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Michael Thau (thau)

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

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Bibliography

    Byrne, Alex and Thau, Michael. 1996. In Defense of the Hybrid View.” Mind 105: 139–149.
    Leblanc, Hugues, Roeper, Thomas, Thau, Michael and Weaver, George. 1991. Henkin’s Completeness Proof: Forty Years Later.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 32: 212–232.
    Thau, Michael. 1994. Undermining and Admissibility.” Mind 103: 491–503.
    Thau, Michael. 2002. Consciousness and Cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Thau, Michael. 2004. What is Disjunctivism? Philosophical Studies 120(1–3): 193–253.
    Thau, Michael. 2007a. Précis of Thau (2002).” Philosophical Studies 132(3): 565–570.
    Thau, Michael. 2007b. Response to Jackson (2007).” Philosophical Studies 132(3): 607–623.
    Thau, Michael. 2007c. Response to Kobes (2007).” Philosophical Studies 132(3): 625–636.
    Thau, Michael. 2007d. Response to Shoemaker (2007).” Philosophical Studies 132(3): 637–659.

Further References

    Jackson, Frank. 2007. Is Belief an Internal State? [on Thau (2002)].” Philosophical Studies 132(3): 571–580.
    Kobes, Bernard W. 2007. The Philosopher’s Projective Error [on Thau (2002)].” Philosophical Studies 132(3): 581–593.
    Shoemaker, Sydney S. 2007. Thau on Perception [on Thau (2002)].” Philosophical Studies 132(3): 595–606.