Alex Byrne (byrne-a)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Byrne, Alex. 1993a. “Truth in Fiction: The Story Continued.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71(1): 24–35.
Byrne, Alex. 1993b. “Review of Currie (1990).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71: 503–505.
Byrne, Alex. 1993c. “Review of Mellor (1991).” The Philosophical Review 102: 285–287.
Byrne, Alex. 1994a. “Behaviourism.” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, edited by Samuel D. Guttenplan, pp. 132–139. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9781405164597.
Byrne, Alex. 1994b. “Review of Bilgrami (1992).” The Philosophical Review 103: 356–358.
Byrne, Alex. 1996a. “On Misinterpreting Kripke’s Wittgenstein.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56.
Byrne, Alex. 1996b. “Spin Control: comment on McDowell (1994).” in Philosophical Issues 7: Perception, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 261–273. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Byrne, Alex. 1997. “Some like It HOT: Consciousness and Higher-Order Thoughts.” Philosophical Studies 86(2): 103–129.
Byrne, Alex. 1998a. “Interpretivism.” in Response-Dependence, edited by Roberto Casati and Christine Tappolet, pp. 205–230. European Review of Philosophy n. 3. Stanford, California: CSLI Publications.
Byrne, Alex. 1998b. “Dennett vs. Gibson [Comments on Pessoa, Thompson and Noë (1998)].” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21(6).
Byrne, Alex. 1998c. “Review of Kim (1996).” The Philosophical Review 107: 113–115.
Byrne, Alex. 1999a. “Cosmic Hermeneutics.” in Philosophical Perspectives 13: Epistemology, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 347–383. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Byrne, Alex. 1999b. “Subjectivity is No Barrier [Comments on Palmer (1999)].” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22(6).
Byrne, Alex. 1999c. “Review of Vision (1997).” The Philosophical Review 108: 415–418.
Byrne, Alex. 2000. “Chalmers’ Two-Dimensional Argument Against Physicalism.” MIT Working Papers in Linguistics and Philosophy 1.
Byrne, Alex. 2001a. “Do Colours Look Like Dispositions? Reply to Langsam (2000) and Others.” The Philosophical Quarterly 51(203): 238–245.
Byrne, Alex. 2001b. “Intentionalism Defended.” The Philosophical Review 110(2): 199–240.
Byrne, Alex. 2001c. “Review of Stroud (2001).” The Philosophical Quarterly 51(204): 395–398.
Byrne, Alex. 2001d. “Review of Carruthers (2000).” Mind 110: 1057–1062.
Byrne, Alex. 2001e. “Chalmers on Epistemic Content.” Unpublished manuscript.
Byrne, Alex. 2002a. “Yes, Virginia, Lemons are Yellow [on Stroud (2001)].” Philosophical Studies 108(1–2): 213–222.
Byrne, Alex. 2002b. “Semantic Values? [on Lance and Hawthorne (1997)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65(1): 201–207.
Byrne, Alex. 2002c. “Something About Mary.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 63: 123–140.  “Essays on the Philosophy of Terence Horgan,” ed. by Johannes L. Brandl and Olga Markic.
Byrne, Alex. 2003a. “Color and Similarity.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66(3): 641–665.
Byrne, Alex. 2003b. “Consciousness and Nonconceptual Content [on Tye (2000)].” Philosophical Studies 113(3): 261–274.
Byrne, Alex. 2004a. “How Hard are the Sceptical Paradoxes?” Noûs 38: 299–325.
Byrne, Alex. 2004b. “Review of Levine (2001).” The Philosophical Review 113: 594–597.
Byrne, Alex. 2004c. “Review of Tye (2000).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68(1): 245–247.
Byrne, Alex. 2004d. “What Phenomenal Consciousness is Like.” in Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. An Anthology, edited by Rocco J. Gennaro, pp. 203–226. Advances in Consciousness Research n. 56. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Co.
Byrne, Alex. 2004e. “Inverted Qualia.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2004/entries/qualia-inverted/.
Byrne, Alex. 2005a. “Perception and Conceptual Content.” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Matthias Steup, 1st ed., pp. 447–483. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Steup, Turri and Sosa (2014).
Byrne, Alex. 2005b. “Introspection.” Philosophical Topics 33(1): 79–104, doi:10.5840/philtopics20053312.
Byrne, Alex. 2006a. “Color and the Mind-Body Problem.” Dialectica 60(3): 223–244.
Byrne, Alex. 2006b. “Comments.” Dialectica 60(3): 337–340.
Byrne, Alex. 2006c. “Intentionality.” in The Philosophy of Science. An Encyclopedia, edited by Sahotra Sarkar and Jessica Pfeifer, pp. 405–410. London: Routledge.
Byrne, Alex. 2007a. “Possibility and Imagination.” in Philosophical Perspectives 21: Philosophy of Mind, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 125–144. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Byrne, Alex. 2007b. “Soames on Quine and Davidson [on Soames (2003)].” Philosophical Studies 135(3): 439–449.
Byrne, Alex. 2009a. “Experience and Content.” The Philosophical Quarterly 59(236): 429–451. Reprinted in Hawley and Macpherson (2011, 60–82).
