Kate Nolfi (nolfi-k)
Email:
knolfi(at)uvm.edu
Beiträge zu Philosophie.ch
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Bibliography
Bar-On, Dorit and Nolfi, Kate. 2016. “Belief Self-Knowledge.” Oxford Philosophy Handbooks Online, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935314.013.51.
Nolfi, Kate. 2014. “Why is Epistemic Evaluation Prescriptive?” Inquiry 57(1): 97–121.
Nolfi, Kate. 2015a. “Which Mental States Are Rationally Evaluable, and Why?” in Philosophical Issues 25: Normativity, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 41–63. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Nolfi, Kate. 2015b. “How to Be a Normativist About the Nature of Belief.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96: 181–204.
Nolfi, Kate. 2018. “Why Only Evidential Considerations Can Justify Belief.” in Normativity: Epistemic and Practical, edited by Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting, pp. 179–199. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198758709.001.0001.