309–331.
Shapiro, Stewart and Wright, Crispin. 2006. “All Things Indefinitely Extensible.” in Absolute Generality, edited by Agustı́n Rayo and Gabriel Uzquiano, pp. 255–304. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wright, Crispin. 1975. “On the Coherence of Vague Predicates.” Synthese 30: 325–366.
Wright, Crispin. 1976a. “Truth-Conditions and Criteria.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 50: 217–245. Reprinted in Wright (1986a, 47–69).
Wright, Crispin. 1976b. “Language-Mastery and the Sorites Paradox.” in Truth and Meaning: Essays in Semantics, edited by Gareth Evans and John Henry McDowell, pp. 223–247. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Keefe and Smith (1996, 151–173), doi:10.1093/oso/9780198250074.001.0001.
Wright, Crispin. 1980. Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics. London: Gerald Duckworth & Co.
Wright, Crispin. 1981a. “Dummett und Revisionism.” The Philosophical Quarterly 31. Reprinted as “Anti-Realism and Revisionism” in Wright (1986a, 433–457).
Wright, Crispin. 1981b. “Realism, Truth-Value Links, Other Minds and the Past.” in Papers on Language and Logic, Proceedings of the Conference on the Philosophy of Language and Logic Held at the University of Keele in April, 1979, edited by Jonathan Dancy, pp. 192–226. Keele: Keele University Library. Reprinted in Wright (1986a, 85–106).
Wright, Crispin. 1981c. “Rule-Following, Objectivity and the Theory of Meaning.” in Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule, edited by Steven H. Holtzman and Christopher M. Leich, pp. 99–117. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, doi:10.4324/9781315823249.
Wright, Crispin. 1982a. “Strict Finitism.” Synthese 51: 203–282. Reprinted in Wright (1986a, 107–175).
Wright, Crispin. 1982b. “Anti-Realist Semantics: The Role of Criteria.” in Idealism Past and Present, edited by Godfrey N. A. Vesey. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures n. 13. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in Wright (1986a, 357–382).
Wright, Crispin. 1983a. Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press.
Wright, Crispin. 1983b. “Keeping Track of Nozick.” Analysis 43: 134–140.
Wright, Crispin, ed. 1984a. Frege: Tradition and Influence. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers.
Wright, Crispin. 1984b. “Kripke’s Account of the Argument against Private Language.” The Journal of Philosophy 81: 759–778.
Wright, Crispin. 1984c. “Can a Davidsonian Meaning-Theory be Construed in Terms of Assertibility?” The Philosophical Quarterly 34. Reprinted in Wright (1986a, 403–432).
Wright, Crispin. 1984d. “Second Thoughts About Criteria.” Synthese 58. Reprinted in Wright (1986a, 383–402).
Wright, Crispin. 1984e. “The Moral Organism.” in The Philosophy of F.H. Bradley, edited by Anthony Richards Manser and Guy Stock, pp. 77–98. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wright, Crispin. 1985a. “Skolem and the Skeptic.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 59: 117–135. Reprinted in Shapiro (1996).
Wright, Crispin. 1985b. “In Defence of the Conventional Wisdom.” in Exercises in Analysis: Essays by Students of Casimir Lewy, edited by Ian Hacking, pp. 171–198. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wright, Crispin. 1986a. Realism, Meaning & Truth. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Wright (1993a).
Wright, Crispin. 1986b. “How can the Theory of Meaning be a Philosophical Project?” Mind and Language 1(1): 31–44.
Wright, Crispin. 1986c. “Introduction.” in Realism, Meaning & Truth, pp. 1–44. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Wright (1993a).
Wright, Crispin. 1986d. “Theories of Meaning and Speakers’ Knowledge.” in Philosophy in Britain Today, edited by Stuart G. Shanker, pp. 267–307. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press.
Wright, Crispin. 1986e. “Does Philosophical Investigations I.258-60 Suggest a Cogent Argument Against Private Language?” in Subject, Thought, and Context, edited by Philip Pettit and John Henry McDowell, pp. 209–266. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wright, Crispin. 1986f. “Inventing Logical Necessity.” in Language, Mind and Logic, edited by Jeremy Butterfield, pp. 187–209. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wright, Crispin. 1986g. “Anti-Realism, Timeless Truth and Nineteen Eighty Four.” in Realism, Meaning & Truth, pp. 176–203. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Wright (1993a).
