Terence E. Horgan (horgan-te)
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Balaguer, Mark and Horgan, Terence E. 2016. “A Solution to the Paradox of Analysis.” Analysis 76(1): 3–7.
Barnard, Robert and Horgan, Terence E. 2006. “Truth as Mediated Correspondence.” The Monist 89(1): 28–49.
Barnard, Robert and Horgan, Terence E. 2012. “The Synthetic Unity of Truth.” in Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates, pp. 180–196. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195387469.001.0001.
Graham, George and Horgan, Terence E. 1988. “How to Be Realistic about Folk Psychology.” Philosophical Psychology 1: 69–81.
Graham, George and Horgan, Terence E. 1991. “In Defense of Southern Fundamentalism.” Philosophical Studies 62: 107–134. Republished as Horgan and Graham (1993).
Graham, George and Horgan, Terence E. 1994. “Southern Fundamentalism and the End of Philosophy.” in Philosophical Issues 5: Truth and Rationality, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 219–247. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co. Reprinted in dePaul and Ramsey (1998, 271–291).
Graham, George and Horgan, Terence E. 1998. “Sensations and Grain Processes.” in Evolving Consciousness, edited by Gregory R. Mulhauser. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Co.
Graham, George and Horgan, Terence E. 2000. “Mary Mary, Quite Contrary.” Philosophical Studies 99: 59–87.
Graham, George and Horgan, Terence E. 2005. “Mary Mary, ‘Au Contraire’: Reply to Raffman (2005).” Philosophical Studies 122(2): 203–212.
Graham, George and Horgan, Terence E. 2008. “Qualia Realism: Its Phenomenal Contents and Discontents.” in The Case for Qualia, edited by Edmond Leo Wright, pp. 89–108. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262232661.001.0001.
Graham, George, Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 2007. “Consciousness and Intentionality.” in The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, edited by Max Velmans and Susan Schneider, pp. 468–484. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Graham, George, Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 2009. “Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of the Mind.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann, and Sven Walter, pp. 512–539. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001.
Henderson, David and Horgan, Terence E. 2001a. “Practicing Safe Epistemology.” Philosophical Studies 102(3): 227–258.
Henderson, David and Horgan, Terence E. 2001b. “The A Priori Isn’t All That It Is Cracked to Be, but It Is Something.” Philosophical Topics 29(1–2): 219–250.
Henderson, David and Horgan, Terence E. 2006. “Transglobal Reliabilism.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6(2): 171–195.
Henderson, David and Horgan, Terence E. 2007. “Some Ins and Outs of Transglobal Reliabilism.” in Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, edited by Sanford C. Goldberg, pp. 100–130. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Henderson, David and Horgan, Terence E. 2009. “Epistemic Virtues and Cognitive Dispositions.” in Debating Dispositions: Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind, edited by Gregor Damschen, Robert Schnepf, and Karsten R. Stueber, pp. 296–319. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Henderson, David and Horgan, Terence E. 2011. The Epistemological Spectrum. At the Interface of Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608546.001.0001.
Henderson, David and Horgan, Terence E. 2013a. “Risk Sensitive Animal Knowledge [on Sosa (2011)].” Philosophical Studies 166(3): 599–608.
Henderson, David and Horgan, Terence E. 2013b. “On the Armchair Justification of Conceptually Grounded Necessary Truths.” in The A Priori in Philosophy, edited by Albert Casullo and Joshua C. Thurow, pp. 111–133. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.001.0001.
Henderson, David and Horgan, Terence E. 2014a. “Replies to our Critics [Casullo (2014), Graham, P. J. (2014) and Lyons (2014)].” Philosophical Studies 169(3): 549–564.
Henderson, David and Horgan, Terence E. 2014b. “Virtue and the Fitting Culturing of the Human Critter.” in Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue, edited by Abrol Fairweather and Owen Flanagan Jr., pp. 197–222. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Henderson, David and Horgan, Terence E. 2015. “What’s the Point?” in Epistemic Evaluation. Purposeful Epistemology, edited by David Henderson and John Greco, pp. 87–115. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199642632.001.0001.
