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Mark van Roojen (vanroojen)

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Bibliography

    van Roojen, Mark. 1996. “Expressivism and Irrationality.” The Philosophical Review 105(3): 322–335.
    van Roojen, Mark. 2000. “Motivational Internalism: A Somewhat Less Idealized Account.” The Philosophical Quarterly 50(199): 233–241.
    van Roojen, Mark. 2002a. “Should Motivational Humeans Be Humeans About Rationality?” Topoi 21: 209–215.
    van Roojen, Mark. 2002b. “Humean and Anti-Humean Internalism about Moral Judgements.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65(1): 26–49.
    Roojen, Mark van. 2004. “Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2004/entries/moral-cognitivism/.
    van Roojen, Mark. 2005a. “Rationalist Realism and Constructivist Accounts of Morality [on Shafer-Landau (2003)].” Philosophical Studies 126(2): 285–295.
    van Roojen, Mark. 2005b. “Expressivism, Supervenience and Logic.” Ratio 18(2): 190–205.
    van Roojen, Mark. 2006. “Knowing Enough to Disagree: A New Response to the Moral Twin Earth Problem.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume I, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 161–194. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    van Roojen, Mark. 2008. “Some Advantages of One Form of Argument for the Maximin Principle.” Acta Analytica 23(4): 319–335.
    Roojen, Mark van. 2008. “Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2008/entries/moral-cognitivism/.
    Roojen, Mark van. 2009. “Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/moral-cognitivism/.
    Roojen, Mark van. 2013. “Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/moral-cognitivism/.
    van Roojen, Mark. 2013. “Scanlon’s Promising Proposal and the Right Kind of Reasons to Believe.” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, volume III, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 59–78. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199685905.001.0001.
    van Roojen, Mark. 2014. “Moral Intuitionism, Experiments and Skeptical Arguments.” in Intuitions, edited by Anthony Robert Booth and Darrell P. Rowbottom, pp. 148–164. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609192.001.0001.
    van Roojen, Mark. 2015. Metaethics. A Contemporary Introduction. London: Routledge.
    van Roojen, Mark. 2018. “Evolutionary Debunking, Realism and Anthropocentric Metasemantics.” in Moral Skepticism. New Essays, edited by Diego E. Machuca, pp. 163–182. Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory. London: Routledge.
    Roojen, Mark van. 2018. “Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/moral-cognitivism/.
    van Roojen, Mark. 2020. “Promising and Assertion.” in The Oxford Handbook of Assertion, edited by Sanford C. Goldberg, pp. 179–200. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.001.0001.
    Roojen, Mark van. 2023. “Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/moral-cognitivism/.

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