Wright, Crispin. 1986h. “Realism, Bivalence and Classical Logic.” in Realism, Meaning & Truth, pp. 458–478. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Wright (1993a).
Wright, Crispin. 1986i. “Facts and Certainty.” Proceedings of the British Academy 71: 429–472. Reprinted in Baldwin and Smiley (2004, 51–94), republished as Wright (2018b), with Wright (2018c).
Wright, Crispin. 1987a. “Further Reflections on the Sorites Paradox.” Philosophical Topics 15(1): 227–290. Reprinted in Keefe and Smith (1996, 204–250).
Wright, Crispin. 1987b. “On Making up One’s Mind: Wittgenstein on Intention.” in Proceedings of the 11th International Wittgenstein Symposium: Logic, Philosophy of Science, and Epistemology, edited by Paul Weingartner and Gerhard Schurz, pp. 391–404. Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft n. 13. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
Wright, Crispin. 1987c. “Dummett and Revisionism.” in Michael Dummett: Contributions to Philosophy, edited by Barry Taylor, pp. 1–30. Nijhoff International Philosophy Series n. 25. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Wright, Crispin. 1988a. “Realism, Anti-realism, Irrealism, Quasi-realism.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12: Realism and Antirealism, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 25–49. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. Reprinted in Wright (2003a, 11–47).
Wright, Crispin. 1988b. “Why Numbers Can Believably Be.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 42: 425–473.
Wright, Crispin. 1988c. “Moral Values, Projection and Secondary Qualities.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 62: 1–26. Reprinted in Wright (2003a, 155–182).
Wright, Crispin. 1989a. “Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy of Mind: Sensation, Privacy and Intention.” The Journal of Philosophy 86: 622–634.
Wright, Crispin. 1989b. “Misconstruals Made Manifest: A Response to Simon Blackburn (1989).” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 14: Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language II, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 48–67. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. Reprinted in Wright (1993a, 239–261).
Wright, Crispin. 1989c. “Wittgenstein’s Rule-following Considerations and the Central Project of Theoretical Linguistics.” in Reflections on Chomsky, edited by Alexander George, pp. 233–264. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Wright, Crispin. 1989d. “The Verification Principle: Another Puncture – Another Patch.” Mind 98: 611–622.
Wright, Crispin. 1989e. “Criticial Notice of McGinn (1984).” Mind 98: 289–305. Reprinted in Miller and Wright (2002, 108–128).
Wright, Crispin. 1989f. “Necessity, Caution and Scepticism.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 63: 203–238.
Wright, Crispin. 1990a. “Field and Fregean Platonism.” in Physicalism in Mathematics, edited by Andrew David Irvine, pp. 73–93. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science n. 45. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Reprinted in Hale and Wright (2001a, 154–168), doi:10.1007/978-94-009-1902-0.
Wright, Crispin. 1990b. “Wittgenstein on Mathematical Proof.” in Philosophy and Politics, edited by Gregory Max Kneale Hunt, pp. 79–99. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures n. 26. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wright, Crispin. 1991a. “Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon.” Mind 100: 87–116.
Wright, Crispin. 1991b. “The Sorites Paradox and its Significance for the Interpretation of Semantic Theory.” in New Enquiries into Meaning and Truth, edited by Neil Cooper and Pascal Engel, pp. 135–162. Hempel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Papers from the Conference on Formal Semantics held at the University of Grenoble II in Sept. 1987.
Wright, Crispin. 1991c. “Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy of Mind: Sensation, Privacy and Intention.” in Meaning Scepticism, edited by Klaus Puhl, pp. 126–147. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Wright, Crispin. 1992a. Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, doi:10.2307/j.ctv1rr6cwg.
Wright, Crispin. 1992b. “Is Higher-Order Vagueness Coherent?” Analysis 52(3): 129–139.
Wright, Crispin. 1992c. “On Putnam’s Proof That We Are Not Brains-In-A-Vat.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92: 67–94. Reprinted in Clark and Hale (1994, 216–241).
Wright, Crispin. 1993a. Realism, Meaning & Truth. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. First edition: Wright (1986a).
Wright, Crispin. 1993b. “Realism: The Contemporary Debate – W(h)ither Now?” in Reality, Representation & Projection, edited by John Haldane and Crispin Wright, pp. 63–84. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wright, Crispin. 1993c. “A Note on Two Realist Lines of Argument.” in Realism, Meaning & Truth, 2nd ed., pp. 262–275. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. First edition: Wright (1986a).