Henderson, David and Horgan, Terence E. 2016. “Abductive Inference, Explicable and Anomalous Disagreement, and Epistemic Resources.” Res Philosophica 93(3): 567–584.
Henderson, David, Horgan, Terence E. and Potrč, Matjaž. 2007. “Transglobal Evidentialism-Reliabilism.” Acta Analytica 22(4): 281–300.
Henderson, David, Horgan, Terence E. and Potrč, Matjaž. 2017. “Nonconciliation in Peer Disagreement: Its Phenomenology and Its Rationality.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 94(1–2): 194–225.
Horgan, Terence E. 1977. “Lehrer on ‘Could’-Statements.” Philosophical Studies 32(4): 403–411, doi:10.1007/bf00368695.
Horgan, Terence E. 1978a. “The Case against Events.” The Philosophical Review 87(1): 28–47.
Horgan, Terence E. 1978b. “Supervenient Bridge Laws.” Philosophy of Science 45(2): 227–249.
Horgan, Terence E. 1980. “Non-Rigid Event Designators and the Modal Individuation of Events.” Philosophical Studies 36: 341–351.
Horgan, Terence E. 1981a. “Action Theory without Actions.” Mind 90: 406–414.
Horgan, Terence E. 1981b. “Counterfactuals and Newcomb’s Problem.” The Journal of Philosophy 78(6): 331–356. Reprinted in Campbell and Sowden (1985, 159–182) and in Horgan (2017a, 11–34).
Horgan, Terence E. 1981c. “Token Physicalism, Supervenience, and the Generality of Physics.” Synthese 49: 395–413.
Horgan, Terence E. 1982. “Supervenience and Microphysics.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63(1): 29–43.
Horgan, Terence E. 1984a. “Supervenience and Cosmic Hermeneutics.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 22(suppl.): 19–38.
Horgan, Terence E. 1984b. “Science Nominalized.” Philosophy of Science 51: 529–549.
Horgan, Terence E. 1984c. “Functionalism, Qualia, and the Inverted Spectrum.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44: 453–469.
Horgan, Terence E. 1984d. “Functionalism and Token Physicalism.” Synthese 59: 321–338.
Horgan, Terence E. 1984e. “Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia.” The Philosophical Quarterly 34(135): 147–183. Reprinted in Ludlow, Nagasawa and Stoljar (2004, 301–308).
Horgan, Terence E. 1985a. “Newcomb’s Problem: A Stalemate.” in Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation: Prisoner’s Dilemma and Newcomb’s Problem, edited by Richmond Campbell and Lanning Sowden, pp. 159–182. Vancouver, British Columbia: University of British Columbia Press.
Horgan, Terence E. 1985b. “Compatibilism and the Consequence Argument.” Philosophical Studies 47: 339–356.
Horgan, Terence E. 1986a. “Truth and Ontology.” Philosophical Papers 15(1): 1–21.
Horgan, Terence E. 1986b. “Review of Brand (1984).” Grazer Philosophische Studien 29: 171–180.
Horgan, Terence E. 1987a. “Science Nominalized Properly [Response to Hale and Resnik (1987)].” Philosophy of Science 54: 281–282.
Horgan, Terence E. 1987b. “Supervenient Qualia.” The Philosophical Review 96: 491–520.
Horgan, Terence E. 1989a. “Mental Quausation.” in Philosophical Perspectives 3: Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 47–76. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Horgan, Terence E. 1989b. “Attitudinatives.” Linguistics and Philosophy 12(2): 133–165.
Horgan, Terence E. 1991a. “Actions, Reasons, and the Explanatory Role of Content.” in Dretske and his Critics, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin, pp. 73–101. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Horgan, Terence E. 1991b. “Metaphysical Realism and Psychologistic Semantics.” Erkenntnis 34(3): 297–322.
