Christopher Tucker (tucker-c)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Cited in the following articles

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Tucker, Christopher. 2006. “Hermeneutics as a… Foundationalism?” Dialogue. Revue canadienne de philosophie / Canadian Philosophical Review 45(4): 627–646.
Tucker, Christopher. 2009a. “Perceptual Justification and Warrant by Default.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87(3): 445–463.
Tucker, Christopher. 2009b. “Evidential Support, Reliability, and Hume’s Problem of Induction.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90: 503–519.
Tucker, Christopher. 2010a. “Why Open-Minded People should Endorse Dogmatism.” in Philosophical Perspectives 24: Epistemology, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 529–545. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Tucker, Christopher. 2010b. “When Transmission Fails.” The Philosophical Review 119(4): 497–529.
Tucker, Christopher. 2012a. “Movin’ on Up: Higher-Level Requirements and Inferential Justification.” Philosophical Studies 157(3): 323–340.
Tucker, Christopher. 2012b. “The Dangers of Using Safety to Explain Transmission Failure: A Reply to Smith (2009).” Episteme 9(4): 393–406.
Tucker, Christopher, ed. 2013a. Seemings and Justification. New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899494.001.0001.
Tucker, Christopher. 2013b. “Seemings and Justification: An Introduction.” in Seemings and Justification. New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism, edited by Christopher Tucker, pp. 1–30. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899494.003.0001.
Tucker, Christopher. 2014a. “On What Inferentially Justifies What: The Vices of Reliabilism and Proper Functionalism.” Synthese 191(14): 3311–3328.
Tucker, Christopher. 2014b. “If Dogmatists Have a Problem with Cognitive Penetration, You Do Too.” Dialectica 68(1): 35–62.
Tucker, Christopher. 2014c. “Why Skeptical Theism Isn’t Skeptical Enough.” in Skeptical Theism. New Essays, edited by Trent Dougherty and Justin P. McBrayer, pp. 45–62. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tucker, Christopher. 2016. “Acquaintance and Fallible Non-Inferential Justification.” in Intellectual Assurance. Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism, edited by Brett Coppenger and Michael Bergmann, pp. 43–60. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719632.001.0001.
Tucker, Christopher. 2017. “How to Think about Satisficing.” Philosophical Studies 174(6): 1365–1384.
Tucker, Christopher. 2018. “How to Explain Miscomputation.” Philosophers' imprint 18(24).
Tucker, Christopher. 2024. “Experience as Evidence.” in The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence, edited by Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Clayton Littlejohn, pp. 19–29. Routledge Handbooks. New York: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315672687.

Further References

Smith, Martin. 2009. “Transmission Failure Explained.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79(1): 164–189.