Alvin I. Goldman (goldman-ai)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Goldman, Alvin I. 1967. “A Causal Theory of Knowing.” The Journal of Philosophy 64: 357–372.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1968. “Actions, Predictions, and Books of Life.” American Philosophical Quarterly 5(3): 135–151.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1969. “The Compatibility of Mechanism and Purpose.” The Philosophical Review 78: 468–482.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1970. A Theory of Human Action. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1971. “The Individuation of Actions.” The Journal of Philosophy 68: 761–774.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1974. “Power, Time and Cost.” Philosophical Studies 26: 263–270.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1975. “Innate Knowledge.” in Innate Ideas, edited by Stephen P. Stich, pp. 111–120. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1976a. “The Volitional Theory Revisited.” in Action Theory: Proceedings of the Winnipeg Conference on Human Action, held at Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada, 9-11 May 1975, edited by Myles Brand and Douglas N. Walton, pp. 67–85. Synthese Library n. 97. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., doi:10.1007/978-94-010-9074-2.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1976b. “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.” The Journal of Philosophy 73(20): 771–791.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1977. “Perceptual Objects.” Synthese 35: 257–284.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1978. “Epistemology and the Psychology of Belief.” The Monist 61(4): 525–535.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1979a. “Varieties of Cognitive Appraisal.” Noûs 13: 23–38.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1979b. “What is Justified Belief?” in Justification and Knowledge. New Studies in Epistemology, edited by George Sotiros Pappas, pp. 1–24. Philosophical Studies Series n. 17. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co. Reprinted in Goldman (2012a, 29–49), doi:10.1007/978-94-009-9493-5_1.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1980. “The Internalist Conception of Justification.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5: Studies in Epistemology, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 27–52. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1986a. Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1986b. “Constraints on Representation.” in The Representation of Knowledge and Belief, edited by Myles Brand and Robert M. Harnish, pp. 287–313. Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1987. “The Cognitive and Social Sides of Epistemology.” in PSA 1986: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Part II: Symposium Papers, edited by Arthur I. Fine and Peter K. Machamer, pp. 295–311. East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1988. “Strong and Weak Justification.” in Philosophical Perspectives 2: Epistemology, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 51–69. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1989a. “Psychology and Philosophical Analysis.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89: 195–209.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1989b. “Metaphysics, Mind, and Mental Content.” Philosophical Topics 17(1): 131–146.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1989c. “Interpretation Psychologized.” Mind and Language 4(3): 161–185. Reprinted in Davies and Stone (1995, 74–100).
Goldman, Alvin I. 1990. “Action and Free Will.” in An Invitation to Cognitive Science. Volume 2: Visual Cognition and Action, volume 2, edited by Daniel N. Osherson and Howard Lasnik, 1st ed., pp. 317–340. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1992a. Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1992b. “The Psychology of Folk Psychology.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1992c. “In Defense of the Simulation Theory.” Mind and Language 7: 104–119.
Goldman, Alvin I., ed. 1993a. Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1993b. Philosophical Applications of Cognitive Science. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1993c. “Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology.” in Philosophical Issues 3: Science and Knowledge, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 271–285. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1993d. “Consciousness, Folk Psychology, and Cognitive Science.” Consciousness and Cognition 2: 364–382.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1994a. “Naturalistic Epistemology and Reliabilism.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19: Philosophical Naturalism, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 301–320. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1994b. “Psychological, Social, and Epistemic Factors in the Theory of Science.” in PSA 1994: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Part II: Symposium Papers, edited by David L. Hull, Micky Forbes, and Richard M. Burian, pp. 277–286. East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1995a. “Social Epistemology, Interests, and Truth.” Philosophical Topics 23(1): 171–187.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1995b. “In Defense of the Simulation Theory.” in Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications, edited by Martin Kinsey Davies and Tony Stone, pp. 191–206. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1996. “Simulation and Interpersonal Utility.” in Mind and Morals: Essays on Ethics and Cognitive Science, edited by Larry May, Michael Friedman, and Andy Clark. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1997. “Science, Publicity, and Consciousness.” Philosophy of Science 64: 525–545.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1998. “Education and Social Epistemology.” in Philosophers on Education. Historical Perspectives, edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, pp. 437–448. London: Routledge.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1999a. Knowledge in a Social World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0198238207.001.0001.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1999b. “A Priori Warrant and Naturalistic Epistemology.” in Philosophical Perspectives 13: Epistemology, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 1–28. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1999c. “Internalism Exposed.” The Journal of Philosophy 96(6): 271–293. Reprinted in Steup (2001, 115–133).
