Erik J. Olsson (olsson-ej)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Angere, Staffan and Olsson, Erik J. 2018. “Publish Late, Publish Rarely! Network Density and Group Performance in Scientific Communication.” in Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge. New Essays, edited by Thomas Boyer-Kassem, Conor Mayo-Wilson, and Michael Weisberg, pp. 34–64. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780190680534.001.0001.
Carlson, Erik and Olsson, Erik J. 1998. “Is Our Existence in Need of Further Explanation?” Inquiry 41(3): 255–275.
Carlson, Erik and Olsson, Erik J. 2001. “The Presumption of Nothingness.” Ratio 14(3): 203–221.
Dutant, Julien and Olsson, Erik J. 2013. “Is there a Statistical Solution to the Generality Problem?” Erkenntnis 78(6): 1347–1365.
Fuhrmann, André and Olsson, Erik J., eds. 2004. Pragmatisch denken. Epistemische Studien / Epistemic Studies n. 4. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Goldman, Alvin I. and Olsson, Erik J. 2009. “Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge.” in Epistemic Value, edited by Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 19–41. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Goldman (2012, 151–174), doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.001.0001.
Lagerlund, Henrik and Olsson, Erik J. 2001. “Disputation and Change of Belief – Burley’s Theory of Obligationes as a Theory of Belief Revision.” in Medieval Formal Logic. Obligations, Insolubles and Consequences, edited by Mikko Yrjönsuuri, pp. 35–62. The New Synthese Historical Library n. 49. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Olsson, Erik J. 1997a. “Coherence. Studies in Epistemology and Belief Revision.” PhD dissertation, Uppsala: Filosofiska Institutionen, Uppsala Universitet.
Olsson, Erik J. 1997b. “Coherence and the Modularity of Mind.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75: 404–411.
Olsson, Erik J. 1998a. “Making Beliefs Coherent: The Subtraction and Addition Strategies.” Journal of Logic, Language, and Information 7(2): 143–163.
Olsson, Erik J. 1998b. “Review of BonJour (1998).” Erkenntnis 49: 243–249.
Olsson, Erik J. 1999. “Cohering With.” Erkenntnis 50: 273–291.
Olsson, Erik J. 2002. “What is the Problem of Coherence and Truth?” The Journal of Philosophy 99(5): 246–272.
Olsson, Erik J., ed. 2003a. The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Philosophical Studies Series n. 95. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Olsson, Erik J. 2003b. “The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer.” in The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer, edited by Erik J. Olsson, pp. 1–20. Philosophical Studies Series n. 95. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Olsson, Erik J. 2004. “F.P. Ramsey on Knowledge and Fallibilism.” Dialectica 58(4): 549–557.
Olsson, Erik J. 2005a. Against Coherence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199279993.001.0001.
Olsson, Erik J. 2005b. “Not Giving the Skeptic a Hearing: Pragmatism and Radical Doubt.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70(1): 98–126.
Olsson, Erik J. 2005c. “The Impossibility of Coherence.” Erkenntnis 63(3): 387–412. Reprinted in Gähde and Hartmann (2005, 95–120).
Olsson, Erik J., ed. 2006a. Knowledge and Inquiry. Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi. Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction, and Decision Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Olsson, Erik J. 2006b. “Introduction: The Pragmatism of Isaac Levi.” in Knowledge and Inquiry. Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi, edited by Erik J. Olsson, pp. 1–17. Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction, and Decision Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Olsson, Erik J. 2006c. “Potential Answers – To What Question?” in Knowledge and Inquiry. Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi, edited by Erik J. Olsson, pp. 157–166. Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction, and Decision Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Olsson, Erik J. 2006d. “Levi and the Lottery.” in Knowledge and Inquiry. Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi, edited by Erik J. Olsson, pp. 167–178. Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction, and Decision Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Olsson, Erik J. 2007. “Reliabilism, Stability, and the Value of Knowledge.” American Philosophical Quarterly 44(4): 343–355.
Olsson, Erik J. 2008a. “Knowledge, Truth, and Bullshit: Reflections on Frankfurt.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32: Truth and its Deformities, edited by Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 94–110. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Olsson, Erik J. 2008b. “Klein on the Unity of Cartesian and Contemporary Skepticism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76(3): 511–524.