Byrne, Alex. 2009b. “Sensory Qualities, Sensible Qualities, Sensational Qualities.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann, and Sven Walter, pp. 268–280. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001.
Byrne, Alex. 2010a. “Recollection, Perception, Imagination.” Philosophical Studies 148(1): 15–26.
Byrne, Alex. 2010b. “Inverted Qualia.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/qualia-inverted/.
Byrne, Alex. 2011a. “Transparency, Belief, Intention.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 85: 201–221, doi:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2011.00203.x.
Byrne, Alex. 2011b. “Knowing that I Am Thinking.” in Self-Knowledge, edited by Anthony Hatzimoysis, pp. 105–124. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590728.001.0001.
Byrne, Alex. 2012a. “Hmm…Hill on the Paradox of Pain [on Hill (2009)].” Philosophical Studies 161(3): 489–496.
Byrne, Alex. 2012b. “Knowing What I See.” in Introspection and Consciousness, edited by Declan Smithies and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 183–210. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.001.0001.
Byrne, Alex. 2014a. “McDowell and Wright on Anti-Scepticism, etc.” in Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, edited by Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini, pp. 275–297. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.001.0001.
Byrne, Alex. 2014b. “Perception and Evidence.” Philosophical Studies 170(1): 101–113.
Byrne, Alex. 2015a. “Skepticism about the Internal World.” in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, edited by Gideon Rosen, Alex Byrne, Joshua Cohen, and Seana Valentine Shiffrin, pp. 282–289. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. Reprinted in Rosen et al. (2018).
Byrne, Alex. 2015b. “Inverted Qualia.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/qualia-inverted/.
Byrne, Alex. 2016a. “The Epistemic Significance of Experience.” Philosophical Studies 173(4): 947–967.
Byrne, Alex. 2016b. “Hill on Mind [on Hill (2014)].” Philosophical Studies 173(3): 831–839.
Byrne, Alex. 2018. Transparency and Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198821618.001.0001.
Byrne, Alex. 2019a. “Perception and Ordinary Objects.” in The Nature of Ordinary Objects, edited by Javier Cumpa and Bill Brewer, pp. 6–26. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316612897.
Byrne, Alex. 2019b. “Schellenberg’s Capacitism [on Schellenberg (2018)].” Analysis 79(4): 713–719.
Byrne, Alex. 2020. “Inverted Qualia.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/qualia-inverted/.
Byrne, Alex. 2023. “Philosophy’s No-Go Zone.” Philosophie.ch, the Swiss Portal for Philosophy, https://www.philosophie.ch/en/2023-05-01-byrne.
Byrne, Alex. 2024. “Introspection and Evidence.” in The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence, edited by Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Clayton Littlejohn, pp. 307–328. Routledge Handbooks. New York: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315672687.
Byrne, Alex, Goldhaber, Charles, Gupta, Anil, Pautz, Adam and Rosenhagen, T. Raja. 2018. “Discussion of Gupta (2018).” Analytic Philosophy 59(1): 75–88.
Byrne, Alex and Green, E. J. 2023. “Whither Naı̈ve Realism? – I.” in Philosophical Perspectives 37: Philosophy of Mind, edited by John Hawthorne and Jason Turner, pp. 49–68. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phpe.12180.
Byrne, Alex and Hájek, Alan. 1997. “David Hume, David Lewis, and Decision Theory.” Mind 105.
Byrne, Alex and Hall, Ned. 1998. “Against the PCA-Analysis.” Analysis 58: 38–44.
Byrne, Alex and Hall, Ned. 1999. “Chalmers on Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics.” Philosophy of Science 66: 370–390.
Byrne, Alex and Hilbert, David R. 1995. “Reply to Hyman: Perception and Causation.” The Journal of Philosophy 92.
Byrne, Alex and Hilbert, David R., eds. 1997a. Readings on Colors. Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Byrne, Alex and Hilbert, David R., eds. 1997b. Readings on Colors. Volume 2: The Science of Color. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Byrne, Alex and Hilbert, David R. 1997c. “Colors and Reflectances.” in Readings on Colors. Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color, edited by Alex Byrne and David R. Hilbert, pp. 263–288. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Byrne, Alex and Hilbert, David R. 1997d. “Unique Hues [Comments on van Brakel and Saunders (1997)].” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20(2).
Byrne, Alex and Hilbert, David R. 1999. “Two Radical Neuron Doctrines [Comments on Gold and Stoljar (1999)].” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22(5).
Byrne, Alex and Hilbert, David R. 2003a. “Color Realism and Color Science.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26(1): 3–21, doi:10.1017/s0140525x03000013.
Byrne, Alex and Hilbert, David R. 2003b. “Color Realism Redux.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26: 52–63.
Byrne, Alex and Hilbert, David R. 2004. “Hardin, Tye, and Color Physicalism.” The Journal of Philosophy 101(1): 37–43.
Byrne, Alex and Hilbert, David R. 2006. “Hoffman’s ‘Proof’ of the Possibility of Spectrum Inversion.” Consciousness and Cognition 15: 48–50.
