Jan Sprenger (sprenger)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Colombo, Matteo and Sprenger, Jan. 2014. “The Predictive Mind and Chess-Playing: A Reply to Shand (2014).” Analysis 74(4): 603–608.
Hartmann, Stephan, Martini, Carlo and Sprenger, Jan. 2009. “Consensual Decision-Making Among Epistemic Peers.” Episteme 6(2): 110–129.
Hartmann, Stephan and Sprenger, Jan. 2011. “Bayesian Epistemology.” in The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 609–620. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Hartmann, Stephan and Sprenger, Jan. 2012. “Judgment Aggregation and the Problem of Tracking the Truth.” Synthese 187(1): 209–221.
Martini, Carlo and Sprenger, Jan. 2018. “Opinion Aggregation and Individual Expertise.” in Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge. New Essays, edited by Thomas Boyer-Kassem, Conor Mayo-Wilson, and Michael Weisberg, pp. 180–202. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780190680534.001.0001.
Martini, Carlo, Sprenger, Jan and Colyvan, Mark. 2013. “Resolving Disagreement Through Mutual Respect.” Erkenntnis 78(4): 881–898.
Peden, William and Sprenger, Jan. 2021. “Statistical Significance Testing in Economics.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Economics, edited by Conrad Heilmann and Julian Reiss, pp. 423–432. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge. Copyright year incorrectly given as 2022.
Reiss, Julian and Sprenger, Jan. 2014. “Scientific Objectivity.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/scientific-objectivity/.
Reiss, Julian and Sprenger, Jan. 2020. “Scientific Objectivity.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/scientific-objectivity/.
Sprenger, Jan. 2011a. “Science without (Parametric) Models: The Case of Bootstrap Resampling.” Synthese 180(1): 65–76.
Sprenger, Jan. 2011b. “Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation.” Philosophy Compass 6(7): 497–508.
Sprenger, Jan. 2011c. “Hempel and the Paradoxes of Confirmation.” in Handbook of the History of Logic. Volume 10: Inductive Logic, edited by Dov M. Gabbay, Stephan Hartmann, and John Woods, pp. 235–264. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co.
Sprenger, Jan. 2013. “A Synthesis of Hempelian and Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation.” Erkenntnis 78(4): 727–738.
Sprenger, Jan. 2016. “Bayesianism vs. Frequentism in Statistical Inference.” in The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy, edited by Alan Hájek and Christopher R. Hitchcock, pp. 382–405. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199607617.001.0001.
Sprenger, Jan. 2024. “The Paradoxes of Confirmation.” in The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence, edited by Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Clayton Littlejohn, pp. 113–123. Routledge Handbooks. New York: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315672687.
Sprenger, Jan and Hartmann, Stephan. 2019. Bayesian Philosophy of Science. Variations on a Theme by the Reverend Thomas Bayes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199672110.001.0001.
Sprenger, Jan and Heesen, Remco. 2011. “The Bounded Strength of Weak Expectations.” Mind 120(479): 819–832.
Sprenger, Jan and Weinberger, Naftali. 2021. “Simpson’s Paradox.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/paradox-simpson/.

Further References

Shand, John. 2014. “Predictive Mind, Cognition, and Chess.” Analysis 74(2): 244–249.