Nishi Shah (shah-n)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Evans, Matthew and Shah, Nishi. 2012. “Mental Agency and Metaethics.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume VII, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 80–109. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653492.001.0001.
Hussain, Nadeem J. Z. and Shah, Nishi. 2013. “Meta-Ethics and Its Discontents: A Case Study of Korsgaard.” in Constructivism in Ethics, edited by Carla Bagnoli, pp. 82–107. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shah, Nishi. 2002. “Clearing Space for Doxastic Voluntarism.” The Monist 85(3): 436–445.
Shah, Nishi. 2003. “How Truth Governs Belief.” The Philosophical Review 112(4): 447–482.
Shah, Nishi. 2006. “A New Argument for Evidentialism.” The Philosophical Quarterly 56(225): 481–498.
Shah, Nishi. 2008. “How Action Governs Intention.” Philosophers' imprint 8(5).
Shah, Nishi. 2010. “The Limits of Normative Detachment.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110(3): 347–371.
Shah, Nishi. 2011. “Can Reasons for Belief Be Debunked?” in Reasons for Belief, edited by Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, pp. 94–108. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shah, Nishi. 2013. “Why we Reason the Way we Do.” in Philosophical Issues 23: Epistemic Agency, edited by Ernest Sosa, Enrique Villanueva, and Baron Reed, pp. 311–325. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Shah, Nishi and Hussain, Nadeem J. Z. 2006. “Misunderstanding Metaethics: Korsgaard’s Rejection of Realism.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume I, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 265–294. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shah, Nishi and Kasser, Jeffery L. 2006. “The Metaethics of Belief: An Expressivist Reading of The Will to Believe.” Social Epistemology 20(1): 1–17.
Shah, Nishi and Velleman, Daniel J. 2005. “Doxastic Deliberation.” The Philosophical Review 114(4): 497–534.