Byrne, Alex and Hilbert, David R. 2007a. “Truest Blue.” Analysis 67(1): 87–92.
Byrne, Alex and Hilbert, David R. 2007b. “Color Primitivism.” Erkenntnis 66(1–2): 73–105, doi:10.1007/s10670-006-9028-8.
Byrne, Alex and Hilbert, David R. 2008. “Basic Sensible Qualities and the Structure of Appearance.” in Philosophical Issues 18: Interdisciplinary Core Philosophy, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 385–405. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Byrne, Alex and Hilbert, David R. 2011. “Are Colors Secondary Qualities?” in Primary and Secondary Qualities. The Historical and Ongoing Debate, edited by Lawrence Nolan, pp. 339–361. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556151.001.0001.
Byrne, Alex and Hilbert, David R. 2021a. “The Science of Colour and Colour Vision.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour, edited by Derek Henry Brown and Fiona Macpherson, pp. 123–139. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781351048521.
Byrne, Alex and Hilbert, David R. 2021b. “Objectivist Reductionism.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour, edited by Derek Henry Brown and Fiona Macpherson, pp. 287–298. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781351048521.
Byrne, Alex and Logue, Heather. 2008. “Either/Or.” in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, edited by Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson, pp. 57–94. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.001.0001.
Byrne, Alex and Logue, Heather, eds. 2009a. Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262026550.001.0001.
Byrne, Alex and Logue, Heather. 2009b. “Introduction.” in Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings, edited by Alex Byrne and Heather Logue, pp. vii–xxix. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262026550.001.0001.
Byrne, Alex and Pryor, James. 2006. “Bad Intensions.” in Two-Dimensional Semantics: Foundations and Applications, edited by Manuel Garcı́a-Carpintero and Josep Macià, pp. 38–54. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199271955.001.0001.
Byrne, Alex, Stalnaker, Robert C. and Wedgwood, Ralph, eds. 2001. Fact and Value: Essays on Ethics and Metaphysic for Judith Jarvis Thomson. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Byrne, Alex and Thau, Michael. 1996. “In Defense of the Hybrid View.” Mind 105: 139–149.
Byrne, Alex and Tye, Michael. 2006. “Qualia Ain’t in the Head.” Noûs 40(2): 241–255.
Rosen, Gideon, Byrne, Alex, Cohen, Joshua and Shiffrin, Seana Valentine, eds. 2015. The Norton Introduction to Philosophy. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. Second edition: Rosen et al. (2018).
Rosen, Gideon, Byrne, Alex, Cohen, Joshua and Shiffrin, Seana Valentine, eds. 2018. The Norton Introduction to Philosophy. 2nd ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
Siegel, Susanna and Byrne, Alex. 2017. “Rich or Thin?” in Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception, edited by Bence Nanay, pp. 59–80. Current Controversies in Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis and Byrne, Alex, eds. 2006. Content and Modality. Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Further References

Bilgrami, Akeel. 1992. Belief and Meaning: The Unity and Locality of Mental Content. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
van Brakel, Jaap and Saunders, B. A. C. 1997. “Are there Non-Trivial Constraints on Colour Categorization?” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20(2).
Carruthers, Peter. 2000. Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Currie, Gregory. 1990. The Nature of Fiction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gold, Ian and Stoljar, Daniel. 1999. “A Neuron Doctrine in the Philosophy of Neuroscience.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22(5).
Gupta, Anil. 2018. “Outline of an Account of Experience.” Analytic Philosophy 59(1): 33–74.
Hawley, Katherine and Macpherson, Fiona. 2011. The Admissible Contents of Experience. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444343915.
Hill, Christopher S. 2009. Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hill, Christopher S. 2014. Meaning, Mind, and Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199665822.001.0001.
Kim, Jaegwon. 1996. Philosophy of Mind. Dimensions of Philosophy Series. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
Lance, Mark Norris and Hawthorne, John. 1997. The Grammar of Meaning: Normativity and Semantic Discourse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Langsam, Harold. 2000. “Why Colours do Look Like Dispositions.” The Philosophical Quarterly 50(198): 68–75.
Levine, Joseph. 2001. Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. Philosophy of Mind Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195132351.001.0001.
McDowell, John Henry. 1994. Mind and World. 1st ed. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1991. Matters of Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Palmer, Stephen E. 1999. Vision Science: Photons to Phenomenology. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Pessoa, Luiz, Thompson, Evan T. and Noë, Alva. 1998. “Finding Out about Filling In: A Guide to Perceptual Completion for Visual Science and the Philosophy of Perception.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21(6): 723–748.
Schellenberg, Susanna. 2018. The Unity of Perception. Content, Consciousness, Evidence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198827702.001.0001.
Soames, Scott. 2003. Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Volume 2: The Age of Meaning. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Stroud, Barry. 2001. The Quest for Reality: Subjectivism & the Metaphysics of Colour. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195151887.001.0001.
Tye, Michael. 2000. Consciousness, Color, and Content. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/2110.001.0001.
Vision, Gerald. 1997. Problems of Vision. Oxford: Oxford University Press.