Matteo Plebani (plebani)

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Berto, Francesco and Plebani, Matteo. 2015. Ontology and Metaontology: A Contemporary Guide. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Caldarola, Elisa and Plebani, Matteo. 2016. “Caricatures and Prop Oriented Make-Believe.” Ergo 3(15): 403–419.
Camposampiero, Matteo Favaretti and Plebani, Matteo, eds. 2012. Existence and Nature. New Perspectives. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Carrara, Massimiliano, Plebani, Matteo and Martino, Enrico. 2016. “Computability, Finiteness and the Standard Model of Arithmetic.” in Objectivity, Realism, and Proof. FilMat Studies in the Philosophy of Mathematics, edited by Francesca Boccuni and Andrea Sereni, pp. 311–318. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science n. 318. Dordrecht: Springer.
Plebani, Matteo. 2011a. Introduzione alla filosofia della matematica. Roma: Carocci editore S.p.a.
Plebani, Matteo. 2011b. “Review of Centrone (2010).” Dialectica 65(3): 477–482.
Plebani, Matteo. 2015. “Could Everything Be True? Probably Not.” Philosophia 43(2): 499–504.
Plebani, Matteo. 2016. “Nominalistic Content, Grounding, and Covering Generalizations: Reply to Liggins (2016).” Synthese 193(2): 549–558.
Plebani, Matteo. 2017. “Non-Factualism versus Nominalism.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98(3): 344–362.
Plebani, Matteo. 2018. “Review of Felka (2016).” Dialectica 72(3): 473–479.
Plebani, Matteo. 2020. “Recent Debates over the Existence of Abstract Objects: An Overview.” in Abstract Objects: For and Against, edited by José L. Falguera and Concha Martı́nez-Vidal, pp. 1–16. Synthese Library n. 422. Cham: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-3-030-38242-1.

Further References

Centrone, Stefania. 2010. Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics in the Early Husserl. Synthese Library n. 345. Dordrecht: Springer.
Felka, Katharina. 2016. Talking about Numbers. Easy Arguments for Mathematical Realism. Studies in Theoretical Philosophy n. 3. Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann, doi:10.5771/9783465138792.
Liggins, David. 2016. “Grounding and the Indispensability Argument.” Synthese 193(2): 531–548.