Olsson, Erik J. 2009. “In Defense of the Conditional Probability Solution to the Swamping Problem.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 79: 93–114.  “Reliable Knowledge and Social Epistemology. Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Goldman and Replies by Goldman,” ed. by Gerhard Schurz and Markus Werning.
Olsson, Erik J. 2011a. “The Value of Knowledge.” Philosophy Compass 6(12): 874–883.
Olsson, Erik J. 2011b. “Coherentism.” in The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 257–268. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge. Reprinted in Bernecker and Michaelian (2017, 310–322).
Olsson, Erik J. 2011c. “A Simulation Approach to Veritistic Social Epistemology.” Episteme 8(2): 127–143.
Olsson, Erik J. 2012. “Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/justep-coherence/.
Olsson, Erik J. 2013a. “Reliabilism as Explicating Knowledge. A Sketch of an Account.” in Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement. Proceedings of the 34th International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg, 2011, edited by Christoph Jäger and Winfried Löffler, pp. 189–202. Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society (new series) n. 19. Berlin: de Gruyter, doi:10.1515/9783110329018.
Olsson, Erik J. 2013b. “A Bayesian Simulation Model of Group Deliberation and Polarization.” in, pp. 113–134.
Olsson, Erik J. 2015a. “Barcan Marcus on Belief and Rationality.” in Modalities, Identity, Belief, and Moral Dilemmas. Themes from Barcan Marcus, edited by Michael Frauchiger, pp. 95–110. Lauener Library of Analytical Philosophy n. 3. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Olsson, Erik J. 2015b. “Gettier and the Method of Explication: A 60 Year Old Solution to a 50 Year Old Problem.” Philosophical Studies 172(1): 57–72.
Olsson, Erik J. 2016. “A Naturalistic Approach to the Generality Problem.” in Goldman and His Critics, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin and Hilary Kornblith, pp. 178–199. Philosophers and Their Critics. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
Olsson, Erik J. 2017a. “Engel vs. Rorty on Truth.” Synthese 194(5): 1433–1450.
Olsson, Erik J. 2017b. “Explicationist Epistemology and Epistemic Pluralism.” in Epistemic Pluralism, edited by Annalisa Coliva and Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen, pp. 23–46. Innovations in Philosophy. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Olsson, Erik J. 2017c. “Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/justep-coherence/.
Olsson, Erik J. 2020. “Formal Models of Assertion.” in The Oxford Handbook of Assertion, edited by Sanford C. Goldberg, pp. 661–682. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.001.0001.
Olsson, Erik J. 2021. “Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/justep-coherence/.
Olsson, Erik J. and Jönsson, Martin L. 2011. “Kinds of Learning and the Likelihood of Future True Beliefs: Reply to Jäger (2011) on Reliabilism and the Value Problem.” Theoria 77(3): 214–222.
Olsson, Erik J. and Proietti, Carlo. 2016. “Explicating Ignorance and Doubt: A Possible Worlds Approach.” in The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance, edited by Rik Peels and Martijn Blaauw, pp. 81–95. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9780511820076.
Olsson, Erik J. and Vallinder, Aron. 2013. “Norms of Assertion and Communication in Social Networks.” Synthese 190(13): 2557–2571.
Spohn, Wolfgang, Schröder-Heister, Peter and Olsson, Erik J. 2005. Logik in der Philosophie. Heidelberg: Synchron, Wissenschaftsverlag der Autoren.
Vallinder, Aron and Olsson, Erik J. 2013. “Do Computer Simulations Support the Argument from Disagreement?” Synthese 190(8): 1437–1454.
Vallinder, Aron and Olsson, Erik J. 2014. “Trust and the Value of Overconfidence: A Bayesian Perspective on Social Network Communication.” Synthese 191(9): 1991–2007.

Further References

Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken, eds. 2017. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
BonJour, Laurence. 1998. In Defense of Pure Reason. A Rationalist Account of A Priori Justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gähde, Ulrich and Hartmann, Stephan, eds. 2005. Coherence, Truth and Testimony. Berlin: Springer.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2012. Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology. Essays. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812875.001.0001.
Jäger, Christoph. 2011. “Process Reliabilism and the Value Problem.” Theoria 77(3): 201–213.