David J. Velleman (velleman-d)
Email:
X
Cited in the following articles
When is Jealousy Appropriate?Contributions to Philosophie.ch
No contributions yet
Bibliography
Boghossian, Paul Artin and Velleman, David J. 1989. “Colour as a Secondary Quality.” Mind 98: 81–103. Reprinted in Byrne and Hilbert (1997) and in Boghossian (2008, 293–314).
Boghossian, Paul Artin and Velleman, David J. 1991. “Physicalist Theories of Color.” The Philosophical Review 100: 67–106. Reprinted in Byrne and Hilbert (1997) and in Boghossian (2008, 315–344).
Hofweber, Thomas and Velleman, David J. 2011. “How to Endure.” The Philosophical Quarterly 61(242): 37–57.
Velleman, David J. 1985. “Practical Reflection.” The Philosophical Review 94(1): 33–61.
Velleman, David J. 1989a. Practical Reflection. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Velleman, David J. 1989b. “Epistemic Freedom.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70: 73–97. Reprinted in Velleman (2000a, 32–55).
Velleman, David J. 1991. “Well-Being and Time.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72: 48–77. Reprinted in Velleman (2000a, 56–84).
Velleman, David J. 1992a. “The Guise of the Good.” Noûs 26(1): 3–26. Reprinted in Velleman (2000a, 99–122).
Velleman, David J. 1992b. “What Happens When Someone Acts?” Mind 101: 461–481. Reprinted in Velleman (2000a, 123–143).
Velleman, David J. 1993. “The Story of Rational Action.” Philosophical Topics 21(1): 229–254. Reprinted in Velleman (2000a, 144–169).
Velleman, David J. 1996. “The Possibility of Practical Reason.” Ethics 106: 694–726. Reprinted in Velleman (2000a, 170–199).
Velleman, David J. 1997a. “How to Share an Intention.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57(1): 29–50. Reprinted in Velleman (2000a, 200–220).
Velleman, David J. 1997b. “Deciding How to Decide.” in Ethics and Practical Reason, edited by Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut, pp. 29–52. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Velleman (2000a, 221–243), doi:10.1093/oso/9780198236467.001.0001.
Velleman, David J. 1998a. “Self to Self.” The Philosophical Review 107(1): 39–76. Reprinted in Velleman (2006a, 170–202).
Velleman, David J. 1998b. “Is Motivation Internal to Value?” in Preferences, edited by Christoph Fehige and Ulla Wessels, pp. 88–102. Perspektiven der analytischen Philosophie / Perspectives in Analytic Philosophy n. 19. Berlin: de Gruyter. Reprinted in Velleman (2000a, 85–98).
Velleman, David J. 1999a. “Love as a Moral Emotion.” Ethics 109(2): 606–628. Reprinted in Velleman (2006a, 70–109), doi:10.1086/233898.
Velleman, David J. 1999b. “The Voice of Conscience.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99: 57–76. Reprinted in Velleman (2006a, 110–128).
Velleman, David J. 1999c. “A Rational Superego.” The Philosophical Review 108: 529–558. Reprinted in Velleman (2006a, 129–155).
Velleman, David J. 2000a. The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Velleman, David J. 2000b. “From Self Psychology to Moral Philosophy.” in Philosophical Perspectives 14: Action and Freedom, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 349–377. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Velleman (2006a, 224–252).
Velleman, David J. 2000c. “Introduction.” in The Possibility of Practical Reason, pp. 1–31. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Velleman, David J. 2000d. “The Aim of Belief.” in The Possibility of Practical Reason, pp. 244–281. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Velleman, David J. 2001. “The Genesis of Shame.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 30(1): 27–52. Reprinted in Velleman (2006a, 45–69).
Velleman, David J. 2002a. “Motivation by Ideal.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 5(2): 89–104. Reprinted in Velleman (2006a, 312–329).
Velleman, David J. 2002b. “Identification and Identity.” in The Contours of Agency: Essay on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, edited by Sarah Buss and Lee Overton, pp. 91–123. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Reprinted in Velleman (2006a, 330–360).
Velleman, David J. 2003a. “Don’t Worry, Feel Guilty.” in Philosophy and the Emotions, edited by Anthony Hatzimoysis, pp. 235–248. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 52. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in Velleman (2006a, 156–169), doi:10.1017/cbo9780511550270.
