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Philip Swenson

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Bibliography

    Buchak, Lara, Zimmerman, Dean W. and Swenson, Philip, eds. 2019. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. vol. IX. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198845492.001.0001.
    Capes, Justin A. and Swenson, Philip. 2017. “Frankfurt Cases: The Fine-Grained Response Revisited.” Philosophical Studies 174(4): 967–981.
    Clarke, Randolph, Capes, Justin A. and Swenson, Philip. 2021. “Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/incompatibilism-theories/.
    Coates, D. Justin and Swenson, Philip. 2013. “Reasons-Responsiveness and Degrees of Responsibility.” Philosophical Studies 165(2): 629–645.
    Crummett, Dustin and Swenson, Philip. 2019. “Gun Control, the Right to Self-Defense, and Reasonable Beneficence to All.” Ergo 6(36): 1035–1056.
    Kierland, Brian and Swenson, Philip. 2013. “Ability-Based Objections to No-Best-World Arguments.” Philosophical Studies 164(3): 669–683.
    Swenson, Philip. 2015. “A Challenge for Frankfurt-Style Compatibilists.” Philosophical Studies 172(5): 1279–1285.
    Swenson, Philip. 2016a. “Ability, Foreknowledge, and Explanatory Dependence.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94(4): 658–671.
    Swenson, Philip. 2016b. “The Frankfurt Cases and Responisibility for Omissions.” The Philosophical Quarterly 66(264): 579–595.
    Swenson, Philip. 2017.“Fischer (2016) on Foreknowledge and Explanatory Dependence.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9(4): 51–62.
    Swenson, Philip. 2019. “Luckily, We Are Only Responsible for What We Could Have Avoided.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43: Moral Luck, edited by Peter A. French, Howard K. Wettstein, and Andrew C. Khoury, pp. 106–118. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1111/misp.12107.
    Timmerman, Travis and Swenson, Philip. 2019. “How to Be an Actualist and Blame People.” in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, volume VI, edited by David W. Shoemaker, pp. 216–240. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198845539.001.0001.

Further References