Andrews Reath (reath)

Contributi a Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Reath, Andrews. 1988. “Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 26(4): 593–619.
Reath, Andrews. 1989. “Kant’s Theory of Moral Sensibility.” Kant-Studien 80(3): 284–302.
Reath, Andrews. 1995. “Understanding Kantian Autonomy.” in Proceedings of the 8th International Kant-Congress Memphis 1995, volume I.3, edited by Hoke Robinson, pp. 1185–1192. Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press.
Reath, Andrews. 2002. “Self-Legislation and Duties to Oneself.” in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays, volume I, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 349–370. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Reath, Andrews. 2003. “Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785): Duty and Autonomy.” in Classics in Western Philosophy. A Reader’s Guide, edited by Jorge J. E. Gracia, Gregory M. Reichberg, and Bernard N. Schumacher, pp. 346–356. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Reath, Andrews. 2005. “Kant’s Critical Account of Freedom.” in A Companion to Kant, edited by Graham H. Bird, pp. 275–290. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470996287.
Reath, Andrews. 2006. Agency and Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory. Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199288836.001.0001.
Reath, Andrews. 2009. “Setting Ends for Oneself Through Reason.” in Spheres of Reason. New Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity, edited by Simon Robertson, pp. 199–220. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199572939.001.0001.
Reath, Andrews. 2010a. “Contemporary Kantian Ethics.” in The Routledge Companion to Ethics, edited by John Skorupski, pp. 456–466. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Reath, Andrews. 2010b. “Introduction.” in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. A Critical Guide, edited by Andrews Reath and Jens Timmermann, pp. 1–10. Cambridge Critical Guides. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Reath, Andrews. 2010c. “Formal Principles and the Form of a Law.” in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. A Critical Guide, edited by Andrews Reath and Jens Timmermann, pp. 31–54. Cambridge Critical Guides. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Reath, Andrews. 2012. “A High Plains Drifter: Remarks on Engstrom (2012).” Analytic Philosophy 53(1): 79–88.
Reath, Andrews. 2013. “Kant’s Conception of the Autonomy of the Will.” in Kant on Moral Autonomy, edited by Oliver Sensen, pp. 32–52. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Reath, Andrews. 2015a. “Did Kant Hold that Rational Volition is Sub Ratione Boni?” in Reason, Value, and Respect. Kantian Themes from the Philosophy of Thomas E. Hill, Jr., edited by Mark Timmons and Robert N. Johnson, pp. 232–255. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199699575.001.0001.
Reath, Andrews. 2015b. “The ‘Kantian Roots’ of the Original Position.” in The Original Position, edited by Timothy Hinton, pp. 201–223. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781107375321.
Reath, Andrews. 2018. “The Law of a Free Will.” in Natur und Freiheit. Akten des XII. Internationalen Kant Kongresses, volume III, edited by Violetta L. Waibel, Margit Ruffing, and David Wagner, pp. 2077–2084. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Reath, Andrews and Timmermann, Jens, eds. 2010. Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. A Critical Guide. Cambridge Critical Guides. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Further References

Engstrom, Stephen P. 2009. The Form of Practical Knowledge: A Study of the Categorical Imperative. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Engstrom, Stephen P. 2012. “Summary of Engstrom (2009).” Analytic Philosophy 53(1): 58–60.