Michael Raymond dePaul (depaul-mr)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

dePaul, Michael Raymond. 1984. “The Thesis of the Second Antinomy.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 1(4): 445–452.
dePaul, Michael Raymond. 1987. “Supervenience and Moral Dependence.” Philosophical Studies 51: 425–439.
dePaul, Michael Raymond. 1988. “The Problem of the Criterion and Coherence Methods in Ethics.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18: 67–86.
dePaul, Michael Raymond. 1993. Balance and Refinement. Beyond Coherence. Methods of Moral Inquiry. London: Routledge.
dePaul, Michael Raymond. 1998. “Why Bother with Reflective Equilibrium?” in Rethinking Intuition, edited by Michael Raymond dePaul and William M. Ramsey, pp. 293–309. Studies in epistemology and cognitive theory. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
dePaul, Michael Raymond, ed. 2000. Resurrecting Old-Fashioned Foundationalism. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
dePaul, Michael Raymond. 2001. “Value Monism in Epistemology.” in Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue, edited by Matthias Steup, pp. 170–185. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195128923.001.0001.
dePaul, Michael Raymond. 2002a. “Review of Goldman (1999).” Noûs 36(2): 335–350.
dePaul, Michael Raymond. 2002b. “A Half Dozen Puzzles regarding Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism [on Feldman (2002)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65(3): 629–635.
dePaul, Michael Raymond. 2004. “Truth Consequentialism, Withholding and Proportioning Belief to the Evidence.” in Philosophical Issues 14: Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 91–112. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
dePaul, Michael Raymond. 2006. “Intuitions in Moral Inquiry.” in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, edited by David Copp, pp. 595–623. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195147790.001.0001.
dePaul, Michael Raymond. 2009a. “Pyrrhonian Moral Skepticism and the Problem of the Criterion.” in Philosophical Issues 19: Metaethics, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 38–56. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
dePaul, Michael Raymond. 2009b. “Ugly Analyses and Value.” in Epistemic Value, edited by Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 112–138. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.001.0001.
dePaul, Michael Raymond. 2009c. “Phenomenal Conservatism and Self-Defeat [on Huemer (2005)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78(1): 205–212.
dePaul, Michael Raymond. 2011. “Foundationalism.” in The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 235–244. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
dePaul, Michael Raymond. 2013. “Agent Centeredness, Agent Neutrality, Disagreement, and Truth Conduciveness.” in Seemings and Justification. New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism, edited by Christopher Tucker, pp. 202–224. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899494.001.0001.
dePaul, Michael Raymond and Grimm, Stephen R. 2007. “Review Essay on Kvanvig (2003).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74(2): 498–514.
dePaul, Michael Raymond and Hicks, Amelia. 2016. “A Priorism in Moral Epistemology.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/moral-epistemology-a-priori/.
dePaul, Michael Raymond and Hicks, Amelia. 2021. “A Priorism in Moral Epistemology.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/moral-epistemology-a-priori/.
dePaul, Michael Raymond and Ramsey, William M., eds. 1998. Rethinking Intuition. Studies in epistemology and cognitive theory. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
dePaul, Michael Raymond and Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus, eds. 2003. Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252732.001.0001.
Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus and dePaul, Michael Raymond. 2003. “Introduction.” in Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, edited by Michael Raymond dePaul and Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, pp. 1–12. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252732.001.0001.

Further References

Feldman, Fred. 2002. “Comments on Two of DePaul’s Puzzles [on dePaul (2002b)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65(3): 636–639.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1999. Knowledge in a Social World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0198238207.001.0001.
Huemer, Michael. 2005. Ethical Intuitionism. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, doi:10.1007/978-0-230-50317-5.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2003. The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.