Horgan, Terence E. 1992. “From Cognitive Science to Folk Psychology: Computation, Mental Representation, and Belief.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52(2): 449–484.
Horgan, Terence E. 1993a. “On What There Isn’t.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53: 593–700.
Horgan, Terence E. 1993b. “From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World.” Mind 102(408): 555–586.
Horgan, Terence E. 1993c. “Nonreductive Materialism and the Explanatory Autonomy of Psychology.” in Naturalism. A Critical Appraisal, edited by Steven J. Wagner and Richard Warner, pp. 295–320. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
Horgan, Terence E. 1993d. “The Austere Ideology of Folk Psychology.” Mind and Language 9.
Horgan, Terence E. 1994a. “Nonreductive Materialism.” in The Mind-Body Problem. A Guide to the Current Debate, edited by Richard Warner and Tadeusz Szubka, pp. 236–241. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Horgan, Terence E. 1994b. “Robust Vagueness and the Forced-March Sorites Paradox.” in Philosophical Perspectives 8: Logic and Language, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 159–188. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Horgan (2017a, 119–150).
Horgan, Terence E. 1994c. “Naturalism and Intentionality.” Philosophical Studies 76: 301–326.
Horgan, Terence E. 1995a. “Transvaluationism: A Dionysian Approach to Vagueness.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 33: 97–125. Reprinted in Horgan (2017a, 151–178).
Horgan, Terence E. 1995b. “Let’s Make a Deal.” Philosophical Papers 24: 209–222. Reprinted in Horgan (2017a, 63–76).
Horgan, Terence E. 1996. “The Perils of Epistemic Reductionism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56(4): 891–897.
Horgan, Terence E. 1997a. “Kim on Mental Causation and Causal Exclusion.” in Philosophical Perspectives 11: Mind, Causation, and World, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 165–184. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Horgan, Terence E. 1997b. “Connectionism and the Philosophical Foundations of Cognitive Science.” Metaphilosophy 28: 1–30.
Horgan, Terence E. 1997c. “Brute Supervenience, Deep Ignorance, and the Problem of the Many.” in Philosophical Issues 8: Truth, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 229–236. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Horgan, Terence E. 1998a. “The Transvaluationist Conception of Vagueness.” The Monist 81(2): 313–330.
Horgan, Terence E. 1998b. “Actualism, Quantification, and Contextual Semantics.” in Philosophical Perspectives 12: Language, Mind, and Ontology, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 503–509. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Horgan, Terence E. 1998c. “Recognitional Concepts and the Compositionality of Concept Possession [on Fodor (1998b)].” in Philosophical Issues 9: Concepts, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 27–33. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Horgan, Terence E. 2000. “The Two-Envelope Paradox, Nonstandard Expected Utility, and the Intensionality of Probability.” Noûs 34(4): 578–603. Reprinted in Horgan (2017a, 77–103).
Horgan, Terence E. 2001a. “Causal Compatibilism and the Exclusion Problem.” Theoria (San Sebastian), Secunda época 16.
Horgan, Terence E. 2001b. “Contextual Semantics and Metaphysical Realism: Truth as Indirect Correspondence.” in The Nature of Truth. Classic and Contemporary Perspectives, edited by Michael Patrick Lynch, pp. 67–96. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Second edition: Lynch et al. (2021), doi:10.7551/mitpress/4884.001.0001.
Horgan, Terence E. 2001c. “The Two-Envelope Paradox and the Foundations of Rational Decision Theory.” in Proceedings of the 23rd International Wittgenstein Symposium: Rationality and Irrationality, edited by Berit Brogaard and Barry Smith, pp. 172–191. Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft n. 29. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky. Reprinted in Horgan (2017a, 104–118).
