Charles Sayward (sayward)
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Bibliography
Erlandson, Douglas K. and Sayward, Charles. 1981. “Is Heaven a Possible World?” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12(1): 55–58.
Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1977. “Theories of Truth and Semantical Primitives.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 6(3): 349–349.
Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1979. “A Problem about Conversational Implicature.” Linguistics and Philosophy 3(1): 19–25.
Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1981b. “Bound Variables and Schematic Letters.” Logique et Analyse 24(95–96): 425–429.
Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1984. “Do we need Quantification?” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 25: 289–302.
Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1987. “Domains of Discourse.” Logique et Analyse 30(117–118): 173–176.
Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1989a. “Can there be a Proof that Some Unprovable Arithmetic Sentence Is True?” Dialectica 43(3): 289–292.
Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1989b. “Are all Tautologies True?” Logique et Analyse 32(125–126): 3–14.
Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1990. “Moral Relativism and Deontic Logic.” Synthese 85(1): 139–152.
Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1991. “Prior and Lorenzen on Quantification.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 41: 151–173.
Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1992. “Classical Logic and Truth-Value Gaps.” Philosophical Papers 21(2): 141–150.
Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1993. “Theories of Truth and Truth-Value Gaps.” Linguistics and Philosophy 16(6): 551–559.
Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1994b. “The Internal/External Question.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 47: 31–41.
Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1996. Intensionality and Truth: An Essay on the Philosophy of A.N. Prior. Synthese Library n. 255. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1998. “Kripke on Necessity and Identity.” Philosophical Papers 27(3): 151–159.
Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 2002. “There is a Problem with Substitutional Quantification.” Theoria 68(1): 4–12.
Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles, eds. 2006a. Arithmetic and Ontology. A Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic. Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities n. 90. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Edited by Pieranna Garavaso.
Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 2006b. “Arithmetic and Ontology. A Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic.” in Arithmetic and Ontology. A Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic, edited by Philip Hugly and Charles Sayward, pp. 27–289. Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities n. 90. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Edited by Pieranna Garavaso.
Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 2006c. “Replies to Commentators [to Cheyne (2006), Shieh (2006) and van Bendegem (2006)].” in Arithmetic and Ontology. A Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic, edited by Philip Hugly and Charles Sayward, pp. 369–386. Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities n. 90. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Edited by Pieranna Garavaso.
Sayward, Charles. 1966. “Assertion and Belief.” Philosophical Studies 17(5): 74–78.
Sayward, Charles. 1970. “Williams’ Definition of ‘\(X\) is True’ [on Williams (1969)].” Analysis 30(3): 95–97.
Sayward, Charles. 1972. “True Propositions: A Reply to Williams (1971).” Analysis 32(3): 101–103.
Sayward, Charles. 1975. “The Province of Logic.” Analysis 36: 47–48.
Sayward, Charles. 1981. “Must Synonymous Predicates be Coextensive?” Logique et Analyse 24(95–96): 431–435.
Sayward, Charles. 1983a. “What is a Second-Order Theory Committed to?” Erkenntnis 20: 79–92.
Sayward, Charles. 1983b. “Minds, Substances, and Capacities.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44(2): 213–226.
Sayward, Charles. 1985. “God and Empty Terms.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 18(3): 149–152.
Sayward, Charles. 1988. “Is English Infinite?” Philosophical Papers 17(2): 141–151.
Sayward, Charles. 1989. “Does the Law of Excluded Middle Require Bivalence?” Erkenntnis 31(1): 129–137.
Sayward, Charles. 1993. “Definite Descriptions, Negation, and Necessitation.” Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies, New Series 13(1): 36–47.
Sayward, Charles. 1995. “Taking Actions Seriously.” Behavior and Philosophy 23: 51–60.
Sayward, Charles. 2000a. “Remarks on Peano Arithmetic.” Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies, New Series 20(1): 27–32.
Sayward, Charles. 2000b. “Understanding Sentences.” Philosophical Investigations 23(1): 48–53.
Sayward, Charles. 2001. “On some Much Maligned Remarks of Wittgenstein on Gödel.” Philosophical Investigations 24(3): 262–270.
Sayward, Charles. 2002a. “Geach on Generalization.” Dialogue. Revue canadienne de philosophie / Canadian Philosophical Review 41: 221–221.
Sayward, Charles. 2002b. “A Conversation about Numbers.” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 29(1–4): 191–209.
Sayward, Charles. 2002c. “A Conversation about Numbers and Knowledge.” American Philosophical Quarterly 39(3): 275–287.
Sayward, Charles. 2003a. “Does Scientific Realism Entail Mathematical Realism?” Facta Philosophica 5(1): 173–181.
Sayward, Charles. 2003b. “A Defense of Mill on Other Minds.” Dialectica 57(3): 315–322.
Sayward, Charles. 2005a. “Thompson Clarke and the Problem of Other Minds.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13(1): 1–14.
Sayward, Charles. 2005b. “A Wittgensteinian Philosophy of Mathematics.” Logic and Logical Philosophy 14(2): 129–144.
Sayward, Charles. 2006. “What is the Logic of Propositional Identity?” Logic and Logical Philosophy 15(1): 3–15.
Sayward, Charles. 2007. “Quine and his Critics on Truth-Functionality and Extensionality.” Logic and Logical Philosophy 16(1): 45–63.
Sayward, Charles. 2015. “A Fregean Conception of Singular Existence.” Logic and Logical Philosophy 24(1): 3–18.
Sayward, Charles and Durrant, Michael. 1967. “Austin on Whether Every Proposition Has a Contradictory.” Analysis 27: 167–170.
Further References
van Bendegem, Jean Paul. 2006. “Non-Realism, Nominalism and Strict Finitism. The Sheer Complexity of It All.” in Arithmetic and Ontology. A Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic, edited by Philip Hugly and Charles Sayward, pp. 343–367. Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities n. 90. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Edited by Pieranna Garavaso.
Cheyne, Colin. 2006. “Numbers, Reference, and Abstraction.” in Arithmetic and Ontology. A Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic, edited by Philip Hugly and Charles Sayward, pp. 191–316. Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities n. 90. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Edited by Pieranna Garavaso.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1970. “ ‘– is true’ ’ [on Williams (1969)].” Analysis 30(3): 98–99.
Jones, O. R. 1970. “On Truth: A Reply to Williams (1969).” Analysis 31(1): 24–29.
Shieh, Sanford. 2006. “What is Non-Realism about Arithmetic?” in Arithmetic and Ontology. A Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic, edited by Philip Hugly and Charles Sayward, pp. 317–342. Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities n. 90. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Edited by Pieranna Garavaso.
Williams, Christopher J. F. 1969. “What does ‘\(X\) is True’ say about \(X\)?” Analysis 29(4): 113–124.
Williams, Christopher J. F. 1971. “Truth: A Composite Rejoinder [to Sayward (1970), Harman (1970), and Jones (1970)].” Analysis 32(2): 57–64.