Nishi Shah (shah-n)

Menzionato/a in queste pagine del portale

Contributi a Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Evans, Matthew and Shah, Nishi. 2012. “Mental Agency and Metaethics.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume VII, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 80–109. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653492.001.0001.
Hussain, Nadeem J. Z. and Shah, Nishi. 2013. “Meta-Ethics and Its Discontents: A Case Study of Korsgaard.” in Constructivism in Ethics, edited by Carla Bagnoli, pp. 82–107. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shah, Nishi. 2002. “Clearing Space for Doxastic Voluntarism.” The Monist 85(3): 436–445.
Shah, Nishi. 2003. “How Truth Governs Belief.” The Philosophical Review 112(4): 447–482.
Shah, Nishi. 2006. “A New Argument for Evidentialism.” The Philosophical Quarterly 56(225): 481–498.
Shah, Nishi. 2008. “How Action Governs Intention.” Philosophers' imprint 8(5).
Shah, Nishi. 2010. “The Limits of Normative Detachment.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110(3): 347–371.
Shah, Nishi. 2011. “Can Reasons for Belief Be Debunked?” in Reasons for Belief, edited by Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, pp. 94–108. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shah, Nishi. 2013. “Why we Reason the Way we Do.” in Philosophical Issues 23: Epistemic Agency, edited by Ernest Sosa, Enrique Villanueva, and Baron Reed, pp. 311–325. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Shah, Nishi and Hussain, Nadeem J. Z. 2006. “Misunderstanding Metaethics: Korsgaard’s Rejection of Realism.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume I, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 265–294. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shah, Nishi and Kasser, Jeffery L. 2006. “The Metaethics of Belief: An Expressivist Reading of The Will to Believe.” Social Epistemology 20(1): 1–17.
Shah, Nishi and Velleman, Daniel J. 2005. “Doxastic Deliberation.” The Philosophical Review 114(4): 497–534.