Horgan, Terence E. 2001d. “Multiple Reference, Multiple Realization, and the Reduction of Mind.” in Reality and Humean Supervenience. Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis, edited by Gerhard Preyer and Frank Siebelt, pp. 205–222. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
Horgan, Terence E. 2002a. “Themes in my Philosophical Work.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 63: 1–26. “Essays on the Philosophy of Terence Horgan,” ed. by Johannes L. Brandl and Olga Markic.
Horgan, Terence E. 2002b. “Replies.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 63: 303–341. “Essays on the Philosophy of Terence Horgan,” ed. by Johannes L. Brandl and Olga Markic.
Horgan, Terence E. 2004. “Sleeping Beauty Awakened: New Odds at the Dawn of the New Day.” Analysis 64(1): 10–21. Reprinted in Horgan (2017a, 209–219).
Horgan, Terence E. 2006. “Materialism: Matters of Definition, Defense, and Deconstruction.” Philosophical Studies 131(1): 157–183.
Horgan, Terence E. 2007. “Synchronic Bayesian Updating and the Generalized Sleeping Beauty Problem.” Analysis 67(1): 50–59.
Horgan, Terence E. 2008. “Synchronic Bayesian Updating and the Sleeping Beauty Problem: A Reply to Pust.” Synthese 160: 155–159. Reprinted in Horgan (2017a, 220–225).
Horgan, Terence E. 2010a. “Materialism, Minimal Emergentism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness.” in The Waning of Materialism, edited by Robert C. Koons and George Bealer, pp. 309–330. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.001.0001.
Horgan, Terence E. 2010b. “Transvaluationism about Vagueness: A Progress Report.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 48: 67–94. Reprinted in Horgan (2017a, 179–208).
Horgan, Terence E. 2011. “Phenomenal Intentionality and the Evidential Role of Perceptual Experience: Comments on Lyons (2009).” Philosophical Studies 153(3): 447–455.
Horgan, Terence E. 2012a. “Introspection about Phenomenal Consciousness: Running the Gamut from Infallibility to Impotence.” in Introspection and Consciousness, edited by Declan Smithies and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 405–422. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.001.0001.
Horgan, Terence E. 2012b. “Connectionism, Dynamical Cognition, and Non-Classical Compositional Representation.” in The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality, edited by Markus Werning, Wolfram Hinzen, and Edouard Machery, pp. 557–573. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press.
Horgan, Terence E. 2013. “Original Intentionality is Phenomenal Intentionality.” The Monist 96(2): 232–251.
Horgan, Terence E. 2014. “Phenomenal Intentionality and Secondary Qualities: The Quixotic Case of Color.” in Does Perception Have Content?, edited by Berit Brogaard, pp. 329–350. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199756018.001.0001.
Horgan, Terence E. 2015a. “Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem, II.” Erkenntnis 80(4): 811–839. Reprinted in Horgan (2017a, 247–280).
Horgan, Terence E. 2015b. “Injecting the Phenomenology of Agency into the Free Will Debate.” in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, volume III, edited by David W. Shoemaker, pp. 34–61. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198744832.001.0001.
Horgan, Terence E. 2015c. “Newcomb’s Problem Revisited.” The Harvard Review of Philosophy 22: 4–15. Reprinted in Horgan (2017a, 46–62).
Horgan, Terence E. 2017a. Essays on Paradoxes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Horgan, Terence E. 2017b. “Introduction.” in Essays on Paradoxes, pp. 1–10. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Horgan, Terence E. 2017c. “The Exchange Continued: Response to Pust’s Response to My Reply.” in Essays on Paradoxes, pp. 226–246. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Horgan, Terence E. 2017d. “Epistemic Probability.” in Essays on Paradoxes, pp. 281–318. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Horgan, Terence E. 2017e. “Troubles for Bayesian Formal Epistemology.” Res Philosophica 94(2): 233–255.
