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Jennifer Nado (nado-j)

Cited in the following articles

Avner Baz's Ordinary Language Challenge to the Philosophical Method of Cases, If Philosophers Aren't Using Intuitions as Evidence, What Are They Doing?

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Bibliography

    Johnson, Michael and Nado, Jennifer. 2014. “Moderate Intuitionism: A Metasemantic Account.” in Intuitions, edited by Anthony Robert Booth and Darrell P. Rowbottom, pp. 68–90. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609192.001.0001.
    Johnson, Michael and Nado, Jennifer. 2017. “Actual vs. Counterfactual Dispositional Metasemantics: A Reply to Andow.” Philosophia 45(2): 717–734.
    Nado, Jennifer. 2011. “Intuition and Inquiry.” PhD dissertation, Rutgers, New Jersey: Philosophy Department, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey.
    Nado, Jennifer. 2014. “Philosophical Expertise.” Philosophy Compass 9(9): 631–641.
    Nado, Jennifer. 2015. “Intuition, Philosophical Theorizing, and the Threat of Skepticism.” in Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism. Rethinking Philosophical Method, edited by Eugen Fischer and John Collins, pp. 204–221. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315714196.
    Nado, Jennifer. 2016a. “The Intuition Deniers.” Philosophical Studies 173(3): 781–800, doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0519-9.
    Nado, Jennifer. 2016b. “Experimental Philosophy 2.0.” Thought 5(3): 159–168.
    Nado, Jennifer. 2017a. “Demythologizing Intuition [on Deutsch (2015)].” Inquiry 60(4): 386–402, doi:10.1080/0020174X.2016.1220639.
    Nado, Jennifer. 2017b. “Knowledge Second (for Metaphilosophy).” in Epistemic Pluralism, edited by Annalisa Coliva and Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen, pp. 147–170. Innovations in Philosophy. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
    Nado, Jennifer. 2019a. “Who Wants to Know?” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume VI, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 114–136. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198833314.001.0001.
    Nado, Jennifer. 2019b. “Intuition, Philosophical Theorizing, and the Threat of Skepticism.” in Explanation in Action Theory and Historiography. Causal and Teleological Approaches, edited by Gunnar Schumann, pp. 204–221. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9780429506048.
    Nado, Jennifer. 2022. “Philosophizing Out of Bounds.” Philosophical Studies 179(1): 319–327, doi:10.1007/s11098-020-01582-0.
    Nado, Jennifer, Kelly, Daniel Ryan and Stich, Stephen P. 2009. “Moral Judgment.” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology, edited by John Symons and Paco Calvo, pp. 621–633. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.

Further References