Goldman, Alvin I. 1999d. “Social Epistemology.” Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 31(93): 3–19.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2000a. “Can Science Know That You Are Conscious? Epistemological Foundations of Consciousness Research.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 7: 3–22.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2000b. “Folk Psychology and Mental Concepts.” Protosociology 14: 4–25.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2000c. “The Mentalizing Folk.” in Metarepresentation: a Multidisciplinary Perspective, edited by Dan Sperber, pp. 171–196. Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science n. 10. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2001a. “Social Epistemology.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2001/entries/epistemology-social/.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2001b. “Replies to Commentators.” Philosophical Topics 29(1–2): 461–511.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2001c. “Social Routes to Belief and Knowledge.” The Monist 84(3): 346–367.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2001d. “The Unity of the Epistemic Virtues.” in Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility, edited by Abrol Fairweather and Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, pp. 30–48. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2001e. “Experts: Which Ones should You Trust?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63(1): 85–110.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2002a. “The Sciences and Epistemology.” in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, edited by Paul K. Moser, pp. 144–176. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195130057.001.0001.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2002b. “Précis of Goldman (1999a).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64(1): 185–190.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2002c. “Reply to Commentators [to Kitcher (2002), Talbott (2002), Copp (2002)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64(1): 215–227.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2002d. “Simulation Theory and Mental Concepts.” in Simulation and Knowledge of Action, edited by Jérôme Dokic and Joëlle Proust, pp. 1–20. Advances in Consciousness Research n. 45. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Co.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2003a. Pathways to Knowledge: Public and Private. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195138791.001.0001.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2003b. “Conceptual Clarification and Empirical Defense of the Simulation Theory of Mindreading.” in Proceedings of the 25th International Wittgenstein Symposium: Persons. An Interdisciplinary Approach, edited by Christian Kanzian, Josef Quitterer, and Edmund Runggaldier, pp. 141–155. Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft n. 31. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2004a. “Epistemology and the Evidential Statues of Introspective Reports.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 11(7–8): 1–16.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2004b. “Group Knowledge Versus Group Rationality: Two Approaches to Social Epistemology.” Episteme 1(1): 11–22.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2004c. “Evaluating Art.” in The Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics, edited by Peter Kivy, pp. 93–108. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470756645.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2004d. “The Need for Social Epistemology.” in The Future for Philosophy, edited by Brian Leiter, pp. 182–207. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199247288.001.0001.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2004e. “Sosa on Reflective Knowledge and Virtue Perspectivism.” in Ernest Sosa and His Critics, edited by John Greco, pp. 86–95. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470756140.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2005a. “Kornblith’s Naturalistic Epistemology [on Kornblith (2002)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71(2): 403–410.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2005b. “Legal Evidence.” in The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, edited by Martin P. Golding and William A. Edmundson, pp. 163–176. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470690116.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2006a. Simulating Minds. The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195138929.001.0001.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2006b. “Social Epistemology.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2006/entries/epistemology-social/.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2006c. “Imagination and Simulation in Audience Responses to Fiction.” in The Architecture of Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction, pp. 41–56. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199275731.001.0001.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2007a. “A Program for ‘Naturalizing’ Metaphysics, with Application to the Ontology of Events.” The Monist 90(3): 457–479.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2007b. “Philosophical Intuitions: Their Target, Their Source, and Their Epistemic Status.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 74: 1–26.  “Philosophical Knowledge. Its Possibility and Scope,” ed. by Christian Beyer and Alex Burri, doi:10.1163/9789401204651_002.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2008a. “Immediate Justification and Process Reliabilism.” in Epistemology: New Essays, edited by Quentin Smith, pp. 63–82. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Goldman (2012a, 50–67), doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264933.001.0001.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2008b. “Reliabilism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2008/entries/reliabilism/.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2008c. “Hurley on Simulation [on Hurley (2008)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77(3): 775–788.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2009a. “Internalism, Externalism, and the Architecture of Justification.” The Journal of Philosophy 106(6): 309–338. Reprinted in Goldman (2012a, 95–122).
