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Ram Neta (neta)

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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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    Neta, Ram. 2002. “\(S\) Knows That \(P\).” Noûs 36(4): 663–681.
    Neta, Ram. 2003a. “Skepticism, Contextualism, and Semantic Self-Knowledge.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67(2): 396–411.
    Neta, Ram. 2003b. “Contextualism and the Problem of the External World.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66(1): 1–31.
    Neta, Ram. 2004a. “Skepticism, Abductivism, and the Explanatory Gap.” in Philosophical Issues 14: Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 296–325. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    Neta, Ram. 2004b. “Perceptual Evidence and the New Dogmatism.” Philosophical Studies 119(1–2): 199–214.
    Neta, Ram. 2005a. “A Contextualist Solution to the Problem of Easy Knowledge.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 69: 183–206. “Epistemological Contextualism,” ed. by Martijn Blaauw.
    Neta, Ram. 2005b. “Contextualism.” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald M. Borchert, 2nd ed. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
    Neta, Ram. 2007a. “Propositional Justification, Evidence, and the Cost of Error.” in Philosophical Issues 17: The Metaphysics of Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 197–216. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    Neta, Ram. 2007b. “In Defense of Epistemic Relativism.” Episteme 4(1): 30–48.
    Neta, Ram. 2007c. “Fixing the Transmission: The New Mooreans.” in Themes from G.E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics, edited by Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay, pp. 62–83. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Neta, Ram. 2007d. “Contextualism and a Puzzle about Seeing.” Philosophical Studies 134(1): 53–63.
    Neta, Ram. 2007e. “Reply to Gallimore (2007).” Philosophical Studies 134(1): 71–72.
    Neta, Ram. 2007f. “Anti-Intellectualism and the Knowledge-Action Principle [on Stanley (2005)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75(1): 180–187.
    Neta, Ram. 2008a. “In Defence of Disjunctivism.” in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, edited by Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson, pp. 311–329. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.001.0001.
    Neta, Ram. 2008b. “How Cheap Can You Get?” in Philosophical Issues 18: Interdisciplinary Core Philosophy, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 130–142. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Neta, Ram. 2009a. “Defeating the Dogma of Defeasibility.” in Williamson on Knowledge, edited by Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 161–182. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287512.001.0001.
    Neta, Ram. 2009b. “Treating Something as a Reason for Action.” Noûs 43(4): 684–699.
    Neta, Ram. 2009c. “Causal Theories of Knowledge and Perception.” in The Oxford Handbook of Causation, edited by Helen Beebee, Christopher R. Hitchcock, and Peter Menzies, pp. 592–606. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279739.001.0001.
    Neta, Ram. 2009d. “Mature Human Knowledge as a Standing in the Space of Reasons.” Philosophical Topics 37(1): 115–132.
    Neta, Ram. 2009e. “Empiricism about Experience [on Gupta (2006)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79(2): 483–489.
    Neta, Ram. 2010a. “Liberalism and Conservatism in the Epistemology of Perceptual Belief.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88(4): 685–705.
    Neta, Ram. 2010b. “Can A Priori Entitlement be Preserved by Testimony?” in Social Epistemology, edited by Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 194–215. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577477.001.0001.
    Neta, Ram. 2010c. “Should we Swap Internal Foundations for Virtues?” Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 42(125): 63–76.
    Neta, Ram. 2011a. “Reflections on Sosa (2009).” Philosophical Studies 153(1): 3–17.
    Neta, Ram. 2011b. “A Refutation of Cartesian Fallibilism.” Noûs 45(4): 658–695.
    Neta, Ram. 2011c. “The Basing Relation.” in The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 109–118. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
    Neta, Ram. 2011d. “The Nature and Reach of Privileged Access.” in Self-Knowledge, edited by Anthony Hatzimoysis, pp. 9–32. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590728.001.0001.
    Neta, Ram. 2012a. “Knowing from the Armchair that Our Intuitions Are Reliable.” The Monist 95(2): 329–351.
    Neta, Ram. 2012b. “Philosophy of Language for Epistemology.” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language, edited by Gillian K. Russell and Delia Graff Fara, pp. 693–704. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
    Neta, Ram. 2013a. “Easy Knowledge, Transmission Failure, and Empiricism.” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume IV, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 166–184. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672707.001.0001.
    Neta, Ram. 2013b. “What is an Inference?” in Philosophical Issues 23: Epistemic Agency, edited by Ernest Sosa, Enrique Villanueva, and Baron Reed, pp. 388–407. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Neta, Ram, ed. 2014a. Current Controversies in Epistemology. Current Controversies in Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
    Neta, Ram. 2014b. “Epistemology: Current Controversies.” in Current Controversies in Epistemology, edited by Ram Neta, pp. 1–8. Current Controversies in Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
    Neta, Ram. 2014c. “The Epistemic ‘Ought’ .” in Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue, edited by Abrol Fairweather and Owen Flanagan Jr., pp. 36–52. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Neta, Ram. 2015. “Coherence and deontology.” in Philosophical Perspectives 29: Epistemology, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 284–304. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
    Neta, Ram. 2016a. “Perceptual Evidence and the Capacity View.” Philosophical Studies 173(4): 907–914.
    Neta, Ram. 2016b. “Access Internalism and the Guidance Deontological Conception of Justification.” American Philosophical Quarterly 53(2): 155–167.
    Neta, Ram. 2016c. “Epistemic Circularity and Virtuous Coherence.” in Performance Epistemology. Foundations and Applications, edited by Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas, pp. 224–248. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746942.001.0001.
    Neta, Ram. 2017. “Two Legacies of Goldman’s Epistemology.” Philosophical Topics 45(1): 121–136.
    Neta, Ram. 2018a. “Evidence, Coherence and Epistemic Akrasia.” Episteme 15(3): 313–328.
    Neta, Ram. 2018b. “Your Evidence Is the Set of Facts That Are Manifest to You.” in The Factive Turn in Epistemology, edited by Veli Mitova, pp. 32–49. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316818992.
    Neta, Ram. 2018c. “Rationally Determinable Conditions.” in Philosophical Issues 28: Philosophy of Logic and Inferential Reasoning, edited by Cory Juhl and Joshua Schechter, pp. 289–299. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12125.
    Neta, Ram. 2019. “The Puzzles of Easy Knowledge and of Higher-Order Evidence: A Unified Solution.” in Higher-Order Evidence. New Essays, edited by Mattias Skipper and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, pp. 173–188. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198829775.001.0001.
    Neta, Ram and Pritchard, Duncan. 2007. “McDowell and the New Evil Genius.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74(2): 381–396.
    Neta, Ram and Rohrbaugh, Guy. 2004. “Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85(4): 396–406.
    Steup, Matthias and Neta, Ram. 2020. “Epistemology.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/epistemology/.

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