Kadri Vihvelin (vihvelin)
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Bibliography
Vihvelin, Kadri. 1988. “The Modal Argument for Incompatibilism.” Philosophical Studies 53(2): 227–244, doi:10.1007/bf00354642.
Vihvelin, Kadri. 1995a. “Causes, Effects and Counterfactual Dependence.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73: 559–573.
Vihvelin, Kadri. 1995b. “Reply to Ekstrom (1995).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73: 579–581.
Vihvelin, Kadri. 2000a. “Libertarian Compatibilism.” in Philosophical Perspectives 14: Action and Freedom, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 139–166. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1111/0029-4624.34.s14.8.
Vihvelin, Kadri. 2000b. “Freedom, Foreknowledge, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30: 1–23.
Vihvelin, Kadri. 2000c. “A Defense of a Reliabilist Account of A Priori Knowledge.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81(1): 90–97.
Vihvelin, Kadri. 2003. “Arguments for Incompatibilism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2003/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/.
Vihvelin, Kadri. 2004. “Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account.” Philosophical Topics 32(1–2): 427–450, doi:10.5840/philtopics2004321/211.
Vihvelin, Kadri. 2007a. “Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, and Impossibilism.” in Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, edited by Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne, and Dean W. Zimmerman, pp. 303–318. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 10. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Vihvelin, Kadri. 2007b. “Arguments for Incompatibilism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2007/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/.
Vihvelin, Kadri. 2011a. “How to Think about the Free Will / Determinism Problem.” in Carving Nature at Its Joints. Natural Kinds in Metaphysics and Science, edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and Matthew H. Slater, pp. 313–340. Topics in Contemporary Philosophy n. 7. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262015936.003.0014.
Vihvelin, Kadri. 2011b. “Arguments for Incompatibilism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/.
Vihvelin, Kadri. 2013. Causes, Laws, and Free Will. Why Determinism Doesn’t Matter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199795185.001.0001.
Vihvelin, Kadri. 2017. “Arguments for Incompatibilism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/.
Vihvelin, Kadri. 2022. “Arguments for Incompatibilism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/.
Further References
Ekstrom, Laura Waddell. 1995. “Causes and Nested Counterfactuals.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73: 574–578.