Mark Colyvan (colyvan)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Baker, Alan and Colyvan, Mark. 2011. “Indexing and Mathematical Explanation.” Philosophia Mathematica 19(3): 323–334.
Baron, Sam, Colyvan, Mark and Ripley, David. 2017. “How Mathematics Can Make a Difference.” Philosophers’ Imprint 17(3).
Beall, J. C. and Colyvan, Mark. 2001a. “Looking for Contradictions.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79(4).
Beall, J. C. and Colyvan, Mark. 2001b. “Heaps of Gluts and Hyde-ing the Sorites [reply to Hyde (2001)].” Mind 110(438): 401–408.
Bueno, Otávio and Colyvan, Mark. 2003. “Paradox Without Satisfaction.” Analysis 63(2): 152–156.
Bueno, Otávio and Colyvan, Mark. 2004. “Logical Non-Apriorism and the ‘Law’ of Non-Contradiction.” in The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays, edited by Graham Priest, J. C. Beall, and Bradley Armour-Garb, pp. 156–175. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199265176.001.0001.
Bueno, Otávio and Colyvan, Mark. 2011. “An Inferential Conception of the Application of Mathematics.” Noûs 45(2): 345–374.
Bueno, Otávio and Colyvan, Mark. 2012. “Just What is Vagueness?” Ratio 25(1): 19–33.
Colyvan, Mark. 1998a. “In Defence of Indispensability.” Philosophia Mathematica 6(1): 39–62.
Colyvan, Mark. 1998b. “Can the Eleatic Principle Be Justified?” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28(3): 313–336.
Colyvan, Mark. 1998c. “Indispensability Arguments in the Philosophy of Mathematics.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr1999/entries/mathphil-indis/.
Colyvan, Mark. 2000. “Conceptual Contingency and Abstract Existence.” The Philosophical Quarterly 50(198): 87–91.
Colyvan, Mark. 2001a. The Indispensability of Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/019513754X.001.0001.
Colyvan, Mark. 2001b. “Russel on Metaphysical Vagueness.” Principia 5: 87–98.
Colyvan, Mark. 2001c. “Review of Burgess and Rosen (1997).” Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic 67(1): 146–150.
Colyvan, Mark. 2002. “Mathematics and Aesthetic Considerations in Science.” Mind 111(411): 69–74.
Colyvan, Mark. 2004. “Review of Giaquinto (2002).” The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 10(2): 214–216.
Colyvan, Mark. 2006. “Scientific Realism and Mathematical Nominalism: A Marriage Made in Hell.” in Rationality and Reality. Conversations with Alan Musgrave, edited by Colin Cheyne and John Worrall, pp. 225–238. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science n. 20. Dordrecht: Springer.
Colyvan, Mark. 2007. “Mathematical Recreation versus Mathematical Knowledge.” in Mathematical Knowledge, edited by Mary Leng, Alexander C. Paseau, and Michael D. Potter, pp. 109–122. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199228249.001.0001.
Colyvan, Mark. 2008a. “The Ontological Commitments of Inconsistent Theories.” Philosophical Studies 141(1): 115–123.
Colyvan, Mark. 2008b. “Vagueness and Truth.” in From Truth to Reality. New Essays in Logic and Metaphysics, edited by Heather Dyke, pp. 29–41. London: Routledge.
Colyvan, Mark. 2008c. “Population Ecology.” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Biology, edited by Sahotra Sarkar and Anya Plutynski, pp. 301–320. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9780470696590.
Colyvan, Mark. 2008d. “Who’s Afraid of Inconsistent Mathematics?” in Philosophy of Mathematics: Set Theory, Measuring Theories, and Nominalism, pp. 28–39. Logos n. 13. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, doi:10.1515/9783110323689.
Colyvan, Mark. 2008e. “Indispensability Arguments in the Philosophy of Mathematics.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2008/entries/mathphil-indis/.