Wright, Crispin. 1993d. “Scientific Realism, Observation and Verificationism.” in Realism, Meaning & Truth, 2nd ed., pp. 279–299. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. First edition: Wright (1986a).
Wright, Crispin. 1993e. “The Verification Principle.” in Realism, Meaning & Truth, 2nd ed., pp. 300–320. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. First edition: Wright (1986a).
Wright, Crispin. 1993f. “About ‘The Philosophical Significance of Gödel’s Theorem’ [Dummett (1963)]: Some Issues.” in Realism, Meaning & Truth, pp. 321–353. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Wright (1993a).
Wright, Crispin. 1993g. “Scientific Realism and Observation Statements.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 1(2): 231–254.
Wright, Crispin. 1993h. “On An Argument On Behalf of Classical Negation.” Mind 102(405): 123–131.
Wright, Crispin. 1994a. “Realism, Pure and Simple? A Reply to Timothy Williamson (1994).” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2(2): 327–341. Reprinted in Wright (2003a, 61–81).
Wright, Crispin. 1994b. “About Dummett (1963): Some Issues.” in The Philosophy of Michael Dummett, edited by Brian McGuinness and Gianluigi Oliveri, pp. 167–203. Synthese Library n. 239. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Papers presented at the First International Philosophy Conference of Mussomeli, Sicily, Sept. 1991.
Wright, Crispin. 1994c. “Response to Jackson (1994).” Philosophical Books 35(3): 169–175. Reprinted in Wright (2003a, 51–60).
Wright, Crispin. 1995a. “Truth in Ethics.” Ratio 8: 209–226. Reprinted in Hooker (1996) and in Wright (2003a, 183–203).
Wright, Crispin. 1995b. “Critical Notice of Dummett (1991).” Philosophical Books 36(2): 89–102. Reprinted in Hale and Wright (2001a, 213–228).
Wright, Crispin. 1995c. “The Epistemic Conception of Vagueness.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 33(suppl.): 133–159.
Wright, Crispin. 1995d. “Intuitionists Are Not (Turing) Machines.” Philosophia Mathematica 3(1): 86–102.
Wright, Crispin. 1995e. “Can there be a rationally compelling Argument for anti-realism about ordinary (‘folk’) psychology?” in Philosophical Issues 6: Content, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 197–221. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Wright, Crispin. 1995f. “Critical Study of Walker (1986).” Synthese 103. Reprinted in Wright (2003a, 211–240).
Wright, Crispin. 1996a. “Human Nature? [Review of McDowell (1994)].” European Journal of Philosophy 4(2): 235–254.
Wright, Crispin. 1996b. “Précis of Wright (1992a).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56(4): 863–868. Reprinted in Wright (2003a, 3–10).
Wright, Crispin. 1996c. “Response to Commentators [on Wright (1992a)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56(4): 911–941. Reprinted in Wright (2003a, 82–124).
Wright, Crispin. 1997a. “On the Philosophical Significance of Frege’s Theorem.” in Language, Thought and Logic. Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett, edited by Richard Kimberley Heck, pp. 201–245. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Hale and Wright (2001a, 272–306).
Wright, Crispin. 1997b. “Indeterminacy of Translation.” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, edited by Bob Hale and Crispin Wright, pp. 397–426. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Hale, Wright and Miller (2017, 670–696).
Wright, Crispin. 1998a. “Why Frege Did Not Deserve His ‘Granum Salis’: A Note on the Paradox of ‘The Concept Horse’ and the Ascription of Bedeutungen to Predicates.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 55: 239–263. “New Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Dummett“,” ed. Johannes Brandl and Peter Sullivan.
Wright, Crispin. 1998b. “On the Harmless Impredicativity of N\(^=\) (‘Hume’s Principle’).” in The Philosophy of Mathematics Today, edited by Matthias Schirn, pp. 339–368. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Hale and Wright (2001a, 229–255), doi:10.1093/oso/9780198236542.001.0001.
Wright, Crispin. 1998c. “Response to Dummett (1998).” in The Philosophy of Mathematics Today, edited by Matthias Schirn, pp. 389–406. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Hale and Wright (2001a, 256–271), doi:10.1093/oso/9780198236542.001.0001.
Wright, Crispin. 1998d. “Self-Knowledge: The Wittgensteinian Legacy.” in Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind, edited by Anthony O’Hear, pp. 101–122. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 43. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Republished in Wright, Smith and Macdonald (1998, 13–46).
