Mark Rowlands (rowlands)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Rowlands, Mark. 1990. “Anomalism, Supervenience, and Davidson on Content-Individuation.” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 20(3): 295–310.
Rowlands, Mark. 1991a. “A Defense of Behaviorism.” Behavior and Philosophy 19: 93–100.
Rowlands, Mark. 1991b. “Content, Narrow.” in Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology, edited by Hans Burkhardt and Barry Smith. Analytica: Investigations in Logic, Ontology, and the Philosophy of Language n. 2. München: Philosophia Verlag.
Rowlands, Mark. 1994. “Connectionism and the Language of Thought.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45: 485–503.
Rowlands, Mark. 1995a. Supervenience and Materialism. Aldershot, Hampshire: Avebury.
Rowlands, Mark. 1995b. “Against Methodological Solipsism: The Ecological Approach.” Philosophical Psychology 8: 5–24.
Rowlands, Mark. 1995c. “Externalism and Token-Token Identity.” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 24: 359–375.
Rowlands, Mark. 1996. “Teleological Semantics.” Mind 105: 279–304.
Rowlands, Mark. 1998. Animal Rights. Moral Theory and Practice. London: MacMillan Publishing Co. Second edition: Rowlands (2009a).
Rowlands, Mark. 1999. The Body in Mind: Understanding Cognitive Processes. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rowlands, Mark. 2001a. The Nature of Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rowlands, Mark. 2001b. “Consciousness and Higher-Order Thoughts.” Mind and Language 16: 290–310.
Rowlands, Mark. 2003. Externalism. Putting Mind and World Back Together Again. Stocksfield: Acumen Publishing.
Rowlands, Mark. 2007. “Mysterianism.” in The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, edited by Max Velmans and Susan Schneider, pp. 335–345. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Rowlands, Mark. 2008. “From the Inside: Consciousness and the First-Person Perspective.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16(3): 281–297.
Rowlands, Mark. 2009a. Animal Rights. Moral Theory and Practice. 2nd ed. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. First edition: Rowlands (1998).
Rowlands, Mark. 2009b. “Memory.” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology, edited by John Symons and Paco Calvo, pp. 336–345. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Rowlands, Mark. 2010. The New Science of the Mind. From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262014557.001.0001.
Rowlands, Mark. 2011. “Intentionality and Embodied Cognition.” Philosophical Topics 39(1): 81–97.
Rowlands, Mark. 2012. Can Animals Be Moral? Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199842001.001.0001.
Rowlands, Mark. 2013. “Enactivism, Intentionality, and Content.” American Philosophical Quarterly 50(3): 303–316.
Rowlands, Mark. 2015. “Hard Problems of Intentionality [on Hutto and Satne (2015)].” Philosophia 43(3): 741–746.
Rowlands, Mark. 2016a. “Moral Subjects.” in, pp. 469–474.
Rowlands, Mark. 2016b. “Animals Acting Morally.” in Animals. New Essays, edited by Andreas Blank, pp. 333–354. Basic Philosophical Concepts. München: Philosophia Verlag, doi:10.2307/j.ctv2nrzh43.
Rowlands, Mark. 2017a. Memory and the Self. Phenomenology, Science and Autobiography. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190241469.001.0001.
Rowlands, Mark. 2017b. “Arguing About Representation.” Synthese 194(11): 4215–4232.
Rowlands, Mark. 2018. “What is Moral Enhancement?” in Moral Enhancement: Critical Perspectives, edited by Michael Hauskeller and Lewis Coyne, pp. 5–18. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 83. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rowlands, Mark. 2019. Can Animals Be Persons? Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780190846039.001.0001.
Rowlands, Mark. 2020a. “Embodied Consciousness.” in The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness, edited by Uriah Kriegel, pp. 673–688. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rowlands, Mark. 2020b. “The Moral Animal.” in The Routledge Handbook of Animal Ethics, edited by Bob Fischer, pp. 83–91. Routledge Handbooks in Applied Ethics. London: Routledge.
Rowlands, Mark. 2021. World on Fire: Humans, Animals, and the Future of the Planet. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780197541890.001.0001.
Rowlands, Mark, Lau, Joe Y. F. and Deutsch, Max Emil. 2020. “Externalism about the Mind.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/content-externalism/.

Further References

Hutto, Daniel D. and Satne, Glenda. 2015. “The Natural Origins of Content.” Philosophia 43(3): 521–536.