Colyvan, Mark. 2009a. “Naturalizing Normativity.” in Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, edited by David Braddon-Mitchell and Robert Nola, pp. 303–314. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262012560.001.0001.
Colyvan, Mark. 2009b. “Mathematics and the World.” in Philosophy of Mathematics, edited by Andrew David Irvine, pp. 651–702. Handbook of the Philosophy of Science n. 4. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.
Colyvan, Mark. 2009c. “Applying Inconsistent Mathematics.” in New Waves in Philosophy of Mathematics, edited by Otávio Bueno and Øystein Linnebo, pp. 160–172. New Waves in Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Colyvan, Mark. 2010. “There is no Easy Road to Nominalism.” Mind 119(474): 285–306.
Colyvan, Mark. 2011. “Indispensability Arguments in the Philosophy of Mathematics.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/mathphil-indis/.
Colyvan, Mark. 2012. “Road Work Ahead: Heavy Machinery on the Easy Road.” Mind 121(484): 1031–1046.
Colyvan, Mark. 2013. “Idealisations in Normative Models.” Synthese 190(8): 1337–1350.
Colyvan, Mark. 2014. “The Undeniable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Special Sciences.” in New Directions in the Philosophy of Science, edited by Maria Carla Galavotti, Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao J. González, Stephan Hartmann, Thomas E. Uebel, and Marcel Weber, pp. 63–74. The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective n. 5. Cham: Springer.
Colyvan, Mark. 2015. “Indispensability Arguments in the Philosophy of Mathematics.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/mathphil-indis/.
Colyvan, Mark. 2016. “Time Enough for Explanation.” The Journal of Philosophy 113(2): 61–88.
Colyvan, Mark. 2019. “Indispensability Arguments in the Philosophy of Mathematics.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/mathphil-indis/.
Colyvan, Mark, Cox, Damian and Steele, Katie. 2010. “Modelling the Moral Dimension of Decisions.” Noûs 44(3): 503–529.
Colyvan, Mark, Cusbert, John and McQueen, Kelvin J. 2018. “Two Flavours of Mathematical Explanation.” in Explanation Beyond Causation. Philosophical Perspectives on Non-Causal Explanations, edited by Alexander Reutlinger and Juha Saatsi, pp. 231–249. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198777946.001.0001.
Colyvan, Mark, Garfield, Jay L. and Priest, Graham. 2005. “Problems with the Argument From Fine Tuning.” Synthese 145(3): 325–338.
Colyvan, Mark and Hájek, Alan. 2016. “Making Ado without Expectations.” Mind 125(499): 829–857.
Lyon, Aidan and Colyvan, Mark. 2008. “The Explanatory Power of Phase Spaces.” Philosophia Mathematica 16(2): 227–243.
Martini, Carlo, Sprenger, Jan and Colyvan, Mark. 2013. “Resolving Disagreement Through Mutual Respect.” Erkenntnis 78(4): 881–898.
Muldoon, Ryan, Lisciandra, Chiara and Colyvan, Mark. 2014. “Disagreement behind the Veil of Ignorance.” Philosophical Studies 170(3): 377–394.
Weber, Zach and Colyvan, Mark. 2010. “A Topological Sorites.” The Journal of Philosophy 107(6): 311–325.
Weber, Zach, Ripley, David, Priest, Graham, Hyde, Dominic and Colyvan, Mark. 2014. “Tolerating Gluts.” Mind 123(491): 813–828.
Zalta, Edward N. and Colyvan, Mark. 1999. “Mathematics: truth and fiction?” Philosophia Mathematica 7(3): 336–349.

Further References

Burgess, John P. and Rosen, Gideon. 1997. A Subject with No Object: Strategies for Nominalistic Interpretations of Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0198250126.001.0001.
Giaquinto, Marcus. 2002. The Search for Certainty. A Philosophical Account of the Foundations of Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hyde, Dominic. 2001. “A Reply to Beall and Colyvan (2001a).” Mind 110.