Wright, Crispin. 1998e. “Euthypronism and the Physicality of Colour: A Comment on Powell (1998).” in Response-Dependence, edited by Roberto Casati and Christine Tappolet, pp. 21–36. European Review of Philosophy n. 3. Stanford, California: CSLI Publications.
Wright, Crispin. 1998f. “Comrades Against Quietism.” Mind 107. Reprinted in Wright (2003a, 125–149).
Wright, Crispin. 1998g. “Truth: A Traditional Debate Reviewed.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28(suppl. 24): 203–238. Translation of Wright (2003d), reprinted in Wright (2003a, 241–287).
Wright, Crispin. 1999. “Is Hume’s Principle Analytic?” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40(1). Reprinted in Hale and Wright (2001a, 307–334) and in Cook (2007, 17–44).
Wright, Crispin. 2000a. “Truth as Sort of Epistemic: Putnam’s Peregrinations.” The Journal of Philosophy 97(5): 335–364. Reprinted in Wright (2003a, 288–331).
Wright, Crispin. 2000b. “Cogency and Question-Begging: Some Reflections on McKinsey’s Paradox and Putnam’s Proof.” in Philosophical Issues 10: Skepticism, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 140–163. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Wright, Crispin. 2000c. “Neo-fregean Foundations for Real Analysis: Some Reflections on Frege’s Constraint.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 41: 317–334. Reprinted in Cook (2007, 253–273).
Wright, Crispin. 2000d. “Facts and Certainty.” in Philosophical Issues 10: Skepticism, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 201–219. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Wright, Crispin. 2001a. “On Being in a Quandary. Relativism, Vagueness, Logical Revisionism.” Mind 110(437): 45–98. Reprinted in Wright (2003a, 443–510).
Wright, Crispin. 2001b. “On Basic Logical Knowledge; Reflections on Boghossian (2001).” Philosophical Studies 106(1–2): 41–85. Reprinted in Bermúdez and Millar (2002, 49–84).
Wright, Crispin. 2001c. Rails to Infinity. Essays on Themes from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Wright, Crispin. 2001d. “Minimalism, Deflationism, Pragmatism, Pluralism.” in The Nature of Truth. Classic and Contemporary Perspectives, edited by Michael Patrick Lynch, pp. 751–787. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Second edition: Lynch et al. (2021), doi:10.7551/mitpress/4884.001.0001.
Wright, Crispin. 2002a. “(Anti-)Sceptics Simple and Subtle: Moore and McDowell.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65(2): 330–348.
Wright, Crispin. 2002b. “The Conceivability of Naturalism.” in Conceivability and Possibility, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 401–440. New York: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Wright (2003a, 357–406), doi:10.1093/oso/9780198250890.001.0001.
Wright, Crispin. 2002c. “Relativism and Classical Logic.” in Logic, Thought and Language, edited by Anthony O’Hear, pp. 95–118. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 51. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wright, Crispin. 2002d. “Warrant for Nothing? Notes on Epistemic Entitlement.” Unpublished manuscript of a talk given at the 4th European Summer School in Analytic Philosophy, Sorbonne / Jean Nicod 2002.
Wright, Crispin. 2002e. “Human Nature?” in Reading McDowell on Mind and World, pp. 140–159. London: Routledge.
Wright, Crispin. 2002f. “Postscript to Wright (2002e).” in Reading McDowell on Mind and World, pp. 160–173. London: Routledge.
Wright, Crispin. 2002g. “What Could Anti-Realism about Ordinary Psychology Possibly Be?” The Philosophical Review 111. Reprinted in Wright (2003a, 407–442).
Wright, Crispin. 2002h. “On Knowing What Is Necessary: Three Limitations of Peacocke’s Account [on Peacocke (1999)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64(3): 655–662.
Wright, Crispin. 2002i. “Meaning and Intention as Judgement Dependent.” in Rule-Following and Meaning, edited by Alexander Miller and Crispin Wright, pp. 129–140. London: Routledge. Reprint of parts of Wright (1989c).
Wright, Crispin. 2003a. Saving the Difference: Essays on Themes from “Truth and Objectivity” . Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Wright, Crispin. 2003b. “Vagueness: A Fifth Column Approach.” in Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox, edited by J. C. Beall, pp. 84–105. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wright, Crispin. 2003c. “Rosenkranz on Quandary, Vagueness and Intuitionism.” Mind 112: 465–474.