Goldman, Alvin I. 2009b. “Williamson on Knowledge and Evidence.” in Williamson on Knowledge, edited by Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 73–91. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Goldman (2012a, 175–196), doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287512.001.0001.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2009c. “Simulation Theory and Cognitive Neuroscience.” in Stich and His Critics, edited by Dominic Murphy and Michael A. Bishop, pp. 137–151. Philosophers and Their Critics. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444308709.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2009d. “Replies to Discussants.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 79: 245–288.  “Reliable Knowledge and Social Epistemology. Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Goldman and Replies by Goldman,” ed. by Gerhard Schurz and Markus Werning.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2009e. “Social Epistemology: Theory and Applications.” in Epistemology, edited by Anthony O’Hear, pp. 1–18. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 64. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2009f. “Précis of Goldman (2006a).” Philosophical Studies 144(3): 431–434.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2009g. “Recursive Tracking versus Process Reliabilism [on Roush (2005)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79(1): 223–230.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2009h. “Replies to Perner and Brandl (2009), Saxe (2009), Vignemont (2009), Carruthers (2009).” Philosophical Studies 144(3): 477–491.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2010a. “Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement.” in Disagreement, edited by Richard H. Feldman and Ted A. Warfield, pp. 187–215. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Goldman (2012a, 197–220), doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.001.0001.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2010b. “Why Social Epistemology is Real Epistemology.” in Social Epistemology, edited by Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 1–28. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Goldman (2012a, 248–279), doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577477.001.0001.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2010c. “Systems-Oriented Social Epistemology.” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume III, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 189–214. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted, as “A Guide to Social Epistemology,” in Goldman (2012a, 221–247).
Goldman, Alvin I. 2010d. “Social Epistemology.” in A Companion to Epistemology, edited by Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa, and Matthias Steup, 2nd ed., pp. 82–92. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444315080.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2011a. “Commentary on Lyons (2009).” Philosophical Studies 153(3): 457–466.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2011b. “Two Routes to Empathy: Insights from Cognitive Neuroscience.” in Empathy. Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives, edited by Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie, pp. 31–44. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199539956.001.0001.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2011c. “Towards a Synthesis of Reliabilism and Evidentialism? Or: Evidentialism’s Troubles, Reliabilism’s Rescue Package.” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 254–280. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board. Reprinted in Goldman (2012a, 123–150), , doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2012a. Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology. Essays. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812875.001.0001.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2012b. “A Moderate Approach to Embodied Cognitive Science.” The Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3(1): 71–88.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2013. Joint Ventures. Mindreading, Mirroring, and Embodied Cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199874187.001.0001.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2014a. “The Bodily Formats Approach to Embodied Cognition.” in Current Controversies in the Philosophy of Mind, edited by Uriah Kriegel, pp. 91–108. Current Controversies in Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2014b. “Social Process Reliabilism: Solving Justification Problems in Collective Epistemology.” in Essays in Collective Epistemology, edited by Jennifer Lackey, pp. 11–41. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199665792.001.0001.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2015a. “Naturalizing Metaphysics with the Help of Cognitive Science.” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume IX, edited by Karen Bennett and Dean W. Zimmerman, pp. 171–215. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198729242.001.0001.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2015b. “Reliabilism, Veritism, and Epistemic Consequentialism.” Episteme 12(2): 131–143, doi:10.1017/epi.2015.25.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2017a. “What Can Psychology Do for Epistemology? Revisiting Epistemology and Cognition.” Philosophical Topics 45(1): 17–32.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2017b. “Gettier and the Epistemic Appraisal of Philosophical Intuition.” in Explaining Knowledge. New Essays on the Gettier Problem, edited by Rodrigo Martins Borges, Claudio de Almeida, and Peter Klein, pp. 213–230. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198724551.001.0001.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2020. “The What, Why, and How of Social Epistemology.” in The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology, edited by Miranda Fricker, Peter J. Graham, David Henderson, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen, and Jeremy Wyatt, pp. 10–20. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Goldman, Alvin I. and Beddor, Bob. 2015. “Reliabilist Epistemology.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/reliabilism/.