Horgan, Terence E. 2020. “Strawson on Panpsychism.” in The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism, edited by William E. Seager, pp. 340–352. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315717708.
Horgan, Terence E. and Graham, George. 1993. “In Defense of Southern Fundamentalism.” in Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind, edited by Scott M. Christensen and Dale R. Turner, pp. 288–311. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Republicationof Graham, G. and Horgan (1991).
Horgan, Terence E. and Graham, George. 2012. “Phenomenal Intentionality and Content Determinacy.” in Prospects for Meaning, edited by Richard Schantz, pp. 321–344. Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy n. 3. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Horgan, Terence E. and Kriegel, Uriah. 2007. “Phenomenal Epistemology: What is Consciousness That We May Know It So Well?” in Philosophical Issues 17: The Metaphysics of Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 123–144. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Horgan, Terence E. and Kriegel, Uriah. 2008. “Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind.” The Monist 91(2): 347–373.
Horgan, Terence E. and Mahtani, Anna. 2013. “Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem.” Erkenntnis 78(2): 333–351.
Horgan, Terence E. and Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 2021. “On the Satisfaction Conditions of Agentive Phenomenology: A Dialogue.” in The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Agency, edited by Christopher Erhard and Tobias Keiling, pp. 264–299. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Horgan, Terence E. and Potrč, Matjaž. 2000. “Blobjectivism and Indirect Correspondence.” Facta Philosophica 2: 249–270.
Horgan, Terence E. and Potrč, Matjaž. 2006a. “Particularist Semantic Normativity.” Acta Analytica 21(1): 45–61.
Horgan, Terence E. and Potrč, Matjaž. 2006b. “Abundant Truth in an Austere World.” in Truth and Realism, edited by Patrick Greenough and Michael Patrick Lynch, pp. 137–161. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Proceedings of the 2004 St.Andrews Conference on Realism and Truth, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288878.001.0001.
Horgan, Terence E. and Potrč, Matjaž. 2008. Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262083768.001.0001.
Horgan, Terence E. and Potrč, Matjaž. 2010. “The Epistemic Relevance of Morphological Content.” Acta Analytica 25(2): 155–173.
Horgan, Terence E. and Potrč, Matjaž. 2011. “Existence Monism Trumps Priority Monism.” in Spinoza on Monism, edited by Philip Goff, pp. –76. Philosophers in Depth. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Horgan, Terence E. and Potrč, Matjaž. 2013. “Epistemological Skepticism, Semantic Blindness, and Competence-Based Performance Errors.” Acta Analytica 28(2): 161–177.
Horgan, Terence E., Potrč, Matjaž and Strahovnik, Vojko. 2018. “Core and Ancillary Epistemic Virtues.” Acta Analytica 33(3): 295–309.
Horgan, Terence E., Sabatés, Marcelo and Sosa, David, eds. 2015. Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World. Themes from the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781139939539.
Horgan, Terence E. and Tammelleo, Steve. 2002. “The Salem Witch Project [on Lance and Hawthorne (1997)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65(1): 193–200.
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 1988. “Settling into a New Paradigm.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 26(suppl.): 97–113. Reprinted in Horgan and Tienson (1991, 241–260).
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 1989. “Representation without Rules.” Philosophical Topics 17(1): 147–174.
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 1990a. “Soft Laws.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15: The Philosophy of the Human Sciences, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 256–279. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 1990b. “Connectionism and the Kuhnian Crisis in Cognitive Science.” Acta Analytica 5(6).
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L., eds. 1991. Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind. Studies in Cognitive Systems n. 9. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 1992a. “Structured Representations in Connectionist Systems?” in Connectionism: Theory and Practice, edited by Steven Davis, pp. 195–228. Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science n. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 1992b. “Levels of Description in Nonclassical Cognitive Science.” Philosophy – Supplement 34. Reprinted in Hookway and Peterson (1993, 159–188).
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 1992c. “Cognitive Systems as Dynamic Systems.” Topoi 11: 27–43.