Wright, Crispin. 2003d. “Wahrheit: Besichtigung einer traditionellen Debatte.” in Wissen zwischen Entdeckung und Konstruktion, Erkenntnistheoretische Kontroversen, edited by Matthias Vogel and Lutz Wingert, pp. 55–106. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag.
Wright, Crispin. 2003e. “Minimalism and Deflationism.” in Saving the Difference: Essays on Themes from “Truth and Objectivity” , pp. 332–349. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. The first two sections are reprinted from Wright (2001d).
Wright, Crispin. 2003f. “Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy of Mind: Sensation, Privacy and Intention.” in Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge, edited by Brie Gertler. Ashgate Epistemology and Mind Series. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315245997.
Wright, Crispin. 2004a. “Intuition, Entitlement and the Epistemology of Logical Laws.” Dialectica 58(1): 155–175.
Wright, Crispin. 2004b. “Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 78: 167–212.
Wright, Crispin. 2004c. “Realism, Relativism and Rhubarb.” Unpublished manuscript of a talk given at the 5th European Summer School in Analytic Philosophy, Venice.
Wright, Crispin. 2004d. “Wittgensteinian Certainties.” in Wittgenstein and Scepticism, edited by Denis McManus, pp. 22–55. London: Routledge.
Wright, Crispin. 2004e. “Scepticism, Certainty, Moore and Wittgenstein.” in Wittgenstein’s Lasting Significance, edited by Max Kölbel and Bernhard Weiss, pp. 228–248. London: Routledge.
Wright, Crispin. 2005. “Contextualism and Scepticism: Even-Handedness, Factivity and Surreptitiously Raising Standards.” The Philosophical Quarterly 55(219).
Wright, Crispin. 2006a. “Intuitionism, Realism, Relativism and Rhubarb.” in Truth and Realism, edited by Patrick Greenough and Michael Patrick Lynch, pp. 38–60. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Proceedings of the 2004 St.Andrews Conference on Realism and Truth, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288878.001.0001.
Wright, Crispin. 2006b. “Vagueness-Related Partial Belief and the Constitution of Borderline Cases [on Schiffer (2003)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73(1): 225–232.
Wright, Crispin. 2007a. “On Quantifying into Predicate Position: Steps Towards a New(tralist) Perspective.” in Mathematical Knowledge, edited by Mary Leng, Alexander C. Paseau, and Michael D. Potter, pp. 150–174. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199228249.003.0009.
Wright, Crispin. 2007b. “New Age Relativism and Epistemic Possibility: The Question of Evidence.” in Philosophical Issues 17: The Metaphysics of Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 262–283. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Wright, Crispin. 2007c. “Wang’s Paradox.” in The Philosophy of Michael Dummett, edited by Randall E. Auxier and Lewis Edwin Hahn, pp. 415–444. The Library of Living Philosophers n. 31. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co.
Wright, Crispin. 2007d. “The Perils of Dogmatism.” in Themes from G.E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics, edited by Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay, pp. 25–48. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wright, Crispin. 2008a. “Fear of Relativism? [on Boghossian (2006)].” Philosophical Studies 141(3): 379–390, doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9280-7.
Wright, Crispin. 2008b. “Relativism about Truth Itself: Haphazard Thoughts about the Very Idea.” in Relative Truth, edited by Manuel Garcı́a-Carpintero and Max Kölbel, pp. 157–186. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234950.001.0001.
Wright, Crispin. 2008c. “Comments on McDowell (2008).” in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, edited by Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson, pp. 390–404. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.001.0001.
Wright, Crispin. 2009. “The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Abstraction.” in Proceedings of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium: Reduction – Abstraction – Analysis, edited by Alexander Hieke and Hannes Leitgeb, pp. 195–216. Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society (new series) n. 11. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Wright, Crispin. 2010. “The Illusion of Higher-Order Vagueness.” in Cuts and Clouds. Vagueness, Its Nature, and Its Logic, edited by Richard Dietz and Sebastiano Moruzzi, pp. 523–549. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.001.0001.
Wright, Crispin. 2011a. “Frictional Coherentism? A Comment on Chapter 10 of Ernest Sosa (2009).” Philosophical Studies 153(1): 29–41.
Wright, Crispin. 2011b. “McKinsey One More Time.” in Self-Knowledge, edited by Anthony Hatzimoysis, pp. 80–104. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590728.001.0001.
