Chad Vance (vance-c)
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Bibliography
Vance, Chad. 2013. “In Defense of the New Actualism: Dispositional Modal Truthmakers and the Branching Conception of Possibility.” PhD dissertation, Boulder, Colorado: University of Colorado.
Vance, Chad. 2014a. “Truthmaker Theory Does Not Solve the Gettier Problem.” Ratio 27(3): 291–305.
Vance, Chad. 2014b. “Dispositional Modal Truthmakers and the Necessary Origin.” Philosophia 42(4): 1111–1127.
Vance, Chad. 2016a. “The Recycling Problem for Event Individuation.” Erkenntnis 81(1): 1–16.
Vance, Chad. 2016b. “Classical Theism and Modal Realism are Incompatible.” Religious Studies 52(4): 561–572, doi:10.1017/S003441251600010X.
Vance, Chad. 2017. “Modal Truthmakers, Truth Conditions, and Analyses: or, How to Avoid the Humphrey Objection.” Acta Analytica 32(2): 145–149.
Vance, Chad. 2018. “Causal Relevance, Permissible Omissions, and Famine Relief.” Dialectica 72(1): 25–47.