Velleman, David J. 2003b. “Narrative Explanation.” The Philosophical Review 112: 1–25.
Velleman, David J. 2004a. “Willing the Law.” in Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays, edited by Peter Baumann and Monika Betzler, pp. 27–56. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in Velleman (2006a, 284–311).
Velleman, David J. 2004b. “Précis of Velleman (2000a).” Philosophical Studies 121(3): 225–238.
Velleman, David J. 2004c. “Replies to Discussion on ‘The Possibility of Practical Reason’ [to Dancy (2004), Mele (2004) and Hussain (2004)].” Philosophical Studies 121(3): 277–298.
Velleman, David J. 2005. “The Self as Narrator.” in Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays, edited by Joel Anderson and John Christman, pp. 56–76. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in Velleman (2006a, 203–223).
Velleman, David J. 2006a. Self to Self. Selected Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511498862.
Velleman, David J. 2006b. “Introduction.” in Self to Self. Selected Essays, pp. 1–15. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511498862.
Velleman, David J. 2006c. “A Brief Introduction to Kantian Ethics.” in Self to Self. Selected Essays, pp. 16–44. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511498862.
Velleman, David J. 2006d. “The Centered Self.” in Self to Self. Selected Essays, pp. 253–283. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511498862.
Velleman, David J. 2007a. Practical Reflection. The David Hume Series. Stanford, California: CSLI Publications. Reprint of Velleman (1989a).
Velleman, David J. 2007b. “Reply to Mackenzie (2007).” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 10(3): 283–290.
Velleman, David J. 2008a. “A Theory of Value.” Ethics 118: 410–436.
Velleman, David J. 2008b. “The Way of the Wanton.” in Practical Identity and Narrative Agency, edited by Catriona Mackenzie and Kim Atkins, pp. 169–192. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy n. 14. London: Routledge.
Velleman, David J. 2009. How We Get Along. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Velleman, David J. 2012a. “Comments on Fischer (2009).” Philosophical Studies 158(3): 515–521.
Velleman, David J. 2012b. “What Good is a Will?” in Action in Context, edited by Anton Leist, pp. 193–215. Berlin: de Gruyter. Reprinted in Vargas and Yaffe (2014, 83–100).
Velleman, David J. 2013. “Sociality and Solitude.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 16(3): 324–335.
Velleman, David J. 2014a. “Symposium on Velleman (2009): Responses to Critics [Clark (2014), Schapiro (2014) and D’Arms (2014)].” Abstracta – Linguagem, Mente e Ação special issue(7): 31–38.
Velleman, David J. 2014b. “Doables.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 17(1): 1–16.
Further References
Boghossian, Paul Artin. 2008. Content & Justification. Philosophical Papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199292103.001.0001.
Byrne, Alex and Hilbert, David R., eds. 1997. Readings on Colors. Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Clark, Philip. 2014. “Inescapability and the Analysis of Agency [on Velleman (2009)].” Abstracta – Linguagem, Mente e Ação special issue(7): 3–15.
D’Arms, Justin. 2014. “Velleman on Reacting and Valuing [on Velleman (2009)].” Abstracta – Linguagem, Mente e Ação special issue(7): 23–29.
Dancy, Jonathan. 2004. “On Knowing What One Is Doing [on Velleman (2000a)].” Philosophical Studies 121(3): 239–247.
Fischer, John Martin. 2009. Our Stories: Essays on Life, Death, and Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hussain, Nadeem J. Z. 2004. “ ‘The Guise of a Reason’ [on Velleman (2000a)].” Philosophical Studies 121(3): 263–275.
Mackenzie, Catriona. 2007. “Bare Personhood? Velleman on Selfhood.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 10(3): 263–281.
Mele, Alfred R. 2004. “Velleman on Action and Agency [on Velleman (2000a)].” Philosophical Studies 121(3): 249–261.
Schapiro, Tamar. 2014. “Velleman on the Work of Human Agency [on Velleman (2009)].” Abstracta – Linguagem, Mente e Ação special issue(7): 17–21.
Vargas, Manuel R. and Yaffe, Gideon, eds. 2014. Rational and Social Agency. The Philosophy of Michael Bratman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794515.001.0001.