Goldman, Alvin I. and Beddor, Bob. 2021. “Reliabilist Epistemology.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/reliabilism/.
Goldman, Alvin I. and Blanchard, Thomas. 2015. “Social Epistemology.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/epistemology-social/.
Goldman, Alvin I. and Jordan, Lucy C. 2013. “Mindreading by Simulation: The Roles of Imagination and Mirroring.” in Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives from Developmental Social Neuroscience, edited by Simon Baron-Cohen, Helen Tager-Flusberg, and Michael V. Lombardo, pp. 448–466. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Goldman, Alvin I. and Kim, Jaegwon, eds. 1978. Values and Morals: Essays in Honor of William Frankena, Charles Stevenson, and Richard Brandt. Philosophical Studies Series n. 13. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Goldman, Alvin I. and Mason, Kelby. 2007. “Simulation.” in Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science, edited by Paul R. Thagard, pp. 267–294. Handbook of the Philosophy of Science n. 12. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.
Goldman, Alvin I. and McLaughlin, Brian P., eds. 2019. Metaphysics and Cognitive Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780190639679.001.0001.
Goldman, Alvin I. and O’Connor, Cailin. 2019. “Social Epistemology.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/epistemology-social/.
Goldman, Alvin I. and Olsson, Erik J. 2009. “Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge.” in Epistemic Value, edited by Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 19–41. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Goldman (2012a, 151–174), doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.001.0001.
Goldman, Alvin I. and Pust, Joel. 1998. “Philosophical Theory and Intuitional Evidence.” in Rethinking Intuition, edited by Michael Raymond dePaul and William M. Ramsey, pp. 179–199. Studies in epistemology and cognitive theory. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
Goldman, Alvin I. and Whitcomb, Dennis, eds. 2011. Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
O’Connor, Cailin, Goldberg, Sanford C. and Goldman, Alvin I. 2023. “Social Epistemology.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/epistemology-social/.
O’Connor, Cailin, Goldberg, Sanford C. and Goldman, Alvin I. 2024. “Social Epistemology.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2024/entries/epistemology-social/.

Further References

Carruthers, Peter. 2009. “Simulation and the First Person [on Goldman (2006a)].” Philosophical Studies 144(3): 467–475.
Copp, David. 2002. “Goldman on the Goals of Democracy [on Goldman (1999a)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64(1): 207–214.
Davies, Martin Kinsey and Stone, Tony, eds. 1995. Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Hurley, Susan L. 2008. “Understanding Simulation.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77(3): 755–774.
Kitcher, Philip. 2002. “Veritistic Value and the Project of Social Epistemology [on Goldman (1999a)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64(1): 191–198.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2002. Knowledge and its Place in Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199246319.001.0001.
Lyons, Jack C. 2009. Perception and Basic Belief: Zombies, Modules, and the Problem of the External World. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195373578.001.0001.
Perner, Josef and Brandl, Johannes L. 2009. “Simulation à la Goldman: Pretend and Collapse [on Goldman (2006a)].” Philosophical Studies 144(3): 435–446.
Roush, Sherrilyn. 2005. Tracking Truth. Knowledge, Evidence, and Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199274738.001.0001.
Saxe, Rebecca. 2009. “The Neural Evidence for Simulation is Weaker than I Think You Think It Is [on Goldman (2006a)].” Philosophical Studies 144(3): 447–456.
Steup, Matthias, ed. 2001. Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195128923.001.0001.
Talbott, William J. 2002. “The Case for a More Truly Social Epistemology [on Goldman (1999a)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64(1): 199–206.
Vignemont, Frédérique de. 2009. “Drawing the Boundary between Low-Level and High-Level Mindreading [on Goldman (2006a)].” Philosophical Studies 144(3): 457–466.