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 1994a. “Representations don’t Need Rules: Reply to Garson (1994).” Mind and Language 9: 1–24.
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 1994b. “A Nonclassical Framework for Cognitive Science.” Synthese 101: 305–345.
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 1995. “Connectionism and the Commitments of Folk Psychology.” in Philosophical Perspectives 9: AI, Connectionism, and Philosophical Psychology, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 127–152. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 1996. Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 1999a. “Short Précis of Horgan and Tienson (1996).” Acta Analytica 13(22).
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 2001. “Deconstructing New Wave Materialism.” in Physicalism and its Discontents, edited by Carl Gillett and Barry C. Loewer, pp. 307–318. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 2002. “The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality.” in Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, edited by David J. Chalmers, pp. 520–533. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 2006. “Cognition Needs Syntax but not Rules.” in Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, edited by Robert J. Stainton, pp. 147–158. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 7. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Horgan, Terence E., Tienson, John L. and Graham, George. 2003. “The Phenomenology of First-Person Agency.” in Physicalism and Mental Causation. The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, edited by Sven Walter and Heinz-Dieter Heckmann, pp. 323–341. Exeter: Imprint Academic.
Horgan, Terence E., Tienson, John L. and Graham, George. 2004. “Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat.” in The Externalist Challenge, edited by Richard Schantz, pp. 297–318. Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy n. 2. Berlin: de Gruyter, doi:10.1515/9783110915273.
Horgan, Terence E., Tienson, John L. and Graham, George. 2006. “Internal-World Skepticism and the Self-Presentational Nature of Phenomenal Consciousness.” in Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, edited by Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford, pp. 41–62. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 1991. “New Wave Moral Realisms Meets Moral Twin Earth.” Journal of Philosophical Research 16: 447–465.
Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 1992a. “Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral Queerness Revived.” Synthese 92: 221–260.
Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 1992b. “Troubles for New Wave Moral Semantics: The Open Question Argument Revived.” Philosophical Papers 21: 153–175.
Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 1993. “Metaphysical Naturalism, Semantic Normativity, and Meta-Semantic Irrealism.” in Philosophical Issues 4: Naturalism and Normativity, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 180–204. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 1996. “From Moral Realism to Moral Relativism in One Easy Step.” Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 28(83): 3–39.
Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 2000a. “Copping Out on Moral Twin Earth.” Synthese 124: 139–152.
Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 2000b. “Nondescriptivism Cognitivism: Framework for a New Metaethics.” Philosophical Papers 29(2): 121–153.
Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 2002. “Conceptual Relativity and Metaphysical Realism.” in Philosophical Issues 12: Realism and Relativism, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 74–96. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 2005. “Moral Phenomenology and Moral Theory.” in Philosophical Issues 15: Normativity, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 57–77. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark, eds. 2006a. Metaethics after Moore. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.001.0001.
Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 2006b. “Expressivism, yes! Relativism, no!” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume I, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 73–98. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 2006c. “Introduction.” in Metaethics after Moore, edited by Terence E. Horgan and Mark Timmons, pp. 1–16. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.001.0001.
Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 2006d. “Cognitivist Expressivism.” in Metaethics after Moore, edited by Terence E. Horgan and Mark Timmons, pp. 255–298. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.001.0001.
Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 2006e. “Morality without Moral Facts.” in Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory, edited by James Dreier, pp. 220–238. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 6. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.
Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 2007. “Moorean Moral Phenomenology.” in Themes from G.E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics, edited by Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay, pp. 203–226. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 2009a. “Expressivism and Contrary-Forming Negation.” in Philosophical Issues 19: Metaethics, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 92–112. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 2009b. “Analytic Moral Functionalism Meets Moral Twin Earth.” in Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals. Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, edited by Ian Ravenscroft, pp. 221–236. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267989.001.0001.
Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 2015. “Modest Quasi-Realism and the Problem of Deep Moral Error.” in Passions and Projections. Themes from the Philosophy of Simon Blackburn, edited by Robert N. Johnson and Michael A. Smith, pp. 190–209. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198723172.001.0001.
Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 2017. “Sentimentalist Moral-Perceptual Experience and Realist Pretensions: A Phenomenological Inquiry.” in Ethical Sentimentalism. New Perspectives, edited by Remy Debes and Karsten R. Stueber, pp. 86–106. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316105672.
Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 2018a. “The Phenomenology of Moral Authority.” in Moral Skepticism. New Essays, edited by Diego E. Machuca, pp. 115–140. Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory. London: Routledge.
Horgan, Terence E. and Timmons, Mark. 2018b. “Gripped by Authority.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48(3–4): 313–336.
Horgan, Terence E. and Tye, Michael. 1985. “Against the Token Identity Theory.” in Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, edited by Ernest LePore and Brian P. McLaughlin, pp. 427–443. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Horgan, Terence E. and Tye, Michael. 1988. “Braving the Perils of an Uneventful World.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 31: 179–186.
Horgan, Terence E. and Woodward, James F. 1985. “Folk Psychology is Here to Stay.” The Philosophical Review 94: 197–225. Reprinted in Greenwood (1991, 149–175) and in Christensen and Turner (1993, 144–187).
Maslen, Cei, Horgan, Terence E. and Daly, Helen. 2009. “Mental Causation.” in The Oxford Handbook of Causation, edited by Helen Beebee, Christopher R. Hitchcock, and Peter Menzies, pp. 523–553. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279739.001.0001.
Further References
Brand, Myles. 1984. Intending and Acting: Toward a Naturalized Action Theory. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Campbell, Richmond and Sowden, Lanning, eds. 1985. Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation: Prisoner’s Dilemma and Newcomb’s Problem. Vancouver, British Columbia: University of British Columbia Press.
Casullo, Albert. 2014. “Uncovering Buried Treasure: Henderson and Horgan on Conceptual Analysis [on Henderson and Horgan (2014a)].” Philosophical Studies 169(3): 509–523.
Christensen, Scott M. and Turner, Dale R., eds. 1993. Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
dePaul, Michael Raymond and Ramsey, William M., eds. 1998. Rethinking Intuition. Studies in epistemology and cognitive theory. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1998a. In Critical Condition: Polemical Essays on Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1998b. “There are no Recognitional Concepts; not even RED.” in Philosophical Issues 9: Concepts, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 1–14. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co. Reprinted in Fodor (1998a, 34–47).
Garson, James W. 1994. “No Representations without Rules: The Prospects for a Compromise between Paradigms in Cognitive Science.” Mind and Language 9: 25–37.
Graham, Peter J. 2014. “Against Transglobal Reliabilism.” Philosophical Studies 169(3): 525–535.
Greenwood, John D., ed. 1991. The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hale, Susan C. and Resnik, Michael D. 1987. “Science Nominalized [on Horgan (1984b)].” Philosophy of Science 54: 277–280.
Hookway, Christopher and Peterson, Donald M., eds. 1993. Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures n. 34. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lance, Mark Norris and Hawthorne, John. 1997. The Grammar of Meaning: Normativity and Semantic Discourse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ludlow, Peter J., Nagasawa, Yujin and Stoljar, Daniel, eds. 2004. There’s Something About Mary. Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Lyons, Jack C. 2009. Perception and Basic Belief: Zombies, Modules, and the Problem of the External World. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195373578.001.0001.
Lyons, Jack C. 2014. “The Epistemological Import of Morphological Content.” Philosophical Studies 169(3): 537–547.
Raffman, Diana. 2005. “Even Zombies Can Be Surprised: A Reply to Graham, G. and Horgan (2005).” Philosophical Studies 122(2): 189–202.
Sosa, Ernest. 2011. Knowing Full Well. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, doi:10.23943/princeton/9780691143972.001.0001.