John L. Tienson (tienson)
Contributions to Philosophie.ch
No contributions yet
Bibliography
Graham, George, Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 2007. “Consciousness and Intentionality.” in The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, edited by Max Velmans and Susan Schneider, pp. 468–484. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Graham, George, Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 2009. “Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of the Mind.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann, and Sven Walter, pp. 512–539. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001.
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 1988. “Settling into a New Paradigm.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 26(suppl.): 97–113. Reprinted in Horgan and Tienson (1991, 241–260).
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 1989. “Representation without Rules.” Philosophical Topics 17(1): 147–174.
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 1990a. “Soft Laws.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15: The Philosophy of the Human Sciences, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 256–279. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 1990b. “Connectionism and the Kuhnian Crisis in Cognitive Science.” Acta Analytica 5(6).
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L., eds. 1991. Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind. Studies in Cognitive Systems n. 9. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 1992a. “Structured Representations in Connectionist Systems?” in Connectionism: Theory and Practice, edited by Steven Davis, pp. 195–228. Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science n. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 1992b. “Levels of Description in Nonclassical Cognitive Science.” Philosophy – Supplement 34. Reprinted in Hookway and Peterson (1993, 159–188).
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 1992c. “Cognitive Systems as Dynamic Systems.” Topoi 11: 27–43.
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 1994a. “Representations don’t Need Rules: Reply to Garson (1994).” Mind and Language 9: 1–24.
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 1994b. “A Nonclassical Framework for Cognitive Science.” Synthese 101: 305–345.
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 1995. “Connectionism and the Commitments of Folk Psychology.” in Philosophical Perspectives 9: AI, Connectionism, and Philosophical Psychology, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 127–152. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 1996. Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 1999a. “Short Précis of Horgan and Tienson (1996).” Acta Analytica 13(22).
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 2001. “Deconstructing New Wave Materialism.” in Physicalism and its Discontents, edited by Carl Gillett and Barry C. Loewer, pp. 307–318. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 2002. “The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality.” in Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, edited by David J. Chalmers, pp. 520–533. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 2006. “Cognition Needs Syntax but not Rules.” in Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, edited by Robert J. Stainton, pp. 147–158. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 7. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Horgan, Terence E., Tienson, John L. and Graham, George. 2003. “The Phenomenology of First-Person Agency.” in Physicalism and Mental Causation. The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, edited by Sven Walter and Heinz-Dieter Heckmann, pp. 323–341. Exeter: Imprint Academic.
Horgan, Terence E., Tienson, John L. and Graham, George. 2004. “Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat.” in The Externalist Challenge, edited by Richard Schantz, pp. 297–318. Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy n. 2. Berlin: de Gruyter, doi:10.1515/9783110915273.
Horgan, Terence E., Tienson, John L. and Graham, George. 2006. “Internal-World Skepticism and the Self-Presentational Nature of Phenomenal Consciousness.” in Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, edited by Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford, pp. 41–62. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Tienson, John L. 1974. “On Analyzing Knowledge.” Philosophical Studies 25: 289–293.
Tienson, John L. 1985. “Entia Successiva and Ordinary Things.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 23(4): 475–480.
Tienson, John L. 1986. “An Observation on Common Names and Proper Names.” Analysis 46(2): 73–76.
Tienson, John L. 1987. “Brains are Not Conscious.” Philosophical Papers 16: 187–193.
Tienson, John L. 1988. “An Introduction to Connectionism.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 26(suppl.): 1–16. Reprinted in Horgan and Tienson (1991, 1–29).
Tienson, John L. 1990. “Is This Any Way to Be a Realist?” Philosophical Psychology 3.
Tienson, John L. 2002. “Higher-Order Causation.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 63: 89–102. “Essays on the Philosophy of Terence Horgan,” ed. by Johannes L. Brandl and Olga Markic.
Tienson, John L. 2012. “On the Limits of Intentional Externalism.” in Intentionality. Historical and Systematic Perspectives, edited by Alessandro Salice, pp. 291–316. Basic Philosophical Concepts. München: Philosophia Verlag, doi:10.2307/j.ctv2nrzhb6.
Further References
Garson, James W. 1994. “No Representations without Rules: The Prospects for a Compromise between Paradigms in Cognitive Science.” Mind and Language 9: 25–37.