Wright, Crispin. 2012a. “The Pain of Rejection, the Sweetness of Revenge [on Richard (2008)].” Philosophical Studies 160(3): 465–476.
Wright, Crispin. 2012b. “Bio-bibliographical note.” in Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge.Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, volume 1, edited by Annalisa Coliva, pp. 15–25. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278053.001.0001.
Wright, Crispin. 2012c. “Meaning and Assertability: Some Reflections on Paolo Casalegno’s ‘The Problem of Non-Conclusiveness’ .” Dialectica 66(2): 249–266.
Wright, Crispin. 2012d. “Replies.” in Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge.Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, volume 1, edited by Annalisa Coliva, pp. 377–485. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278053.001.0001.
Wright, Crispin. 2012e. “Reflections on Récanati (2012).” in Immunity to Error through Misidentification, edited by Simon Prosser and François Récanati, pp. 247–280. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wright, Crispin. 2012f. “Frege and Benacerraf’s Problem.” in Analysis and Interpretation in the Exact Sciences. Essays in Honour of William Demopoulos, edited by Mélanie Frappier, Derek Henry Brown, and Robert DiSalle, pp. 117–134. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science n. 78. Dordrecht: Springer.
Wright, Crispin. 2012g. “A Plurality of Pluralisms.” in Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates, pp. 123–156. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195387469.001.0001.
Wright, Crispin. 2013. “Foreword.” in Basic Laws of Arithmetic, pp. vii–xi. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Translated and edited by Philip A. Ebert and Marcus Rossberg, with Crispin Wright.
Wright, Crispin. 2014a. “Comments on Boghossian (2014).” Philosophical Studies 169(1): 27–37.
Wright, Crispin. 2014b. “On Epistemic Entitlement (II): Welfare State Epistemology.” in Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, edited by Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini, pp. 213–247. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.001.0001.
Wright, Crispin. 2015. “Self-Knowledge: The Reality of Privileged Access.” in Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism, edited by Sanford C. Goldberg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781107478152.
Wright, Crispin. 2016a. “On the Characterization of Borderline Cases.” in Meanings and Other Things. Themes from the Work of Stephen Schiffer, edited by Gary Ostertag, pp. 190–210. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684939.001.0001.
Wright, Crispin. 2016b. “Abstraction and Epistemic Entitlement: On the Epistemological Status of Hume’s Principle.” in Abstractionism. Essays in Philosophy of Mathematics, edited by Philip A. Ebert and Marcus Rossberg, pp. 161–185. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199645268.001.0001.
Wright, Crispin. 2017. “The Variability of ‘Knows’: An Opinionated Overview.” in The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism, edited by Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, pp. 13–31. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Wright, Crispin. 2018a. “Counter-Conceivability Again.” in Being Necessary. Themes of Ontology and Modality from the Work of Bob Hale, edited by Ivette Fred-Rivera and Jessica F. Leech, pp. 266–282. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198792161.001.0001.
Wright, Crispin. 2018b. “Facts and Certainty.” in Skepticism. Historical and Contemporary Inquiries, edited by G. Anthony Bruno and A. C. Rutherford, pp. 61–99. London: Routledge.
Wright, Crispin. 2018c. “Facts and Certainty: A Retrospect.” in Skepticism. Historical and Contemporary Inquiries, edited by G. Anthony Bruno and A. C. Rutherford, pp. 100–113. London: Routledge.
Wright, Crispin. 2018d. “A Plague on All Your Houses: Some Reflections on the Variable Behaviour of ‘Knows’ .” in Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History, edited by Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi, and Sebastiano Moruzzi, pp. 357–384. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Wright, Crispin. 2018e. “Logical Non-Cognitivism.” in Philosophical Issues 28: Philosophy of Logic and Inferential Reasoning, edited by Cory Juhl and Joshua Schechter, pp. 425–450. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12132.
Wright, Crispin. 2019. “ ‘How Did the Serpent of Inconsistency Enter Frege’s Paradise?’ .” in Essays on Frege’s Basic Laws of Arithmetic, edited by Philip A. Ebert and Marcus Rossberg, pp. 411–436. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198712084.001.0001.
Wright, Crispin. 2020a. “Replies to Part I: Frege and Logicism.” in Logic, Language, and Mathematics. Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, edited by Alexander Miller, pp. 279–353. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199278343.001.0001.
