Mark Sacks (sacks-m)
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Bibliography
Sacks, Mark. 1990. “Through a Glass Darkly: Vagueness in the Metaphysics of the Analytic Tradition.” in The Analytic Tradition: Meaning, Thought, and Knowledge, edited by David E. Bell and Neil Cooper, pp. 173–196. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Sacks, Mark. 1994. “Cognitive Closure and the Limits of Understanding.” Ratio 7(1): 26–42.
Sacks, Mark. 1997. “Transcendental Constraints and Transcendental Features.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5(2): 164–186.
Sacks, Mark. 1998. “The Subject, Normative Structure, and Externalism.” in The Story of Analytic Philosophy. Plots and Heroes, edited by Anat Biletzki and Anat Matar, pp. 88–107. Routledge Studies in Twentieth-Century Philosophy n. 1. London: Routledge.
Sacks, Mark. 1999. “Transcendental Idealism: Between Reproof and Celebration [critical notice to Moore (1997)].” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7(3): 373–386.
Sacks, Mark. 2000. “Transcendental Arguments and the Inference to Reality: A Reply to Stern (2000).” in Transcendental Arguments. Problems and Prospects, edited by Robert Stern, pp. 67–82. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sacks, Mark. 2003. Objectivity and Insight. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sacks, Mark. 2005a. “The Nature of Transcendental Arguments.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13(4): 439–460.
Sacks, Mark. 2005b. “Sartre, Strawson and Others.” Inquiry 48(3): 275–299.
Sacks, Mark. 2006. “Kant’s First Analogy and the Refutation of Idealism.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106: 115–132.
Further References
Moore, Adrian W. 1997. Points of View. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0198250622.001.0001.
Stern, Robert. 2000. “On Kant’s Response to Hume. The Second Analogy as Transcendental Argument.” in Transcendental Arguments. Problems and Prospects, edited by Robert Stern, pp. 47–66. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press.