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Charles Sayward (sayward)

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Bibliography

    Erlandson, Douglas K. and Sayward, Charles. 1981. Is Heaven a Possible World? International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12(1): 55–58.
    Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1975a. Prior on Propositional Identity.” Analysis 36: 182–184.
    Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1975b. Quine’s Way Out.” Analysis 36: 28–37.
    Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1977. Theories of Truth and Semantical Primitives.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 6(3): 349–349.
    Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1979. A Problem about Conversational Implicature.” Linguistics and Philosophy 3(1): 19–25.
    Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1980. Tarski and Proper Classes.” Analysis 40: 205–207.
    Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1981a. Expressions and tokens.” Analysis 41: 181–187.
    Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1981b. Bound Variables and Schematic Letters.” Logique et Analyse 24(95–96): 425–429.
    Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1984. Do we need Quantification? Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 25: 289–302.
    Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1987. Domains of Discourse.” Logique et Analyse 30(117–118): 173–176.
    Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1989a. Can there be a Proof that Some Unprovable Arithmetic Sentence Is True? Dialectica 43(3): 289–292.
    Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1989b. Are all Tautologies True? Logique et Analyse 32(125–126): 3–14.
    Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1990. Moral Relativism and Deontic Logic.” Synthese 85(1): 139–152.
    Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1991. Prior and Lorenzen on Quantification.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 41: 151–173.
    Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1992. Classical Logic and Truth-Value Gaps.” Philosophical Papers 21(2): 141–150.
    Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1993. Theories of Truth and Truth-Value Gaps.” Linguistics and Philosophy 16(6): 551–559.
    Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1994a. Quantifying Over the Reals.” Synthese 101(1): 53–64.
    Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1994b. The Internal/External Question.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 47: 31–41.
    Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1996. Intensionality and Truth: An Essay on the Philosophy of A.N. Prior. Synthese Library n. 255. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1998. Kripke on Necessity and Identity.” Philosophical Papers 27(3): 151–159.
    Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 2002. There is a Problem with Substitutional Quantification.” Theoria 68(1): 4–12.
    Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles, eds. 2006a. Arithmetic and Ontology. A Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic. Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities n. 90. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Edited by Pieranna Garavaso.
    Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 2006b. Arithmetic and Ontology. A Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic.” in Arithmetic and Ontology. A Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic, edited by Philip Hugly and Charles Sayward, pp. 27–289. Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities n. 90. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Edited by Pieranna Garavaso.
    Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 2006c. Replies to Commentators [to Cheyne (2006), Shieh (2006) and van Bendegem (2006)].” in Arithmetic and Ontology. A Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic, edited by Philip Hugly and Charles Sayward, pp. 369–386. Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities n. 90. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Edited by Pieranna Garavaso.
    Sayward, Charles. 1966. Assertion and Belief.” Philosophical Studies 17(5): 74–78.
    Sayward, Charles. 1970. Williams’ Definition of \(X\) is True’ [on Williams (1969)].” Analysis 30(3): 95–97.
    Sayward, Charles. 1972. True Propositions: A Reply to Williams (1971).” Analysis 32(3): 101–103.
    Sayward, Charles. 1975. The Province of Logic.” Analysis 36: 47–48.
    Sayward, Charles. 1981. Must Synonymous Predicates be Coextensive? Logique et Analyse 24(95–96): 431–435.
    Sayward, Charles. 1983a. What is a Second-Order Theory Committed to? Erkenntnis 20: 79–92.
    Sayward, Charles. 1983b. Minds, Substances, and Capacities.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44(2): 213–226.
    Sayward, Charles. 1985. God and Empty Terms.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 18(3): 149–152.
    Sayward, Charles. 1988. Is English Infinite? Philosophical Papers 17(2): 141–151.
    Sayward, Charles. 1989. Does the Law of Excluded Middle Require Bivalence? Erkenntnis 31(1): 129–137.
    Sayward, Charles. 1993. Definite Descriptions, Negation, and Necessitation.” Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies, New Series 13(1): 36–47.
    Sayward, Charles. 1995. Taking Actions Seriously.” Behavior and Philosophy 23: 51–60.
    Sayward, Charles. 2000a. Remarks on Peano Arithmetic.” Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies, New Series 20(1): 27–32.
    Sayward, Charles. 2000b. Understanding Sentences.” Philosophical Investigations 23(1): 48–53.
    Sayward, Charles. 2001. On some Much Maligned Remarks of Wittgenstein on Gödel.” Philosophical Investigations 24(3): 262–270.
    Sayward, Charles. 2002a. Geach on Generalization.” Dialogue. Revue canadienne de philosophie / Canadian Philosophical Review 41: 221–221.
    Sayward, Charles. 2002b. A Conversation about Numbers.” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 29(1–4): 191–209.
    Sayward, Charles. 2002c. A Conversation about Numbers and Knowledge.” American Philosophical Quarterly 39(3): 275–287.
    Sayward, Charles. 2003a. Does Scientific Realism Entail Mathematical Realism? Facta Philosophica 5(1): 173–181.
    Sayward, Charles. 2003b. A Defense of Mill on Other Minds.” Dialectica 57(3): 315–322.
    Sayward, Charles. 2005a. Thompson Clarke and the Problem of Other Minds.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13(1): 1–14.
    Sayward, Charles. 2005b. A Wittgensteinian Philosophy of Mathematics.” Logic and Logical Philosophy 14(2): 129–144.
    Sayward, Charles. 2006. What is the Logic of Propositional Identity? Logic and Logical Philosophy 15(1): 3–15.
    Sayward, Charles. 2007. Quine and his Critics on Truth-Functionality and Extensionality.” Logic and Logical Philosophy 16(1): 45–63.
    Sayward, Charles. 2015. A Fregean Conception of Singular Existence.” Logic and Logical Philosophy 24(1): 3–18.
    Sayward, Charles and Durrant, Michael. 1967. Austin on Whether Every Proposition Has a Contradictory.” Analysis 27: 167–170.
    Sayward, Charles and Voss, Stephen H. 1972. Absurdity and Spanning.” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 2(3): 227–238.
    Voss, Stephen H. and Sayward, Charles. 1976. Eternal Sentences.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 54(1): 14–23.

Further References

    van Bendegem, Jean Paul. 2006. Non-Realism, Nominalism and Strict Finitism. The Sheer Complexity of It All.” in Arithmetic and Ontology. A Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic, edited by Philip Hugly and Charles Sayward, pp. 343–367. Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities n. 90. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Edited by Pieranna Garavaso.
    Cheyne, Colin. 2006. Numbers, Reference, and Abstraction.” in Arithmetic and Ontology. A Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic, edited by Philip Hugly and Charles Sayward, pp. 191–316. Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities n. 90. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Edited by Pieranna Garavaso.
    Harman, Gilbert H. 1970. ‘– is true’ ’ [on Williams (1969)].” Analysis 30(3): 98–99.
    Jones, O. R. 1970. On Truth: A Reply to Williams (1969).” Analysis 31(1): 24–29.
    Shieh, Sanford. 2006. What is Non-Realism about Arithmetic? in Arithmetic and Ontology. A Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic, edited by Philip Hugly and Charles Sayward, pp. 317–342. Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities n. 90. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Edited by Pieranna Garavaso.
    Williams, Christopher J. F. 1969. What does \(X\) is True’ say about \(X\)? Analysis 29(4): 113–124.
    Williams, Christopher J. F. 1971. Truth: A Composite Rejoinder [to Sayward (1970), Harman (1970), and Jones (1970)].” Analysis 32(2): 57–64.