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Philip Swenson (swenson-p)

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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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Bibliography

    Buchak, Lara, Zimmerman, Dean W. and Swenson, Philip, eds. 2019. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. vol. IX. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198845492.001.0001.
    Capes, Justin A. and Swenson, Philip. 2017. “Frankfurt Cases: The Fine-Grained Response Revisited.” Philosophical Studies 174(4): 967–981.
    Clarke, Randolph, Capes, Justin A. and Swenson, Philip. 2021. “Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/incompatibilism-theories/.
    Coates, D. Justin and Swenson, Philip. 2013. “Reasons-Responsiveness and Degrees of Responsibility.” Philosophical Studies 165(2): 629–645.
    Crummett, Dustin and Swenson, Philip. 2019. “Gun Control, the Right to Self-Defense, and Reasonable Beneficence to All.” Ergo 6(36): 1035–1056.
    Kierland, Brian and Swenson, Philip. 2013. “Ability-Based Objections to No-Best-World Arguments.” Philosophical Studies 164(3): 669–683.
    Swenson, Philip. 2015. “A Challenge for Frankfurt-Style Compatibilists.” Philosophical Studies 172(5): 1279–1285.
    Swenson, Philip. 2016a. “Ability, Foreknowledge, and Explanatory Dependence.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94(4): 658–671.
    Swenson, Philip. 2016b. “The Frankfurt Cases and Responisibility for Omissions.” The Philosophical Quarterly 66(264): 579–595.
    Swenson, Philip. 2017.“Fischer (2016) on Foreknowledge and Explanatory Dependence.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9(4): 51–62.
    Swenson, Philip. 2019. “Luckily, We Are Only Responsible for What We Could Have Avoided.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43: Moral Luck, edited by Peter A. French, Howard K. Wettstein, and Andrew C. Khoury, pp. 106–118. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1111/misp.12107.
    Timmerman, Travis and Swenson, Philip. 2019. “How to Be an Actualist and Blame People.” in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, volume VI, edited by David W. Shoemaker, pp. 216–240. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198845539.001.0001.

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