Travis Timmerman (timmerman)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Pereira, Felipe and Timmerman, Travis. 2020. “The (Un)Desirability of Immortality.” Philosophy Compass 15(2), doi:10.1111/phc3.12652.
Timmerman, Travis. 2013. “Autonomy and Moral Regard for Ends.” in Kant on Moral Autonomy, edited by Oliver Sensen, pp. 212–224. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Timmerman, Travis. 2015a. “Sometimes There is Nothing Wrong with Letting a Child Drown.” Analysis 75(2): 204–212.
Timmerman, Travis. 2015b. “Does Scrupulous Securitism Stand-Up to Scrutiny? Two Problems for Moral Securitism and How We Might Fix Them.” Philosophical Studies 172(6): 1509–1528.
Timmerman, Travis. 2016. “Your Death Might Be the Worst Thing Ever to Happen to You (but Maybe You Shouldn’t Care).” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46(1): 18–37.
Timmerman, Travis. 2018a. “Doomsday Needn’t Be So Bad.” Dialectica 72(2): 275–296.
Timmerman, Travis. 2018b. “Avoiding the Asymmetry Problem.” Ratio 31(1): 88–102.
Timmerman, Travis. 2019. “Effective Altruism’s Underspecification Problem.” in Effective Altruism. Philosophical Issues, edited by Hilary Greaves and Theron Pummer, pp. 166–183. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198841364.001.0001.
Timmerman, Travis and Cohen, Yishai. 2016. “Moral Obligations: Actualist, Possibilist, or Hybridist?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94(4): 672–686.
Timmerman, Travis and Cohen, Yishai. 2019. “Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/actualism-possibilism-ethics/.
Timmerman, Travis and Cohen, Yishai. 2020. “The Limits of Virtue Ethics.” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, volume X, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 255–281. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198867944.001.0001.
Timmerman, Travis and Pereira, Felipe. 2019. “Non-Repeatable Hedonism Is False.” Ergo 6(25): 697–705.
Timmerman, Travis and Swenson, Philip. 2019. “How to Be an Actualist and Blame People.” in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, volume VI, edited by David W. Shoemaker, pp. 216–240. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198845539.001.0001.