Wright, Crispin. 2020b. “Replies to Part II: Intuitionism and the Sorites.” in Logic, Language, and Mathematics. Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, edited by Alexander Miller, pp. 354–383. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199278343.001.0001.
Wright, Crispin. 2020c. “Replies to Part III: Logical Revisionism.” in Logic, Language, and Mathematics. Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, edited by Alexander Miller, pp. 384–416. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199278343.001.0001.
Wright, Crispin. 2020d. “Reply to Part IV: The Epistemology of Metaphysical Possibility.” in Logic, Language, and Mathematics. Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, edited by Alexander Miller, pp. 417–432. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199278343.001.0001.
Wright, Crispin. 2021. The Riddle of Vagueness: Selected Essays 1975–2020. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199277339.001.0001.
Wright, Crispin. 2023. Essays on Relativism: 2001–2021. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192845993.001.0001.
Wright, Crispin and Hale, Bob. 1992. “Nominalism and the Contingency of Abstract Objects.” The Journal of Philosophy 89(3): 111–135. Reprinted in Schirn (1996, 174–199).
Wright, Crispin, Smith, Barry C. and Macdonald, Cynthia, eds. 1998. Knowing Our Own Minds. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199241406.001.0001.
Further References
Baldwin, Thomas and Smiley, Timothy J., eds. 2004. Studies in the Philosophy of Logic and Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bermúdez, José-Luis and Millar, Alan, eds. 2002. Reason and Nature. Essays in the Theory of Rationality. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199256839.001.0001.
Blackburn, Simon. 1989. “Manifesting Realism.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 14: Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language II, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 29–47. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
Boghossian, Paul Artin. 2001. “How are Objective Epistemic Reasons Possible?” Philosophical Studies 106(1): 1–40, doi:10.1023/A:1013141719930.
Boghossian, Paul Artin. 2006. Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287185.001.0001.
Boghossian, Paul Artin. 2014. “What is Inference?” Philosophical Studies 169(1): 1–18.
Clark, Peter and Hale, Robert, eds. 1994. Reading Putnam. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Cook, Roy T., ed. 2007. The Arché Papers on the Mathematics of Abstraction. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science n. 71. Dordrecht: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-4265-2.
Dummett, Michael A. E. 1963. “The Philosophical Significance of Gödel’s Theorem.” Ratio 5: 140–155. Reprinted in Dummett (1978, 186–201).
Dummett, Michael A. E. 1978. Truth and Other Enigmas. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Dummett, Michael A. E. 1991. Frege and Other Philosophers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/019823628X.001.0001.
Dummett, Michael A. E. 1998. “Neo-Fregeans: in Bad Company?” in The Philosophy of Mathematics Today, edited by Matthias Schirn, pp. 369–387. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198236542.001.0001.
Hooker, Brad, ed. 1996. Truth in Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Jackson, Frank. 1994. “Realism, Truth and Truth Aptness [review of Wright (1993a)].” Philosophical Books 35(3): 162–169.
Keefe, Rosanna and Smith, Peter, eds. 1996. Vagueness: A Reader. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/7064.001.0001.
McDowell, John Henry. 1994. Mind and World. 1st ed. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
McDowell, John Henry. 2008. “The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument.” in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, edited by Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson, pp. 376–389. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in McDowell (2009, 225–241), doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.001.0001.
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Peacocke, Christopher. 1999. Being Known. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0198238606.001.0001.
Powell, Mark. 1998. “Realism or Response Dependence?” in Response-Dependence, edited by Roberto Casati and Christine Tappolet, pp. 7–20. European Review of Philosophy n. 3. Stanford, California: CSLI Publications.
Récanati, François. 2012. “Immunity to Error through Misidentification: What it is and Where it Comes From.” in Immunity to Error through Misidentification, edited by Simon Prosser and François Récanati, pp. 180–201. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Richard, Mark. 2008. When Truth Gives Out. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239955.001.0001.
Schiffer, Stephen. 2003. The Things We Mean. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199257760.001.0001.
Schirn, Matthias, ed. 1996. Frege: Importance and Legacy. Perspektiven der analytischen Philosophie / Perspectives in Analytic Philosophy n. 13. Berlin: de Gruyter.
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Sosa, Ernest. 2009. Reflective Knowledge: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge. Volume II. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217250.001.0001.
Walker, Ralph C. S. 1986. The Coherence Theory of Truth. London: Routledge.
Williamson, Timothy. 1994. “Critical Study of Wright (1992a).” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2(2): 130–144.