Eric Schwitzgebel (schwitzgebel)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Cited in the following articles

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

French, Peter A., Wettstein, Howard K. and Schwitzgebel, Eric, eds. 2015. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 39: Philosophy and Science Fiction. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Gopnik, Alison and Schwitzgebel, Eric. 1998. “Whose Concepts are They, Anyway? The Role of Philosophical Intuition in Empirical Psychology.” in Rethinking Intuition, edited by Michael Raymond dePaul and William M. Ramsey, pp. 75–93. Studies in epistemology and cognitive theory. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
Ivanhoe, Philip J., Flanagan, Owen, Jr., Harrison, Victoria S., Hagop, Sarkissian and Schwitzgebel, Eric, eds. 2018. The Oneness Hypothesis Beyond the Boundary of Self. New York: Columbia University Press.
Myers-Schulz, Blake and Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2013. “Knowing that P without Believing that P.” Noûs 47(2): 371–384.
Schwitzgebel, Eric. 1999. “Representation and Desire: A Philosophical Error with Consequences for Theory-of-Mind Research.” Philosophical Psychology 12: 157–180.
Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2001. “In-Between Believing.” The Philosophical Quarterly 51(202): 76–82.
Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2002a. “A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief.” Noûs 36(2): 249–275.
Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2002b. “Why did We Think We Dreamed in Black and White?” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 33(4): 649–660.
Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2006a. “Do Things Look Flat?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72(3): 589–599.
Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2006b. “Belief.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2006/entries/belief/.
Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2007. “Human Nature and Moral Education in Mencius, Xunzi, Hobbes, and Rousseau.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 24(2): 147–168.
Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2008. “The Unreliability of Naive Introspection.” The Philosophical Review 117(2): 245–273.
Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2010a. “Acting Contrary to Our Professed Beliefs, or The Gulf Between Occurrent Judgment and Dispositional Belief.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91: 531–553.
Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2010b. “Belief.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/belief/.
Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2010c. “Introspection.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/introspection/.
Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2011a. Perplexities of Consciousness. Life and Mind: Philosophical Issues in Biology and Psychology. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2011b. “Belief.” in The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 14–24. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2012. “Introspection, What?” in Introspection and Consciousness, edited by Declan Smithies and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 29–48. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.001.0001.
Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2013a. “Précis of Schwitzgebel (2011a).” Philosophical Studies 165(3): 1161–1163.
Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2013b. “Reply to Kriegel (2013), Smithies (2013) and Spener (2013).” Philosophical Studies 165(3): 1195–1206.
Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2014a. “The Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92(4): 665–682.
Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2014b. “Introspection.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/introspection/.
Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2015a. “If Materialism is True, the United States is Probably Conscious.” Philosophical Studies 172(7): 1697–1721.
Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2015b. “Belief.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/belief/.
Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2016. “Is the United States Phenomenally Conscious? Reply to Kammerer (2015).” Philosophia 44(3): 877–883.
Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2019a. “Belief.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/belief/.
Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2019b. “Introspection.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/introspection/.
Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2023. “Belief.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/belief/.
Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2024. “Introspection.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2024/entries/introspection/.
Schwitzgebel, Eric and Garza, Mara. 2015. “A Defense of the Rights of Artificial Intelligences.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 39: Philosophy and Science Fiction, edited by Peter A. French, Howard K. Wettstein, and Eric Schwitzgebel, pp. 98–119. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Schwitzgebel, Eric and Gordon, Michael S. 2000. “How Well Do We Know Our Own Conscious Experience? The Case of Human Echolocation.” Philosophical Topics 28(2): 235–246.
Schwitzgebel, Eric and Rust, Joshua. 2009. “The Moral Behaviour of Ethicists: Peer Opinion.” Mind 118(472): 1043–1059.

Further References

Kammerer, François. 2015. “How a Materialist Can Deny That the United States is Probably Conscious – Response to Schwitzgebel.” Philosophia 43(4): 1047–1057.
Kriegel, Uriah. 2013. “A Hesitant Defense of Introspection [on Schwitzgebel (2011a)].” Philosophical Studies 165(3): 1165–1176.
Smithies, Declan. 2013. “On the Unreliability of Introspection [on Schwitzgebel (2011a)].” Philosophical Studies 165(3): 1177–1186.
Spener, Maja. 2013. “Moderate Scepticism about Introspection [on Schwitzgebel (2011a)].” Philosophical Studies 165(3): 1187–1194.