Alison Gopnik (gopnik-a)
Cited in the following articles
Self-Knowledge and Interpersonal ReasoningContributions to Philosophie.ch
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Bibliography
Gopnik, Alison. 1990. “Developing the idea of intentionality: Children’s theories of mind.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20: 89–114.
Gopnik, Alison. 1993. “How We Know Our Minds: The Illusions of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16(1): 1–14, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00028636.
Gopnik, Alison. 1996. “Theories and Modules: Creation Myths, Developmental Realities, and Neurath’s Boat.” in Theories of Theories of Mind, edited by Peter Carruthers and Peter K. Smith, pp. 169–183. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gopnik, Alison. 2000. “Explanation as Orgasm and the Drive for Causal Knowledge: The Function, Evolution, and Phenomenology of the Theory Formation System.” in Explanation and Cognition, edited by Frank C. Keil and Robert A. Wilson, pp. 299–324. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Gopnik, Alison. 2001. “Theories, Language, and Culture: Whorf Without Wincing.” in Language Acquisition and Conceptual Development, edited by Melissa Bowerman and Stephen C. Levinson, pp. 45–69. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gopnik, Alison. 2003. “The Theory Theory as an Alternative to the Innateness Hypothesis.” in Chomsky and His Critics, edited by Louise M. Antony and Norbert H. Hornstein, pp. 238–254. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470690024.
Gopnik, Alison. 2009. The Philosophical Baby. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.
Gopnik, Alison and Kushnir, Tamar. 2014. “The Origins and Development of Our Conception of Free Will.” in Surrounding Free Will. Philosophy, Psychology, Neuroscience, edited by Alfred R. Mele, pp. 4–24. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333950.001.0001.
Gopnik, Alison and Mettzoff, Andrew N. 1994. “Minds, Bodies, and Persons: Young Children’s Understanding of the Self and Others as Reflected in Imitation and Theory of Mind Research.” in Self-Awareness in Animals and Humans: Developmental Perspectives, pp. 166–186. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gopnik, Alison and Mettzoff, Andrew N. 1997. Words, Thoughts, and Theories. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Gopnik, Alison and Mettzoff, Andrew N. 1998. “Theories vs. Modules: to the Max and Beyond. A Reply to Poulin-Dubois and to Stich and Nichols.” Mind and Language 13(3): 450–456.
Gopnik, Alison and Schulz, Laura, eds. 2007a. Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy and Computation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gopnik, Alison and Schulz, Laura. 2007b. “Introduction.” in Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy and Computation, edited by Alison Gopnik and Laura Schulz, pp. 1–17. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gopnik, Alison and Schwitzgebel, Eric. 1998. “Whose Concepts are They, Anyway? The Role of Philosophical Intuition in Empirical Psychology.” in Rethinking Intuition, edited by Michael Raymond dePaul and William M. Ramsey, pp. 75–93. Studies in epistemology and cognitive theory. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
Gopnik, Alison and Wellman, Henry M. 1995. “Why the Child’s Theory of Mind Really Is a Theory.” Mind and Language 10: 145–171. Reprinted in Davies and Stone (1995, 259–273).
Meltzoff, Andrew N. and Gopnik, Alison. 2013. “Learning about the mind from evidence: Children’s development of intuitive theories of perception and personality.” in Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives from Developmental Social Neuroscience, edited by Simon Baron-Cohen, Helen Tager-Flusberg, and Michael V. Lombardo, pp. 19–34. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Richardson, Thomas S., Schulz, Laura and Gopnik, Alison. 2007. “Data-Mining Probabilists or Experimental Determinists? A Dialogue on the Principles Underlying Causal Learning in Children.” in Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy and Computation, edited by Alison Gopnik and Laura Schulz, pp. 208–230. Oxford: Oxford University Press.