William M. Ramsey (ramsey-wm)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

dePaul, Michael Raymond and Ramsey, William M., eds. 1998. Rethinking Intuition. Studies in epistemology and cognitive theory. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
Frankish, Keith and Ramsey, William M., eds. 2014. The Cambridge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence. Cambridge Handbooks. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ramsey, William M. 1990. “Where does the Self-Refutation Objection Take Us?” Inquiry 33: 453–465.
Ramsey, William M. 1992a. “Prototypes and Conceptual Analysis.” Topoi 11: 59–70. Reprinted in dePaul and Ramsey (1998, 161–177).
Ramsey, William M. 1992b. “Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mental Representation.” in Connectionism: Theory and Practice, edited by Steven Davis, pp. 247–276. Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science n. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ramsey, William M. 1994. “Distributed Representation and Causal Modularity: A Rejoinder to Forster and Saidel.” Philosophical Psychology 7: 453–461.
Ramsey, William M. 1995. “Rethinking Distributed Representation.” Acta Analytica 10(14): 9–25.
Ramsey, William M. 1996. “Conceptual Analysis and the Connectionist Account of Concepts.” in Philosophy and Cognitive Science: Categories, Consciousness, and Reasoning. Proceedings of the Second International Colloquium on Cognitive Science, edited by Andy Clark, Jesús Ezquerro, and Jesús M. Larrazabal, pp. 35–58. Philosophical Studies Series n. 69. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Ramsey, William M. 1997. “Do Connectionist Representations Earn Their Explanatory Keep?” Mind and Language 12(1): 34–66.
Ramsey, William M. 2002. “Naturalism Defended.” in Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism, edited by James K. Beilby, pp. 15–29. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
Ramsey, William M. 2003. “Eliminative Materialism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2003/entries/materialism-eliminative/.
Ramsey, William M. 2006. “Multiple Realizability Intuitions and the Functionalist Conception of Mind.” Metaphilosophy 37(1): 53–73.
Ramsey, William M. 2007a. Representation Reconsidered. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ramsey, William M. 2007b. “Eliminative Materialism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2007/entries/materialism-eliminative/.
Ramsey, William M. 2013a. “Eliminative Materialism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/materialism-eliminative/.
Ramsey, William M. 2013b. “Bigotry and Religious Belief.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94: 125–151.
Ramsey, William M. 2017. “Must Cognition Be Representational?” Synthese 194(11): 4197–4214.
Ramsey, William M. 2019a. “Intuitions as Evidence Facilitators.” Metaphilosophy 50(1–2): 76–99, doi:10.1111/meta.12351.
Ramsey, William M. 2019b. “Maps, Models and Computational Simulations in the Mind.” in The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind, edited by Mark Sprevak and Matteo Colombo, pp. 259–271. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Ramsey, William M. 2019c. “Eliminative Materialism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/materialism-eliminative/.
Ramsey, William M. 2020a. “Defending Representation Realism.” in What are Mental Representations?, edited by Joulia Smortchkova, Krzystof Dolega, and Tobias Schlicht, pp. 54–78. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780190686673.001.0001.
Ramsey, William M. 2020b. “Was Rorty an Eliminative Materialist?” in A Companion to Rorty, edited by Alan Malachowski, pp. 27–42. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118972199.
Ramsey, William M. and Stich, Stephen P. 1990. “Connectionism and Three Levels of Nativism.” Synthese 82: 177–205. Reprinted in Ramsey, Stich and Rumelhart (1991, 287–310).
Ramsey, William M., Stich, Stephen P. and Garon, Joseph. 1990. “Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology.” in Philosophical Perspectives 4: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 499–533. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Greenwood (1991, 93–119), Ramsey, Stich and Rumelhart (1991, 199–228), Christensen and Turner (1993, 315–339) and in Macdonald and Macdonald (1995, 311–338).
Ramsey, William M., Stich, Stephen P. and Rumelhart, David E., eds. 1991. Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Further References

Christensen, Scott M. and Turner, Dale R., eds. 1993. Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Greenwood, John D., ed. 1991. The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Macdonald, Cynthia and Macdonald, Graham F., eds. 1995. Connectionism – Debates on Psychological Explanation. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.